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Preface and acknowledgements
Via a Master’s thesis on socially responsible business and a report on
illegal bingo in Amsterdam, I ended up in crime. Kees Schuyt, who su-
pervised my Master’s thesis, asked me to assist Marion van San with her
study on ‘crime and criminalisation of immigrant youth in Belgium’. I
then conducted commercial policy research at Regioplan and tried to
mend my ways by researching the transnational orientations of migrants
as part of a project at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. But, as it
often goes in crime, I recidivated. During the Rotterdam project I wrote
a PhD research proposal about illegal residence and crime in the Nether-
lands and Belgium. On the basis of that proposal I was accepted as a
PhD candidate at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research
(ASSR) at the University of Amsterdam. Although that international
comparison turned out to be unattainable, given time limitations, I be-
lieve my study gives a rich analysis of the Dutch situation – richer than I
initially considered possible.
Eventually it grew into more than a study of crime. In this book I also
go into other forms of rule transgression and observance that are impor-
tant for public safety, particularly for its more subjective aspects such as
fear of crime. Further, I became interested in the spatial component of
my research problem: In what type of neighbourhoods do illegal mi-
grants live, and why? To what extent and under what conditions does the
presence of these migrants have positive or negative consequences for
the safety and viability of the neighbourhoods concerned? Finally, I be-
came interested in the possibility that migration and illegal residence
might bring about new care arrangements for the poor in countries of
destination like the Netherlands. At some point I wanted to bring that
thought, which I have taken from Bram de Swaan, to the centre of my
research topic. My supervisor, Godfried Engbersen, did not think this
was a good idea, so I decided to serve it as a dessert in the section ‘im-
plications for policy’ in the concluding chapter. (Researching is also ne-
gotiating.) I hope the study is of interest to a broad audience in the Neth-
erlands and elsewhere.
Doing a PhD is generally seen as a solo enterprise. In that respect I
was pleasantly surprised. At the ASSR I met many other PhD students
and within that research school smaller sub-schools continually emerged
with whom I could swim along in various ways. I followed and organised
courses with them, taught, formed reading and PhD groups and orga-
nised activities with them such as a conference about the municipal elec-
tions. With some of my PhD colleagues I regularly had a sandwich or a
beer; with others I went skiing or shared activities like keeping fit or
salsa dancing. I would like to thank the following people in particular
for making the past few years more interesting and fun than they would
otherwise have been: Floris Noordhoff, Josien de Klerk, Gerben
Korthouwer, Ward Berenschot, Corina Hendriks, Eelke Heemskerk,
Deasy Simandjuntak, Hester Houwing, Daniel Reijer, Peter van der
Graaff, Sjoukje Botman, Christian Bröer, Justus Uitermark, Jill Alpes
and Imrat Verhoeven. Furthermore, I would like to thank staff members
José Komen, Hans Sonneveld, Miriam May, Teun Bijvoet, Anneke Dam-
mers and Hermance Mettrop. During my research they made great ef-
forts behind the scenes, to the benefit of the research, as did the women
and men of the faculty library.
In my own research I sought out cooperation both inside and outside
the ASSR. In recent years I have worked and written with the following
people: Godfried Engbersen, Marion van San, Wim Bernasco, Erik Snel,
Jan de Boom, Joanne van der Leun and Jack Burgers. My experience with
them all was stimulating and I would like to warmly thank them.
I am grateful to IMISCOE for giving me the opportunity to publish
this book in the IMISCOE-AUP Dissertation Series. Several other insti-
tutions and individuals have contributed to my study, financially or
otherwise. I would like to express my gratitude in particular to the Min-
istry of Housing, the Ministry of Justice, the research programme Politie
en Wetenschap (‘Police and Science’), the Central Bureau for Statistics,
the Dutch police forces, the Taakorganisatie Vreemdelingen Zorg (‘Task-
Organisation Alien Care’), staff members of the Immigration and Natur-
alisation Service (particularly the research department INDIAC), the
Aliens’ Detention department at Tilburg prison, editorial staff and refer-
ees of the journals Urban Studies, The Netherlands’ Journal of Social
Sciences, Mens & Maatschappij, Sociologie,Migrantenstudies, the municipa-
lities of Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam (Simon Bontekoning),
researchers of the European IMISCOE network, ‘my’ sociology students
at the University of Amsterdam, the Landelijk Ongedocumenteerden
Steunpunt (‘National Support Point for the Undocumented’) (Rian
Ederveen), residents of the Bospolder-Tussendijken neighbourhood in
the city of Rotterdam and the De Schilderswijk neighbourhood in the
city of The Hague and various employees of local housing corporations
and neighbourhood centres. I would like to thank Johan Goudsblom for
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his comments regarding Chapters 1 and 7. Zoe Goldstein and Rowan
Hewison corrected my English, for which I am grateful. Rowan also po-
lished the manuscript before publication.
I would like to pause specifically to remember the migrants who have
cooperated with this research, for which I am very grateful. They may
have had little to gain from it. I have tried to describe their experiences
and life stories conscientiously.
The fellow craftsman I have worked with most over the last few years,
and from whom I have certainly learned most, is Godfried Engbersen.
For a PhD student it must be a great privilege to receive a call from your
supervisor on a Monday morning, checking whether you might be back
from your holidays. Sometimes I had to reach a compromise, but there
was always more than enough space for my own contribution. The coop-
eration was stimulating and pleasant, and if that did not happen to be
the case on one occasion, we solved it very well. Many thanks.
The communis opinio wants us to keep work and private matters sepa-
rate, but of course they have influenced each other, usually in a positive
sense: when things were going well privately, they had a favourable effect
on my work, and vice versa. And when they did not go so well, either
privately or at work – or both – fortunately my dear friends, family (Ton,
Ineke, Sander, thank you), music pals, sports pals and dance pals were
there for me too.
Dear Tessa, three years ago we first danced with each other. That was
no crime, it was love!
Underlying publications
This book is an edited version of the dissertation I defended at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam in December 2007. It was assessed by a commit-
tee made up of Godfried Engbersen (Full Professor in Sociology at the
Erasmus University Rotterdam), Catrien Bijleveld (Full Professor in
Criminology at the Vrije University Amsterdam), Jack Burgers (Full Pro-
fessor in Urban Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam), Jan-
Willem Duyvendak (Full Professor in Sociology at the University of Am-
sterdam), Sako Musterd (Full Professor in Human Geography at the
University of Amsterdam), Jan Rath (Full Professor in Sociology and Mi-
gration Studies at the University of Amsterdam) and Bram de Swaan
(Emeritus Professor in Sociology at the University of Amsterdam). In
the summer of 2008 the manuscript was revised on the basis of very
valuable feedback from the IMISCOE Editorial Committee.
Chapter 2 is a somewhat adapted version of A. Leerkes, G. Engbersen
and M. Van San (2007) ‘Shadow Places. Patterns of Spatial Concentra-
tion and Incorporation of Irregular Immigrants in the Netherlands’, Ur-
ban Studies, 44 (8): 1491-1516. A Dutch version was published as A.
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Chapter 3 is an English adaptation of A. Leerkes and W. Bernasco
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168-204. A shorter and adapted version has been submitted to Urban
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Chapter 4 is a revised and somewhat more detailed version of A.
Leerkes (2004) ‘Embedded Crimes. On the overlapping patterns of de-
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Netherlands’ Journal of Social Sciences, 40 (1): 3-23.
Chapter 5 is an English version of A. Leerkes (2007) ‘“I am just trying
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litie en Wetenschap / Elsevier.
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1 Introduction
Brief outline of the research problem
Since the 1970s the Netherlands and other Western1 countries have in-
creasingly implemented restrictive immigration policies for people from
non-Western countries. At present such persons have to meet numerous
conditions if they want to live in or merely visit Western countries. Many
Western countries have developed policies intended to discourage such
migrants from settling without government consent. The Netherlands
seeks to accomplish this to a large degree by systematically excluding
them from formal institutions such as the official labour market, social
security and public housing (Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001). Spain
and Greece, which previously did not set out to make illegal residence
unattractive (and frequently even legalised segments of their illegal po-
pulation), have recently begun adopting or proposing additional restric-
tive measures (Anderson 2000; Kyle & Siracusa 2005).
As a result, in recent decades the new social figure of the ‘illegal mi-
grant’ has proliferated in the Western world. Although there were illegal
migrants before the 1970s, particularly in the United States (Ngai 2004),
their number appears to have increased in spite of (and indeed owing to)
current restrictive immigration politics (Doomernik 2001). Moreover,
under the influence of these policies, illegal migrants have come to occu-
py a more clearly identifiable social position in comparison to legally
residing inhabitants, including migrants with permission to remain.
From a sociological perspective illegal migrants can increasingly be
viewed as a class, a set of people with a more or less comparable social
position (Lenski 1994; Bourdieu 1990: 59). In that capacity the phenom-
enon deserves specific social scientific study (cf. Engbersen 1997).
The extent of illegal residence, while modest, is significant. In the
Netherlands, a country of some 16 million registered inhabitants and
1.6 million first-generation immigrants, approximately 1 per cent of the
population was estimated to be illegal during the research period (1997-
2005) (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2004).2 Hence, about one in
ten first-generation migrants appears to be illegal. The phenomenon is
concentrated in certain agricultural areas and deprived urban neighbour-
hoods. In some urban neighbourhoods the figure is probably more like
6 to 8 per cent (Leerkes et al. 2004). It is assumed that the proportion
may be greater in countries that have a larger informal economy than the
Netherlands. Estimates of illegal residence in the United States range
from 3.4 million (Espenshade 1995) to 9 million (Martin 2004: 60), or
1.5 to 3.0 per cent of the total population, while in Italy, which only re-
cently became a country of immigration, there are proportionally fewer
immigrants than in the Netherlands though a greater percentage of
them is illegal (Castles & Miller 2003: 83).3 Substantial numbers of ille-
gal migrants are also present in transit countries such as Turkey, Russia,
Mexico and Malaysia (Schoenhardt 2001; Bade 2004).
Illegal migrants in the Netherlands originate from more than 200
countries. The largest groups are Turks, Moroccans, Algerians and Suri-
namese followed by a substantial number from Eastern and Central
Europe, many of whom came to the Netherlands on tourist visas and
overstayed, while others crossed the border illegally or became illegal
migrants when they were refused refugee status (Burgers and Engber-
sen 1999; Staring 2001). Refused asylum seekers are estimated to con-
stitute 15 per cent of the illegal population in the Netherlands (De Boom
et al. 2006).
Social scientists have begun to wonder how such sizable groups can
exist in contemporary societies despite the legal prohibition on their pre-
sence. Some obvious further questions bear upon the social conse-
quences of illegal residence for the countries of destination. For exam-
ple, what are the consequences for the labour market, economic
development or public health? This study addresses the question of the
extent to which the state’s efforts to implement the social exclusion of –
in its view – unwanted migrants has consequences for public safety, with
reference in particular to the neighbourhoods where illegal residence
tends to become spatially concentrated.
There are two main reasons for taking up the relationship between
illegal migration and public safety as a theme. First, the state’s drive to-
wards social exclusion makes it harder for unwanted migrants to mi-
grate in a regular way. Migrants who nonetheless manage to settle have
limited conventional livelihood opportunities, particularly in a country
like the Netherlands with its policy of excluding such migrants from for-
mal institutions. It is conceivable that this drive towards social exclusion
encourages them to become involved in alternative and illegal means of
migration and subsistence. Second, it might be assumed that the precar-
ious social position of illegal migrants constitutes, at the same time, an
impediment to rule transgression; might not the illegal residence status
contribute to social pressure to comply with rules as much as possible,
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in order to minimise the chances of police contacts and, consequently,
detention and expulsion?
Here, then, in a few brief sentences, one has the research problem, or
issue, that this study tries to answer. The book encompasses five sub-
studies, the results of which were initially reported in four separate arti-
cles and one – at the time of writing – unpublished paper. All five pieces
have been edited for publication in this book, but their basic structure
was preserved for reasons of time and efficiency. As a consequence, this
introductory chapter, which discusses aspects that are often spread over
several chapters, is longer than is the rule in social science dissertations.
It elaborates on the research problem of the study in the light of previous
research in the field and provides an explanation of immigration policy
in the Netherlands, as well as a number of other characteristics of Dutch
society that are required for a good understanding of the book. It also
addresses the relevance of this study for other destination countries in
Europe and North America, while some ethical aspects of studying ille-
gal residence in relation to public safety are also discussed. The chapter
ends with a brief explanation of why this dissertation was based on sub-
studies and a brief outline of the five sub-studies and the data sources on
which they were based. Chapter 8 summarises the main conclusions of
the study as a whole.
Previous research and the contribution of the study
Research on illegal migration and crime
Research on the relationship between migration and crime has a long
tradition in the social sciences, particularly in the United States (Thomas
& Znaniecki 1918; Shaw & McKay 1942). Research is currently being
carried out in several countries (Tonry 1997; De Haan-Marshall 1997;
Waters 1999; Van San & Leerkes 2001). The taboo surrounding such
research in social scientific circles after the Second World War was bro-
ken in the Netherlands during the 1970s, although it has remained a
sensitive topic.4
Dutch researchers have always focused on groups that the police and
wider society associated with crime at that particular time.5 Initially, this
concerned mostly Indonesian youth from the Moluccas (Buikhuisen &
Timmermans 1971) and drug dealers of Creole Surinamese origin (Van
Amersfoort & Biervliet 1977). Attention later shifted to second-genera-
tion Moroccans and Antilleans (Van Gemert 1998; Van San 1998) and
attention is now being paid to the latest migration flows, in particular
from Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (Snel et al. 2000; Kromh-
out & Van San 2003; De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes 2006).
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Almost all national and international criminological research pertains
to migrant groups with legal residence. In the Netherlands, particularly,
this has changed since the mid-1990s. In 1995 an exploratory study was
published (Engbersen, Van der Leun & Willems 1995) in which re-
searchers described the – to quote the study’s subtitle – ‘interweaving of
illegality and crime’, based on police data for Rotterdam. This publica-
tion was the prelude to an extensive and more encompassing study of
the social position of illegal migrants in the Netherlands, paying special
attention to the situation in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht (Bur-
gers & Engbersen 1999; Engbersen 1999; Staring 2001; Engbersen et
al. 2002; Van der Leun 2003). In this research programme crime re-
mained a central topic, alongside other sociological themes such as la-
bour, housing and health care.
Outside the Netherlands research on the relation between illegality
and criminality was and remains scarce (exceptions are: Wolf 1988; Sca-
lia 1996, 2002; McDonald 1997; Alt 1999; Van Meeteren, Van San &
Engbersen 2008), though in a number of studies the topic is addressed
indirectly (Mahler 1995; Grabosky & Smith 2001).6 Foreign research
mostly focuses on illegal residence in connection with labour (see for
instance Cornelius et al. 2004). Criminologists are mostly occupied with
human smuggling and with victimisation within specific groups of ille-
gal migrants after settlement, predominantly in connection with the traf-
ficking of women (cf. Goodey 2003).
When I started this study in 2003 the interest in illegal residence
within Dutch sociology had already led to some theory formation about
the relationship between illegality and crime. On the one hand, it was
assumed that illegal residence status curbs criminality (see Van der
Leun 2003); illegal migrants were assumed to have greater reason to
shun police contacts than legally resident inhabitants because of the risk
of expulsion. There were, however, no concrete empirical indications for
this ‘deterrence thesis’, except for the broad observation that a minority
of all apprehended illegal migrants had police contacts because of
crimes, while the ones who did were suspected of less serious crimes
than criminally involved immigrants with legal residence status (Engber-
sen & Van der Leun 2001: 58-59).
On the other hand, there were indications that such criminality as did
occur was a response to the sometimes very marginal social position of
specific groups of illegal migrants. Thus it was proposed that some of
them commit ‘survival crime’, supposedly as a result of their failure to
achieve an ‘integrated career’ (Engbersen & Van der Leun 1995: 254).
This latter supposition was known as the ‘marginalisation thesis’.
The researchers stressed that not all immigrants who lacked a resi-
dence permit had an equally marginal position. The observed patterns
pointed to the existence of a ‘differential opportunity structure’ (cf. Clo-
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ward & Ohlin 1960) with three dimensions, defined by the degree of
access to: (i) formal institutions of the welfare state such as the formal
labour market and social security, (ii) informal institutions like the infor-
mal economy and a network of family, friends and acquaintances in the
Netherlands and (iii) criminal circuits. Involvement in crime would
mostly develop in groups with little or no access to formal and informal
institutions. Possible access to criminal institutions would bring a num-
ber of somewhat more organised offences, such as involvement in the
drug trade, within the reach of illegal migrants.
These theoretical suppositions rested on three important empirical
findings. First, substantial differences were observed according to na-
tionality. In Rotterdam, no more than 4 per cent of illegal Turkish immi-
grants apprehended turned out to have come into contact with the police
because of criminal activity. For Eastern Europeans, Algerians and Mor-
occans these percentages were 32, 54 and 65, respectively (Engbersen &
Van der Leun 1995). On the basis of the qualitative fieldwork, this varia-
tion was attributed to differences rooted in nationality with respect to
social and particularly ethnic ties. In some publications these ties are
referred to as ‘relational embeddedness’ or ‘social capital’.
It became apparent that many illegal migrants from Turkey were sup-
ported by established Turkish migrant communities in the Netherlands.
The established Turks increased access to formal institutions in informal
ways, for instance, by lending out health insurance cards, as well as to
informal institutions, for instance, by arranging informal work in Turk-
ish shops. To a great extent, the illegal migration of Turks had the char-
acteristics of directed chain migration; many newcomers turned out to
know beforehand where they were going to reside and possibly where
they would work (Staring 2001). Among groups receiving less support
from established countrymen – such as asylum seekers who have ex-
hausted all legal remedies as well as ‘pioneers’ from Eastern Europe –
there was a greater occurrence of improvised migration patterns; migration
‘on the off chance’.
Among North African illegal migrants, crime turned out to be rela-
tively high, even though there are many established Moroccans in the
Netherlands. The researchers attributed this apparent discrepancy to the
fragmented nature of the Moroccan migrant community, which they as-
sumed diminished its potential as a source of social capital (cf. Van Ge-
mert 1998). In addition, there turned out to be life chances in the lower
echelons of the Rotterdam drug circuits for North African illegal mi-
grants to the degree that they speak French: in the 1990s there was a
lively street trade in the harbour city for the benefit of French and Bel-
gian ‘drug tourists’. They were (and to a lesser degree still are) drawn by
the favourable price-quality relationship of hard drugs. In the illegal
economy too, the Netherlands is Europe’s ‘mainport’ (Zaitch 2002).
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The second empirical observation was also gathered during fieldwork
in Rotterdam (Burgers & Engbersen 1999). The researchers interviewed
165 illegal migrants and observed that respondents with families and
permanent residence in the Netherlands reported involvement in crime
less frequently than did homeless illegal migrants who lacked kin in the
Netherlands (Burgers & Engbersen 1999: 255).
The third empirical observation was based on police data concerning
all illegal migrants apprehended in the Netherlands between 1997 and
2000. While in 1997 suspicions of minor crimes – crimes punishable
with less than four years of imprisonment7 – accounted for 18.5 per cent
of apprehensions, this percentage had grown to 28.2 by 2000 (Engber-
sen et al. 2002). In the same period, the Dutch government made in-
creasing efforts to make illegal residence unattractive (see below in the
section on the rise of internal border control), tightening the exclusion
from formal institutions of migrants without residence permits.
Housing and spatial spreading
In the 1990s Burgers (1998), in particular, delved into the subject of the
housing situation among illegal migrants. On the basis of fieldwork in
Rotterdam and with the help of Mahler’s (1995) insights for the US, Bur-
gers pointed to the existence of ‘parallel housing markets’ in Dutch
neighbourhoods, i.e. informal markets that show much similarity to the
formal housing market. Rents in rent-controlled social housing in the
Netherlands tend to be below market prices because of rental price reg-
ulation. This makes it easier for legal residents to offer cheap sublets of
their apartments (or sections thereof) to family or acquaintances who
happen to be illegal migrants, or to offer them free accommodation in
the apartment altogether. At the same time, Burgers found a commer-
cial, more private housing sector where illegal migrants could find high-
er priced accommodation.
Using police data, Van der Leun (2003: 71) conducted an exploratory
quantitative study of the spatial concentration of illegal residence in Rot-
terdam. The registered residential addresses of apprehended illegal mi-
grants suggested a substantial over-representation in deprived neigh-
bourhoods. It turned out that more than 60 per cent of the registered
addresses were located in three areas, or boroughs, whereas only a third
of the legal urban population lived in these three areas. Van der Leun
explained this spatial concentration as reflecting the presence of legally
resident immigrant families as well as the labour opportunities for mi-
grants lacking a residence permit in these neighbourhoods. A number
of international studies provided indications about the determinants of
residential patterns among illegal migrants (Chavez 1992; Miller 1995;
Bade 2003; Cornelius 2005).
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The study’s contribution
Previous research had yielded new insights into the relationship be-
tween illegal residence and crime, but it had its limitations. To begin
with, hardly any illegal migrants who had committed crimes had been
spoken to; respondents in Rotterdam reported their own involvement in
crime on the basis of a structured questionnaire, but they were not inter-
viewed about the crimes they had committed. As a consequence, it was
unclear how criminal illegal migrants had responded to the conditions
they encountered in their country of destination, what they had been
trying to achieve by their crimes and to what extent criminal careers de-
veloped only after settlement in the Netherlands. There was a clear lack
of studies into the role of agency played by people within these groups.
(This aspect is given more prominence in Chapter 5).
In this study, crime patterns among illegal migrants have been com-
pared systematically for the first time to crime patterns in other social
groups, including comparable migrant groups with legal residence
(Chapter 4). This made it possible to discover whether previous research
had overestimated the importance of illegal residence status in explain-
ing crime patterns. Furthermore, additional theoretical insights from
criminology were used, particularly from criminological studies of crime
among legal migrants. For instance, more attention is paid here to cul-
tural aspects of offending, as well as to the involvement of illegal mi-
grants in criminal migration and cross-border crime, where the commit-
ting of crimes in the destination country, or at the border, is a motive for
migration (see particularly Chapters 5 and 6). This study also pays more
attention to illegal residence as a result rather than a determinant or
condition of criminal involvement, for example, when the state with-
draws the resident permit of an immigrant because he or she has been
convicted of crimes (this aspect is given prominence in Chapter 6).
As has been said, qualitative sub-studies and exploratory research con-
stituted the basis of existing scientific knowledge regarding the spatial
distribution of illegal migrants and its determinants. This aspect was
researched systematically for the first time in this study (Chapter 2).
Further, building upon this spatial perspective, this study was the first to
explore the consequences of the concentrated presence of illegal mi-
grants in certain urban environments for local neighbourhood safety
and what could be termed liveability (Chapter 3). Concerning the latter it
should be mentioned that there was no research into the relationship
between illegal residence and patterns of transgression of (or compli-
ance with) unwritten social rules in public space, or into the more subjec-
tive aspects of safety among urban residents in neighbourhoods where
illegal residence is concentrated, such as fear of crime.
In sum, this study intends to contribute to what Merton (1968) called
‘theories of the middle range’, i.e. theories that aim to bridge the gap
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between abstract theorising and empirical evidence. In particular, it in-
tends to contribute to substantive theory on the terrain of migration,
crime and public safety. It does so by: (1) critically testing and developing
existing ideas about the relationship between restrictive immigration
policies and crime involvement among migrants; (2) broadening the re-
search from a focus on crime involvement among illegal migrants to an
analysis of illegal residence in relation to objective and subjective notions
of public safety; (3) examining the spatial aspects of illegal residence and
public safety; and (4) paying more attention to illegal residence as a re-
sult rather than a determinant or condition of crime involvement (i.e.
when the state withdraws a residence permit because of crimes com-
mitted by its holder).
Specification of the research questions
International inequality and international migration
International migration, in general, and illegal migration, in particular,
involves substantial but relatively limited and selective groups. Although
the unequal distribution of wealth and security – the World Bank (2006)
estimates no fewer than two billion people in the world earn less than
two dollars a day – creates a vast potential for international migration,
there are several factors limiting the number of international migrants
to a relatively modest fraction of 2 to 3 per cent of the global population
(Castles & Miller 2003: 5; Cornelius et al. 2004: 3). Even though interna-
tional migrants are now thought to represent about 10 per cent of the
population in Western countries (Cornelius et al. 2004: 3), the magni-
tude of international migration remains limited when compared, for in-
stance, to domestic migration.8
The recent migration literature has identified various factors that limit
the extent of international migration (see for instance Faist 2000; Mas-
sey et al. 2005). It is pointed out, for example, that long distance migra-
tion is relatively expensive and risky. The poorest people on the planet
simply cannot afford international migration, although members of
households sometimes pool their resources to facilitate the migration of
a productive family member (Stark 1995; Taylor 1999). Social reasons
also contribute to ‘distance deterrence’ (Molho 1995); the chances of mi-
gration decrease with the distance to be travelled. On the one hand, dis-
tance deterrence arises because most people do not want to leave home
(or at least not to go far from it) for very long; in many cases staying put
increases the chances of social acceptance and integration within the fa-
mily and society at large (Fischer, Martin & Straubhaar 1997). On the
other hand, those who want to leave cannot always establish themselves
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elsewhere, even if they have the money to travel. The social and cultural
ties (family ties, economic ties, correspondences in language, etc.) be-
tween potential migrants and earlier immigrants who are established in
their countries of destination facilitate migration. Admittedly, such ties
are on the increase overall, but to the smallest degree of all for the poor-
est people on the planet. Hence, the poorest countries do not supply the
most emigrants and most international migrants are not among the
poorest; most tend to be the ‘top dogs among the underdogs’. (This was
probably less true for labour migrants who were recruited in Mediterra-
nean countries during the 1950s and 1960s; it is also less the case for
chain migrants.)9 Accordingly, the relationship between income and mi-
gration is not linear: migration initially increases when incomes in the
country of origin rise, only to decrease after a certain point. In the migra-
tion literature this phenomenon is known as the ‘migration hump’ (Mar-
tin 1993; Martin & Taylor 2001).
The increased regulation of international migration contributes to the
select nature of international migration even further (also see Carling
2002; Turner 2007). I will turn to this factor now, concentrating on the
Dutch case and first giving a brief historical perspective.
Background to Dutch immigration policy
The Netherlands is a prosperous country that has attracted many mi-
grants throughout the centuries. In large measure the country owes its
Golden Age in the seventeenth century to newcomers, both poor mi-
grant labourers and affluent aliens who often settled in the relatively tol-
erant Dutch cities for religious reasons. Nonetheless, the reception of
newcomers was never entirely positive. In Amsterdam, well-to-do aliens,
such as the French Huguenots, could count on favourable conditions of
settlement (Lucassen & Penninx 1997), while newcomers who were un-
able to support themselves, or who caused trouble, were often sent away
(De Swaan 1988). Delinquent exiles risked having a cut in one of their
cheeks so they could be identified more easily in the case of recidivism
(Spierenburg 1995), and for a long time ‘gypsies’ were forbidden to re-
side in the Netherlands because they were considered thieves (Lucassen
& Penninx 1997).
When Dutch cities were forced to give up their leading world position
to England and France and, somewhat later, the United States, immigra-
tion receded and a substantial emigration to the New World developed.
This situation changed only in the second half of the twentieth century,
when the Netherlands was becoming increasingly industrialised and the
economy expanded considerably.10 Migrant labourers were recruited in
various economic sectors during the second half of the 1950s and 1960s
in particular, predominantly from countries around the Mediterranean
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(Italy, Spain, Portugal, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco and Turkey). This
occurred in part with the help of the Dutch government. Unskilled em-
ployees were at that time very welcome, given the supply scarcity at the
bottom of the labour market.
After the global oil crisis in 1973 more and more voices were heard
arguing for a more restrictive immigration policy with regard to poorer
countries. A reduction in the number of non-Western newcomers was
then deemed necessary in order to protect the welfare state in the light
of rising unemployment figures. Aside from this, some felt such a re-
duction was required to make possible the integration of those who had
arrived in previous immigration flows that, as became increasingly re-
cognised in the 1980s, had led to the formation of permanent ethnic
minorities (Bade 2004).11 More recently there has also been concern
that continuing immigration, in particular from Arab countries, might
conflict with established ‘cultural’ institutions and mores, such as equal-
ity between the sexes, gay rights and the separation between religion and
the state (Fortuyn 2001).
In spite of the sometimes striking and revealing historical analogies
with regard to migration control, there are also significant differences
between contemporary immigration policy and previous forms of migra-
tion regulation. For instance, the selection of desired immigrants is now
often made beforehand (Wray 2006). A further difference is that politi-
cal elites could exert much more control over emigration in the past;
many people were not free ‘subjects’, and could not simply leave if they
wanted to (Torpey 1999).12 Additionally, European unification took
shape in the second half of the twentieth century and, as a consequence,
Dutch immigration policy became more entangled with practices in
other Western European states. As part of this same development, Dutch
immigration policy became more liberal with respect to the settlement
of EU citizens. Since 1968 citizens of EU member states cannot, in prin-
ciple, be refused entry to the Netherlands (Lucassen & Penninx 1997).
They are now entitled to look for a job without requiring a special work
permit. Hence, in general Dutch (and EU) immigration policy should be
qualified as selectively restrictive.
In the 1980s and 1990s several measures were taken in the Nether-
lands to curb migration from poorer countries. For instance, the Alien
Labour Law, which regulates the employment of foreigners in the labour
market, was passed in 1995 and subsequently implemented. It stipulates
that migrant labourers are entitled to a residence permit only if there is a
shortage of employees from what are called EER countries, i.e. member
states of the European Union, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Re-
strictive measures have been taken with respect to family formation and
unification as well. Nowadays, since the modification of the Vreemdelin-
genbesluit 2000 (Aliens Resolution 2000), Dutch residents are required
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to have steady employment, must be at least 21 years old and need to
earn at least 120 per cent of the minimum wage if they want to bring a
foreign partner over. The asylum policy, too, has been sharpened several
times.13
Tourists from countries with a visa obligation have to demonstrate
sufficient means of support, or have to find a resident of the Netherlands
or another Schengen country who has sufficient means to invite them. A
tourist visa can be refused if there is any suspicion of an intention to
settle illegally. The number of countries with a visa obligation has been
augmented several times, with Surinam and Turkey (1980) and North
African countries (1983) for instance. The visa policy with regard to
what were at the time future member states of the European Union is
again an exception to this rule. Since 1994 the European Union has ex-
perienced three enlargements. As a result, the number of member states
has more than doubled in twelve years. In two rounds, in 2004 and
2007, mostly relatively poor countries from Central and Eastern Europe
were incorporated. As a prelude, the visa obligation for Poland was
dropped in the early 1990s, while for Bulgaria and Romania this oc-
curred in 2001.
The rise of internal border control
Because of diminishing control over external borders owing to European
integration, and because a growing number of migrants ended up set-
tling without government consent, the Netherlands has increasingly
started to protect its ‘internal borders’. Internal border control consists
of a wide array of policy measures within state territory and can be con-
trasted with external border controls such as visa requirements and bor-
der policing (Broeders & Engbersen 2007; Guiraudon & Lahav 2007;
Lahav & Guiraudon 2000; Van der Leun 2006; Zolberg 2003).
For this study I find it useful to make an analytical distinction between
two types of internal border control in particular, although they are
sometimes difficult to separate in practice. I propose to call the first type
of internal border control ‘secondary territorial exclusion’. It is directed
at tracing and expelling the ‘residue’ of those immigrants who are un-
wanted by the state, but who have circumvented the primary external
border controls. (The term residue is also appropriate because, as was
explained in the section on international inequality and migration, most
potential migrants are immobile because of economic and other factors).
I will call the second type of internal border control ‘institutional exclu-
sion’, involving all measures aimed at systematically excluding illegal
migrants from important institutions of the welfare state, such as the
formal labour market, the housing market, health care and social secu-
rity. It is the combination of external border control and both types of
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internal border control that determines, to a large extent, what it means,
potentially, to have ‘illegal residence status’.
During the 1990s the Dutch government focused on intensifying the
second type of internal border control. Policy in this area began with the
advisory report of the Zeevalking Committee, which advised the govern-
ment on illegal employment in 1991. In the same year the state blocked
illegal migrants’ access to the formal labour market by imposing sanc-
tions on employers and by establishing a protective ring of documentary
requirements around the formal labour market. It became impossible
for illegal migrants to obtain a tax number and a social security number,
which had serious repercussions for their labour market position (Van
der Leun & Kloosterman 2006; Broeders & Engbersen 2007).
A few years later the state took steps to exclude illegal migrants from
public services (welfare, social security, health care, education, public
housing). In 1998, the Linking Act came into force (Van der Leun
2003); from then on, only immigrants with residence permits could ob-
tain social security and other social benefits. It also facilitated the exclu-
sion of illegal migrants from all houses and apartments for which a
housing permit is required.14 The law is known as the Koppelingswet
(‘Linking Act’) because it permits immigration service registration files,
census bureau data, tax identification data and social security data to be
cross-checked in order to verify the validity of a person’s residence and
work status.
The legislative changes to exclude illegal migrants from formal insti-
tutions were supported by major administrative operations. In 1995 a
central computerised database, known as the VAS (Vreemdelingen Ad-
ministratie Systeem or ‘Foreigner Administration System’), containing
data on all foreigners residing in the Netherlands came into existence.
Along with police units, several other government services – such as wel-
fare departments – have access to the VAS so that they can determine
whether their clients are lawfully residing in the Netherlands and are
thus entitled to certain services or benefits. Housing corporations also
have to check with the municipality whether their clients have a resi-
dence permit and are thus entitled to rent their apartments (this repre-
sents an interesting case of what Garland (2001: 124) has called ‘respon-
sibilisation strategies’, in which state agencies prompt action by non-
state organisations and actors). The government has also increasingly
allocated resources to enforce sanctions against employers who hire ille-
gal migrants informally: between 1997 and 2003 the annual budget of
the Labour Inspectorate rose by 44 per cent. While the institutional ex-
clusion of illegal migrants is not always enforced to the letter of the law
because professionals sometimes resist such measures (Van der Leun
2003), there is no doubt that illegal migrants’ access to the formal labour
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market, housing market, social security and health care was radically re-
duced over the course of the 1990s.
The Dutch government also took a number of measures to intensify
the other type of internal border control, i.e. secondary territorial exclu-
sion. In 1994 the Wet op de Identificatieplicht (‘Law on Identification
Obligation’) was introduced, which stipulated that people must be able
to identify themselves in the case of crimes and misdemeanours, or
whenever there is concrete suspicion of illegal residence as well as in a
place of employment (the latter requirement also facilitated the institu-
tional exclusion of illegal migrants from the labour market). Practices of
secondary territorial exclusion were intensified around the turn of the
century; for instance, after the implementation of the Aliens Act 2000,
in April 2001 a ‘reasonable presumption of illegal residence’ became
sufficient grounds to demand identification, rather than a ‘concrete sus-
picion’. After the turn of the century, the police also became more active
in tracing illegal migrants in places other than at work. Particularly in
the big cities, specialised teams were increasingly formed to arrest those
illegal migrants heavily involved in crime (particularly in the Amsterdam
area) and to target illegal ‘doss houses’, i.e. houses where between eight
and twenty people, often illegal migrants, were renting a bed or a room
(see Chapters 3 and 6).
Most recently, the Dutch state is trying to develop an effective policy of
expulsion as a final step towards the general objective of a restrictive
illegal immigrant policy (ACVZ 2002; Minderhoud 2004). In spite of
this, no more than half of all apprehended illegal migrants are actually
effectively repatriated (Engbersen et al. 2002; Van Kalmthout & Van
Leeuwen 2004). Expulsions fail in part because the illegal migrant can-
not leave, because he or she is stateless or because the country of origin
does not grant a laissez passer (travel document for return). It may also be
that the migrant does not want to return because of a lack of prospects in
his or her country of origin, migration debts and the like. Illegal mi-
grants can also hamper expulsion by concealing their identity.
This raises the question of what consequences ‘illegal stayers’ – illegal
migrants who do not leave or who come to the Netherlands in spite of an
active policy of the discouragement of international migration, in gener-
al, and illegal residence, in particular, – experience from, and attach to,
an immigration policy that, on the one hand, reduces residence opportu-
nities and life chances for illegal migrants but on the other is unable to
realise an effective policy of expulsion. Moreover, in studying this group,
we should keep in mind that illegal migrants constitute a relatively small
and privileged few out of a far greater number of potential international
migrants who are less mobile.
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A closed welfare state and a differentiated, open-market society
While the Netherlands can be typified as being a relatively closed welfare
state it is simultaneously a differentiated market society which contri-
butes greatly to international flows of goods and people. As the latter
features are essential for a clear understanding of this study, I will briefly
describe and enumerate them in the following section.
First, the social structure in the Netherlands is marked by a high de-
gree of economic, ethnic and cultural differentiation. The Dutch Cen-
traal Bureau voor de Statistiek (‘Bureau for Statistics’ or CBS) finds it
useful to distinguish more than a thousand economic sectors. These sec-
tors provide labour opportunities in more than a hundred ‘lower’ and
‘higher’ categories of professions. Diversity according to ethnic back-
ground is also considerable. At present, almost one in five inhabitants
(19 per cent) was born abroad or has at least one parent who was born
outside of the Netherlands. Approximately one in ten inhabitants has a
foreign nationality, possibly in addition to Dutch nationality, and more
than 6 per cent of the population was born in a non-Western country.
There are 56 foreign nationalities whose representation in the popula-
tion exceeds 4,000 persons (Blom et al. 2005).
Economic differentiation and ethnic heterogeneity are not unrelated.
Partly because of its history as a trading nation and colonial power, the
Netherlands participates intensively in a market society that increasingly
spans the entire globe. Throughout its history the Netherlands has been
characterised by involvement in a very extensive international traffic of
goods, ideas and people. In 2005 the gross domestic product amounted
to 505 billion euros. In the same year no less than 250 billion euros in
goods and 68 billion euros in services were imported, including 139 bil-
lion from outside the European Union. Even more goods and services
were exported and conveyed: 281 billion euros in goods and 74 billion
euros in services (of which 98 billion went to non-EU countries). The
‘openness’ of the Netherlands is also indicated by the high number of
holiday trips by the Dutch to foreign countries: residents of the Nether-
lands buy 14 million holidays in foreign countries each year, 2.1 million
of which are outside the European Union.15
In today’s differentiated market societies individuals have a relatively
large measure of personal freedom and responsibility (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim 2002). The variety of possible lifestyles is considerable, even
if many people still opt for ‘the herd’ (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2004).
Partner choice, for instance, is far less prescribed by the family and/or
the community; to a great degree people can and indeed must make
such choices individually (Shorter 1975; Collins 1988). At present, about
one in three households consists of a single person – and in the cities in
particular – there are very many singles. Some are widows or widowers,
while others do not have a steady partner (at least not for the moment)
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for other reasons; many people engage in temporary relationships with
partners to whom they may or may not be married and with whom they
may or may not live (Bauman 2003). This is less the case for people with
a more traditional, non-Western background and orientation. In these
groups, tradition and family may determine the selection of a partner
(Hooghiemstra 2003).
The Netherlands is a secular, democratic country. With the rise of lib-
eralism and the ideal of the self-regulating market, the economic sphere
has been uncoupled from the familial and political sphere to a great ex-
tent (cf. Polanyi 1944). Employers can hire employees from the labour
market that suit their needs; specific features of the employee, such as
origin and sex, are now less relevant than before. In a democracy other
institutions that structure social traffic – besides the market – exhibit
considerable autonomy. The state even protects relative freedoms within
civil society and family life with legislation. Accordingly, as members of
parliament strive for arrangements that conflict with the agendas of cer-
tain segments of the social fabric or laws protecting these segments, the
enforcement of their legal ideals will be more problematic and obser-
vance will be less complete.
The state itself is not a monolithic whole either. First, a distinction is
made between the municipal, provincial and national governments –
and between the various departments contained therein – as well as the
European Union at a supranational level. Second, the legislature, the ex-
ecutive and the judicial powers are separated, though interests that
emerge in these spheres may sometimes clash. For instance, civil ser-
vants empowered to implement restrictive immigration policy may let
their professional ideologies prevail (see Van der Leun 2003).16 Simi-
larly, civil servants responsible for the economy sometimes set other
priorities with regard to immigration policy from civil servants responsi-
ble for public order and safety (see Cornelius et al. 2004).
The simultaneously closed and open character of Dutch society creates
ambivalence about migration flows. Among some parts of the social fab-
ric, there is a demand for the knowledge and labour provided by aliens,
or there are familial or affective ties that stretch beyond national borders
– think of the migrant communities with family in the country of origin,
or Dutch tourists with a holiday boyfriend or girlfriend. Parts of the po-
pulation feel that the Netherlands should maintain its tradition of open-
ness and tolerance, while precisely because of the increased dependence
on foreigners, many others voice fears for their institutions and privi-
leges (cf. Elias 1939).
In the current epoch most states feel forced to open themselves to
external influences, in the sphere of trade in particular. Among many of
those who are already established, however, the desire to protect domes-
tic institutions – the regulated labour market, social security, cultural
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achievements, public order – produces a simultaneous desire for social
boundaries. In immigration policy the tension between inclusive and ex-
clusive tendencies produces an inclination towards selectivity: there is a
desire to keep the door open to desirable influences, while excluding
influences seen as undesirable. Illegal migrants pre-eminently embody
the paradox of this ‘double movement’ (cf. Polanyi 1944). In a differen-
tiated, open-market society residential and employment opportunities
exist for various kinds of migrants in various social niches, while the
craving for safety and closure in other parts of society prompts the state
to classify these migrants as illegal.
Effects of the restrictive immigration policy on public safety
The restrictive immigration policy is in part aimed at preventing prob-
lems of public order and safety. The state can refuse, withdraw, or de-
cline to renew a tourist visa or residence permit or declare a migrant an
undesirable alien if the foreigner is believed to be or become a threat to
public order (ACVZ 2005). These aspects of external and internal border
control are less central in this study, but I will return to them in Chapter
6 particularly.
It may well be that a restrictive immigration policy also promotes pub-
lic safety in a more indirect way by discouraging settlement by econom-
ically disadvantaged migrants. In many cities in developing countries the
‘excess’ domestic migration, which is often hard for governments to con-
trol, is coupled with considerable safety problems connected with the
formation of dangerous slum areas. Such effects of restrictive immigra-
tion policy are outside the scope of this study.
Here I am primarily interested in the possible effects of restrictive im-
migration policy for those who do not receive permission to settle in the
Netherlands but who settle nonetheless, either after entering the country
illegally or by overstaying after a period of legal residence has ended as,
for instance, a tourist or an asylum seeker. I want to know to what extent
the behaviour of this group, insofar as it is relevant for public safety in
the country of destination, can be explained by their specific relationship
with the state in that country, in this case the Netherlands. My interest is
primarily focused on illegal residence and, to a lesser extent, the migra-
tion processes preceding it. This brings us to the first central question:
To what extent and under what conditions do residence and migration by
illegal migrants have consequences for public safety in the Netherlands, and
what influence does a restrictive immigration policy (particularly the ‘illegal
residence status’) have on these consequences?
I examine this central question in part from a spatial perspective.
Prior to this study, as we have seen, there were indications that illegal
residence is concentrated in specific neighbourhoods. Further, a high
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percentage of street crime is committed close to where the offenders
were living (cf. Kleemans 1996). Subjective aspects of public safety have
a clear spatial component as well (cf. Covington & Taylor 1991). For these
reasons we might expect that the answer to the first central question
would in any case vary from municipality to municipality and, within
these municipalities, from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. In addi-
tion, research on the spatial distribution of illegal migrants increases
our insight into the social ties between illegal migrants and more estab-
lished groups in society. One of the themes connecting the sub-studies is
that these ties codetermine, albeit in complex ways, the extent to which
the illegality of residence has consequences for public safety and in what
ways. Hence, the ecology of illegal residence can be used as a window
onto the sociology of illegal residence. This brings us to the second cen-
tral question: To what extent and in what way is illegal residence spatially
concentrated in the Netherlands, how can patterns of spatial concentration
and incorporation be explained, and what are the consequences of the spatial
concentration of illegal residence for neighbourhood safety?
The study’s relevance for other countries
In recent decades other destination countries in Europe, as well as the
United States and Australia, have witnessed a similar increase in restric-
tions aimed at limiting international mobility from poorer countries (see
for instance Andreas & Snyder 2000; Cornelius et al. 2004). For in-
stance, since the 1980s the list of countries whose citizens required a
visa to enter the EU has been expanded in almost all EU countries (Bigo
& Guild 2005).
There are, however, significant international differences in the type of
migration controls employed for these purposes. The Dutch case echoes
current immigration control policies adopted by the Scandinavian coun-
tries, Germany and France, which have laid the emphasis on guarding
the internal borders of the labour market and public provision (Cyrus &
Vogel 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004; Guiraudon & Lahav 2007; Düvell
2006). The United States has focused more on controlling its external
physical borders (Andreas & Snyder 2000). These international differ-
ences arise in part from differences between forms of illegal migration.
The most prevalent form of illegal migration in most European coun-
tries is legal entry (as a tourist, family visitor, or asylum seeker), followed
by overstaying the allowed period specified by law or the entry visa. The
illegal crossing of borders is much less prevalent in Europe than it is in
the United States (OECD 2007: 48). A second factor concerns differ-
ences in formalised solidarity. Maintenance of comprehensive govern-
mental forms of solidarity in the spheres of health care, social security,
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education and public housing, for the benefit of citizens and denizens, is
assumed to imply the exclusion of unwelcome immigrants from the wel-
fare state’s social entitlements; the financial viability and legitimacy of
such entitlements might be endangered if too many immigrants were to
gain access to public provision too easily. This explains why countries
with less internal solidarity, such as the United States and the countries
of southern Europe, are more capable of incorporating illegal migrants
into their societies and labour markets once they cross the border, and
are more apt to introduce legalisation programmes in which illegal mi-
grants who have worked for a number of years are eventually given resi-
dent status.
In spite of these international differences, there is an apparent ten-
dency towards increased internal border controls, both in the EU and
the US. This makes the Dutch case a strategic site for researching the
effects of internal border controls – especially controls involving institu-
tional exclusion.
The tendency towards tighter internal border controls in the EU is part
of a larger tendency towards the harmonisation of migration policies: the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Commission a more promi-
nent role in immigration, asylum and development policy (EMN 2007).
So far, the European Commission primarily meets that responsibility by
developing the ‘external dimension’ of immigration policy (Boswell
2003; Human Rights Watch 2005), which mainly includes the exporta-
tion of traditional instruments of migration control to the originating
and transit countries (the latter being the countries migrants travel
through on their way to the EU). Yet in May 2007 the European Com-
mission issued a Proposal for a Council Directive providing for sanc-
tions against employers of illegal third-country nationals (Carrera &
Guild 2007). It aims to establish a harmonised EU framework for im-
posing sanctions on employers for hiring illegal migrants. This proposal
is part of the EU’s increased efforts to develop migration policy at an EU
level.
The United States has recently adopted similar internal border con-
trols, along with stricter law enforcement. Over the past few years almost
all American states have adopted measures aimed at: (1) curbing the em-
ployment of illegal migrants (via more severe employer sanctions and
the denial of state contracts), (2) making it more difficult for illegal mi-
grants to obtain state identification documents such as driving licenses,
and (3) excluding illegal migrants from public benefits, mostly by deny-
ing them public assistance (cf. Jencks 2007; NCSL 2008).
The characterisation of the Netherlands as an open and differentiated
market society is, to a large extent, also valid for other affluent countries
in the West. For instance, due to the globalisation of social and economic
life, the presence of various ethnic groups who maintain transnational
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relationships with all parts of the world is becoming increasingly com-
mon (Portes 1999; Snel, Engbersen & Leerkes 2005). Furthermore, sin-
gles are proliferating around the Western world (Blok et al. 2000; Bau-
man 2003). Finally, in other destination countries there are often similar
labour opportunities for illegal migrants in agriculture, construction,
and in the expanding service sector (take-away restaurants, cleaning,
baby-sitting) (see also Sassen 1991, 1999; Ehrenreich 2002; Cornelius
et al. 2004).
Definition of terms
In this introductory chapter I want to elaborate on a number of central
terms. I will do this by first defining what I mean by the terms ‘illegal
migrant’, ‘objective safety’, ‘subjective safety’, ‘crime’ and ‘criminal ille-
gal migrant’.
Illegal migrant
Illegal migrants are persons of foreign nationality, or no nationality, who
reside illegally within the territory of a state, in this case the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. The Dutch Bureau for Statistics (CBS) stipulates as an
additional condition that residence in the Netherlands has lasted for at
least three months. The latter stipulation mainly has technical research
implications for the CBS, and is not significant here.17 This study per-
tains to people who have tried to settle in the Netherlands more or less
permanently (immigrants) as well as to people who from the start have
been counting on a temporary residence (pendulum migrants or transi-
ents). For this reason I use the term illegal migrant in this study in stead
of the term illegal immigrant.
The predicate ‘illegal’ does not refer to a characteristic of a person, but
rather describes a relationship between him or her and the state in a
certain jurisdiction. Whether or not residence is considered illegal, and
whether or not the state attaches consequences to illegal residence, lar-
gely depends on the state itself. In other words, illegal residence has the
character of a social (or state) construct, over which the individual con-
cerned has hardly any influence (cf. Gans 1995). Illegal migrants can
decide to settle illegally in a certain jurisdiction or attempt to stay for
longer than the state permits – though persons who are victims of hu-
man trafficking or who are not taken back by their country of origin
cannot decide for themselves even to that extent and can exert little influ-
ence on the legislative consequences associated with illegal residence
status.18
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There is no agreement in the social sciences about what term should
be used to refer to this category of migrants. The formal legal term is
‘illegal aliens’, though this term is rarely used. Most researchers prefer
to replace the term alien by migrant or immigrant, and a considerable
number prefer not to use the term ‘illegal’. This has produced the neolo-
gisms ‘undocumented migrant’ and ‘irregular migrant’ in the social
science literature (see for instance Chavez 1992; Van Liempt 2007).
Unfortunately, none of the available terms is wholly unproblematic. I
agree that the use of the terms illegal alien and illegal migrant may, at
least in some contexts, express or imply an a priori criminalisation of the
people concerned. At the same time, the terms undocumented migrant
and irregular migrant are barely any more neutral. In my opinion, the
use of such deliberate alternatives implies a critical stance towards re-
strictive immigration policy, and in any case the descriptive adequacy of
the latter euphemisms is questionable. Firstly, the immigrants con-
cerned are not necessarily undocumented. Many are in fact documented,
for example, visa overstayers or rejected asylum seekers or those appre-
hended repeatedly because of illegal residence. Similarly, the adjective
irregular is problematic since it suggests that illegal migration tends to
be unstructured, while in fact it is often highly structured.
For this book I have in the end decided to use the term ‘illegal mi-
grant’ in spite of its disadvantages. I would like to stress, however, that I
only intend to use it as a short descriptive term for illegally residing mi-
grant. In other words I use it only where I wish to indicate in a few words
that a migrant’s residence or stay in a jurisdiction is, at a specific time,
illegal according to the ruling state in that jurisdiction. I do not mean to
imply any particular position in regard to whether the presence of legal
or illegal migrants in the Netherlands or elsewhere is a good or bad
thing. Furthermore, I do not mean to essentialise the ‘illegality’ of the
people concerned: my study shows that an illegal migrant may become a
legal migrant over time and vice versa. An important reason for using
the term illegal migrant is that it is comparable to other widely used
terms in the social sciences and elsewhere, such as illegal drugs and
illegal resistance. Whether or not the latter phenomena are to be con-
demned or praised is likewise a subjective matter that necessarily lies
beyond the scope of empirical research. I realise that I could have used
‘illegal alien’ in a similar vein (cf. Ngai 2004), but I have decided it
sounds too formal.
Objective and subjective safety
Safety has both objective and subjective facets. I define objective safety
as the extent to which offences (felonies as well as misdemeanours) oc-
cur in the Netherlands. Safety increases as the number of offences de-
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creases. In the liberal tradition, a central task of the government is to
help protect the individual’s right to freedom. Criminal law is used to
help protect people against aggression by third parties. Further, beha-
viour that conflicts with deeply felt social conventions is often made pun-
ishable even if there is no clear victim, one example being the prohibi-
tion on nudity in public spaces. Subjective safety pertains to the
judgments people make about crime and nuisance in public space and
whether they feel safe there (Vanderveen 2006).
I am primarily interested in objective aspects of safety, particularly in
felonies. Felonies are offences that are strongly condemned by society and
carry harsh prison sentences. Misdemeanours, i.e. lesser offences that
are usually settled by a fine (but in the Netherlands are sometimes pun-
ishable by up to a year in prison), are of interest to me as well, particu-
larly insofar as they occur in public or semi-public space. Hence, I am
mainly interested in street crime and disorder. When illegal migrants
work informally for a company, this does not, in my view, constitute a
threat to public safety. Safety does have socio-economic aspects (see Wac-
quant 2001; Bauman 2004), but social security is not prominent in this
study.
Illegal residence as such is not punishable in the Netherlands. An ille-
gal migrant can be held in custody with a view to expulsion, but formally,
from a legal perspective, this is not a punishment. Only in the case of
repeated illegal residence, may the migrant, under certain conditions,
be declared an ongewenst vreemdeling (‘undesirable alien’). Repeated or
continued residence is then regarded as a crime against the authorities
(ACVZ 2005).19 I do not treat illegal residence per se as an intrinsic
threat to public safety, except in the case of an ‘undesirable alien’.
Sociologically, offences differ from transgressions of informal norms
because they can be sanctioned by society in specific ways. The state can
use its monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1947) in order to protect
public safety or the legal order. Nonetheless, legal distinctions may be
somewhat artificial in the context of studies in social science. Although
it is not uncommon among criminologists, particularly those with a clas-
sical orientation, to rely on legal definitions, some criminological
schools are reluctant to reduce the object of study to offences alone.
Some criminologists point out that not all immoral behaviour is punish-
able, for example, certain forms of exploitation by corporations, and
claim that the law sometimes merely serves to protect the interests of
powerful groups in society. From such a critical perspective the restric-
tive immigration regime could perhaps be understood as state crime, and
the legal notion of the ‘illegal alien’ as a form of symbolic violence (cf.
Bourdieu 1990: 127)! Life-course criminology often researches the viola-
tion of norms, or anti-social behaviour as such, and does not limit itself
to actual criminality (see for instance Sampson and Laub 2005).
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My focus on felony crimes and misdemeanours is implied in my defi-
nition of my research project. It speaks for itself that a researcher inter-
ested in illegal residence and public safety should look at the violation of
official norms. This focus also has a pragmatic basis. Felonies and mis-
demeanours are extensively registered by the police and other state orga-
nisations, and are measured in various surveys in the field of social
science. By using a number of existing data sources I could make a lar-
ger scientific contribution, which in addition would be socially relevant.
As we have seen, there has up to now been a relative lack of empirical
information on illegal residence and public safety.
Nonetheless, I did not want to ignore the aforementioned criticisms
altogether. While the emphasis in this book is on perpetratorship among
illegal migrants in the sense of involvement in felonies and misdemea-
nours, I also look at subjective aspects of public safety. Far from all social
rules in public space are legally sanctioned (Goffman 1963, 1971a); the
legal order is merely part of the social order. Violations of informal rules,
in particular, turn out to determine how people judge and experience
safety in public space. I have therefore also taken an interest in the ques-
tion of whether or not illegal migrants transgress or comply with unwrit-
ten rules in neighbourhood life, and to what extent the illegality of their
residence contributes to this. I also point out that from a sociological
perspective, offences often differ fundamentally in nature; for example,
there are not always any individual victims. Further, I argue that the state
has increasingly started to deploy its power of definition, and has mobi-
lised criminal law in order to keep certain categories of aliens away from
the Netherlands. The introduction of the Law on Identification is a case
in point.
Criminal illegal migrant
Sometimes I use the term ‘criminal illegal migrant’ when I wish to de-
note in a few words that an illegal migrant has committed a crime (or is
a crime suspect or convict). I do not mean thereby to essentialise the
criminality of such migrants. I acknowledge that even offenders who
commit many crimes do not commit crimes most of the time (cf. Collins
2008).
Ethical aspects
During my research I presented preliminary results at various scientific
conferences and seminars. A number of times I was confronted with
ethical questions. Some colleagues were concerned about my research
on the determinants of the spatial concentration of illegal residence
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(Chapter 2): would this knowledge not encourage raids? One researcher
even pointed out that the maps demonstrating the spatial distribution of
illegal migrants, though increasing our insight into illegal residence, re-
sembled the maps made in the Netherlands during the Second World
War (printed in Scott 1988), when Dutch civil servants made maps for
the Nazis demonstrating the spatial distribution of Jews across Amster-
dam. Other researchers voiced fears that my interest in crime and disor-
der among illegal migrants would promote their further stigmatisation
and criminalisation. Outside of academia, the subject of my study is
emotionally and politically charged. Some circles speak powerfully and
engage in acts designed to protect illegal migrants (cf. Westerink 2005),
while in other circles the negative aspects of both legal and illegal migra-
tion for the receiving society are emphasised and dramatised.20
On the whole, I am confident that my study is ethically responsible
according to prevailing professional standards as described, for instance,
by the American Sociological Association. In accordance with the stan-
dard of ‘informed consent’, all my respondents and informants were told
about the purpose of the study, and their anonymity was guaranteed.
Moreover, I have paid due attention to the need to report the findings in
a balanced and responsible way. Four of the five sub-studies in this book
had been published in peer-reviewed journals before I included them in
this book.
I am, however, uncertain about the ethical soundness of two aspects of
this study. I have no clear answer to either issue; I hope, therefore, that
both will be debated by migration researchers and other social scientists.
The first point concerns the question of whether the standard of in-
formed consent is adequate in the light of increasing opportunities for
linking separate quantitative data sources. New possibilities for research
arise when data files are linked, as I have done. Sometimes these possi-
bilities clearly transcend the purposes for which the separate data were
initially gathered. For instance, while respondents to the Police Monitor
(a survey on crime and neighbourhood safety, which is an important
data source in Chapter 3) knew that they were cooperating with a scien-
tific study, they could not have foreseen that these data would eventually
be used in this book to explore the effects of illegal residence on neigh-
bourhood safety. These possibilities only arose after the Police Monitor
data had been linked to police apprehension data, which were in turn
linked to data on neighbourhood characteristics. (I did ask the scientific
department of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, which owns the Police
Monitor data, for their permission to re-use the data for these purposes,
but I realise that civil servants who assessed my request may have be-
lieved the state had an interest in that sub-study).
The second aspect pertains to the prescription by the American Socio-
logical Association that research in the social sciences should ‘respect
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people’s rights’. This standard is problematic if people’s rights and inter-
ests are clearly in conflict, as is inherently the case with a study on illegal
residence. Some readers may feel that people in poorer countries have a
right to settle in affluent countries without the consent of the govern-
ments in the countries of destination, given the present, highly stratified
international order (cf. Düvell 2006). From a critical perspective it may
also be argued that illegal migrants have a right not to be studied, be-
cause knowledge about illegal residence may contribute to more effec-
tive ways of excluding such migrants. However, such a position ob-
viously ignores the right of the established population in destination
countries to know about migration flows that influence their society and
life chances. Measures to restrict immigration were introduced partly
because of pressure, by labour unions for instance, to protect the welfare
state, which benefits poorer native groups and promotes intranational
social equality.
I sincerely hope that this study, building on previous social science
research, has a fair chance of being used in productive ways. In the pre-
sent social and political conditions, scientific knowledge about illegal mi-
gration may lead to their more effective exclusion, but it could also lead
to increased incorporation of such migrants, for instance by easing the
restrictions on legal migration. In the Netherlands, a legalisation pro-
gramme was introduced in 2007, granting residence permits to about
25,000 rejected asylum seekers. The political parties who proposed the
programme were familiar with my work and other social science re-
search on illegal residence in the Netherlands.21 In addition, publishing
findings and discussing them with researchers and students may also
expose social myths that are persistent on both sides of the political spec-
trum. This would enlarge the space for a more nuanced discussion on
the basis of verifiable assertions (Elias 1978; Burgers 1996). A further
critical argument for conducting this research is that social science loses
a lot of credibility – particularly when it aspires to be socially relevant – if
it anxiously puts up with the fact that significant areas of social life are
terra incognita.
Finally, I propose a shared moral responsibility, by which I mean that
part of the moral responsibility lies with me as a researcher – for in-
stance, I should not expose the respondents’ identities or precise resi-
dential addresses and should not, in reporting findings, omit factors
that I know are relevant – but another part lies with everybody who uses
the findings, including journalists, policymakers and politicians. The lat-
ter should not willingly distort or selectively ignore my findings.
38 ILLEGAL RESIDENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE NETHERLANDS
Data sources
I was able to collect an unprecedented amount of interesting quantitative
and qualitative data. These were mostly obtained during research activ-
ities for two contract studies as a result of a research proposal by my
PhD supervisor (see points 1, 2 and 4 below). These were a study by
order of the Ministry of Housing and a study for the independent re-
search programme Politie en Wetenschap (‘Police and Science’), which
is subsidised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, between
2003 and 2006 I gave seminars to sociology students at the University
of Amsterdam. As part of these classes each student conducted an inter-
view with a resident in a city neighbourhood with a relatively high per-
centage of illegal residents (see point 2 below). Further, various statistical
data were gathered that were available in the Netherlands. The following
is a concise list of the data on which this study is based:
1. At the end of 2003, the 25 regional police forces in the Netherlands
delivered anonymised data on all illegal migrants apprehended22 in
the period from January 1997 up to and including September 2003.
This provided information at the individual level about the reason
for, place and date of apprehension (or apprehensions) and, insofar
as is known to the police, the date of arrival in the Netherlands, na-
tionality, date of birth and sex.
2. Two urban neighbourhoods were selected where, according to police
data, higher than normal concentrations of illegal residence could be
found, one in Rotterdam and one in The Hague. In these neighbour-
hoods, a fellow researcher and I spoke with a total of twenty profes-
sionals. In addition, interviews were conducted with 70 illegal mi-
grants from six countries and 45 accommodation providers. The
latter interviews were done in the respondents’ mother tongues by a
team of trained interviewers with at least a higher vocational educa-
tion. In the two neighbourhoods, the sociology students spoke to a
total of 101 residents. The interviews were rehearsed in the seminars.
3. In 2005 I recorded the life stories of 26 male illegal migrants with an
asylum background and a record of offences. Most respondents were
interviewed twice for two hours each time. The records of offences
were made available by the Ministry of Justice.
4. At my request, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND)
made data available on all immigrants declared undesirable aliens
between 1997 and 2003 and/or who had lost their residence permit
because of public order violations.
5. In the period 2003-2005 I gathered various statistical files and data
on socio-economic neighbourhood characteristics, neighbourhood
safety and neighbourhood crime. The main data sources were Kern-
cijfers wijken en buurten 1999 (‘Core figures on districts and neigh-
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bourhoods 1999’) compiled by the Dutch Bureau for Statistics and
the Politiemonitor Bevolking (‘Police population monitor’) for the
years 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.
6. In 2007 I interviewed two key informants who were involved in pro-
viding relief to illegal migrants in the form of accommodation. These
were a policymaker for the Amsterdam municipality and a coordina-
tor of a foundation subsidised by Dutch churches.
Preview of the following chapters
Five sub-studies were conducted with these data in order to answer the
aforementioned research questions, and each sub-study constitutes a
chapter in this book. There were two main reasons for basing this dis-
sertation on sub-studies. Firstly, it allowed me to make the most efficient
use of the data that were collected during the two commissioned studies
(for the Ministry of Housing and the Police and Science programme)
and to profit from the analyses that I had already carried out as part of
these studies. Secondly, I wanted to create more opportunities to work
with other researchers. By splitting the study into sub-studies, I could
seek the cooperation of other researchers on aspects of my study. Three
of the five sub-studies have been written in cooperation with four differ-
ent co-authors. I am confident that the impact and quality of my scienti-
fic work have profited from this strategy (as has my job satisfaction),
although it has also necessitated a more unconventional format for this
dissertation.
I have primarily used the findings and limitations of the existing
Dutch research as a point of departure, since science aspires to cumula-
tive knowledge. In most sub-studies I incorporated additional theoretical
insights. This was necessary because the sub-problems implied in the
two central research questions extend over several disciplines, including
sociology, social geography, criminology and social psychology. The theo-
ry I have used is explained in the relevant chapters, insofar as it has not
been discussed in this introductory chapter. There I also go into research
methods and the reliability and representativeness of the empirical data.
The following chapters can be read independently in combination
with this introductory chapter. They have nonetheless been arranged in
such a way that they build upon each other and form a coherent whole.
Part 1 of this book – The ecology of illegal residence – starts with the sub-
study that looked into how illegal residence is spatially embedded in
Dutch society. The empirical basis constituted the quantitative and quali-
tative data collected under 1, 2 and 6. The observed patterns are de-
scribed and explained in Chapter 2: Shadow places.
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The second sub-study builds upon this ecological perspective. It ex-
plores the consequences of illegal residence for the safety and comfort
of urban neighbourhoods. How safe and liveable are neighbourhoods
where concentrations of illegal residence have been observed? Is there
more or less crime than in other neighbourhoods? Do the residents feel
more or less safe? To what extent can variations in neighbourhood safety
be attributed to illegal residence? These questions were addressed based
on the quantitative and qualitative data under 1, 2 and 6. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the results: Against state rules, against street rules?
We will see in Chapter 3 that the effect of the presence of illegal mi-
grants on neighbourhood safety depends, at least in part, on the extent to
which the immigrants concerned are involved in crime (which is the
case for only a minority of illegal migrants). For this reason, three sub-
studies were conducted in order to enhance our understanding of the
relationship between illegal residence and crime. These sub-studies con-
stitute Part 2 of this book: Illegal residence and crime.
The third sub-study, i.e. the first sub-study of this book’s second part,
compared the patterns of criminality among illegal migrants to the pat-
terns of criminality among legal migrants of the same age group and
country of origin. It involved a comparison of migrants from eleven
countries, aged from fourteen up to and including 24 years. To that end
the data collected under 1 in the section on data sources were compared
with police data on crime suspects with legal residence which have been
published by other researchers (Kromhout & Van San 2003). This is the
subject of Chapter 4: Embedded crimes?
For the purpose of the fourth sub-study the experiences and stories of
illegal migrants involved in crime were recorded and analysed qualita-
tively. How did the men become engaged in criminal activities? To what
extent do the stories and records of offences collected during my field-
work in the Tilburg Prison indicate that illegal residence status may have
played a part in this outcome? How did the men deal with their situa-
tion? What crimes did they choose to commit and what crimes did they
avoid? The results are described in Chapter 5: I am just trying to live my
life.
The fifth sub-study analyses the background of the considerable rise
in the number of crime suspects with illegal residence status in the
Netherlands since the mid-1990s. On the basis of the quantitative data
that was collected I looked into whether the marginalisation thesis –
which asserts that the increase is caused by the heightened marginalisa-
tion of illegal migrants under the influence of increased internal border
control by means of institutional exclusion – holds up after statistically
controlling for five alternative explanations: practices of reclassification
by the state, criminal migration, developments in crime detection and
registration, an increase in crime among legal migrants and, finally, de-
INTRODUCTION 41
mographic changes in the composition or size of the illegal population.
The results can be found in Chapter 6: The rise in crime.
The main conclusions of the study as a whole are explained in Chapter
7, where a number of implications for policy are also discussed.
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Part 1
The ecology of illegal residence

2 Shadow places
Introduction
Illegal residence appears to be unevenly spread across the Netherlands;
an explorative study indicated that most illegal residents lived in the four
large cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) as well as
a number of border and rural areas (Engbersen et al. 2002). It can there-
fore be assumed that illegal migrants make up a considerably larger part
of the population in some places than the national average of 1 per cent –
locally probably up to about 6 to 8 per cent (Leerkes et al. 2004). Studies
in other countries indicate a similar pattern: illegal residence is concen-
trated in specific urban and rural environments (Chavez 1992; Miller
1995; Bade 2003; Cornelius 2005).
There is as yet no systematic empirical information on the spatial dis-
tribution of illegal residence in the Netherlands and other Western coun-
tries on the level of municipalities and neighbourhoods. The research
questions of this chapter are: To what extent, and in what way, is illegal
residence spatially concentrated within the Netherlands and how can
patterns of spatial concentration and incorporation be explained?
Unlike in previous studies, the spatial distribution of illegal residence
will be described in quantitative terms in this chapter. The central deter-
minants of illegal migrants’ residential pattern will also be operationa-
lised, i.e. defined in measurable ‘terms’ and tested quantitatively. Statis-
tical results will be interpreted and illustrated with data from two
ethnographical neighbourhood studies. Such a triangular approach is in-
novative in this research field.
This sub-study focuses on illegal residence in urban environments, as
most illegal migrants live in big cities; fieldwork was conducted in two
urban neighbourhoods in the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague, the
second- and third-largest cities in the Netherlands.
First, the central theoretical concepts and assumptions of this study
are presented and then the data sources and research methods will be
explained. I briefly describe the spatial distribution of the illegal popula-
tion across Dutch municipalities and provinces. The determinants of the
spatial patterns of illegal residence in urban environments are analysed
subsequently, followed by an outline of the implications of the findings
for other Western destination countries, projected into the near future.
Opportunity structure: spatial aspects
There is an abundant international literature on the spatial concentra-
tion of migrant groups with legal residence. The American literature,
which includes work by researchers from the Chicago School who were
the first to write about processes of spatial distribution among migrant
groups, is particularly rich (see, among others, Park, Burgess & McKen-
zie 1925; Massey & Denton 1993; Jargowsky 1997). A comparable litera-
ture is emerging in Europe, a continent increasingly confronted by simi-
lar processes of spatial and economic segregation, spatial mobility and
the emergence of ‘residential enclaves’ (Van der Wouden & Bruine
2001; Musterd & Deurloo 2002; Van Kempen & Idamir 2003; Musterd
2004).
Various studies provide indications of the crucial factors of the spatial
settlement pattern of illegal migrants. The first of these is the degree of
embeddedness in transnational social networks. For this incorporation
process, one can use the term ‘social capital’ as operationalised by Portes
(1998) to refer to the ability of illegal migrants to mobilise various re-
sources (money, work, housing, information, documents and also possi-
ble marriage partners) from their ethnic and family networks. Social
capital determines to a large degree the residential opportunities avail-
able to illegal migrants (Mahler 1995; Engbersen 2001; Grzymala-Ka-
zlowska 2005; Engbersen, Van San & Leerkes 2006). The social capital
that illegal migrants can mobilise varies both between and within ethnic
groups. Not every immigrant has access to a network of fellow migrants.
Dutch studies show that Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese groups
(and, to a lesser extent, African groups) can often fall back on established
migrant communities (Burgers & Engbersen 1999). Lack of social capi-
tal is found particularly among rejected asylum seekers who come from
new immigration countries, but strongly marginalised illegal migrants,
who cannot depend on established migrant communities, can also be
found in other groups. If they do not find a job, they will have to fend
for themselves in most cases.
Labour opportunities constitute a second residential factor. Various
authors assume that there is increasing room for low-skilled jobs (for-
mal and informal) at the bottom of the labour market in large cities (Sas-
sen 1991; Miller 1995; Bonacich & Appelbaum 2000). In this part of the
economy, remnants of industrial activities (such as textile sweatshops)
remain and there is low-wage labour in all kinds of enterprises in the
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personal service industries (cleaning, security, catering, care for children
and the elderly, home improvement). Furthermore, a sizeable ethnic
economy has evolved in many large cities where informal labour by ille-
gal compatriots is a relatively common phenomenon. By keeping labour
costs low these businesses hope to achieve economic success. There is
also considerable demand for illegal labour in agriculture and horticul-
ture (Cornelius 2005). Illegal migrants are very important for this sector
in Western Europe (see Cornelius et al. 2004).
A third relevant factor is the presence of cheap and accessible accom-
modation. The local housing market in some city districts is favourable
to illegal migrants, since many private landlords are willing to rent out
flats, rooms or beds to them. Building on Mahler’s views (Mahler 1995),
Burgers (1998) noted the existence of ‘parallel housing markets’ in
Dutch city districts – i.e. informal markets that are broadly similar to the
formal housing market. He points to two parallels. On the one hand,
there is social housing in the Netherlands, with its rent ceilings, which
makes it possible for illegal migrants to live-in with compatriots free of
charge or in exchange for a modest rent. On the other hand, there is a
private housing market that is harder to control by the government. Ille-
gal migrants have access to this private market if they can afford to pay
higher rents. There are now a number of hybrid forms in which legal
migrants sublet or re-let their council houses to illegal migrants (Leerkes
et al. 2004). Offering accommodation to illegal migrants can be a wel-
come source of income for legal migrants (and also for established ille-
gal ones). Those who have been in the Netherlands for a longer period of
time can start a career as a landlord, linking the formal and informal
housing markets. Due to governmental regulations, rents – particularly
in the social sector – are often lower than market prices. This makes
informal sub tenancy lucrative. A previous study indicated that the active
dispersal policy implemented in the case of asylum seekers has had
some effect on the distribution of illegal migrants (see Leerkes et al.
2004) though these effects were limited. First, most illegal migrants do
not have an asylum history and are therefore not subjected to a policy of
dispersal. Secondly, failed asylum seekers often appear to leave rural and
small town areas and head for the big cities.
The three factors that constitute the opportunity structure of illegal
residence – social capital, labour and housing – are often connected.
People who have much social capital often have easier access to labour
and housing (Engbersen 2001). Others are more dependent on commer-
cial intermediaries, shadowy temporary employment agencies and land-
lords, for obtaining work and housing. Various ethnographic studies
conducted in Dutch cities and in cities such as New York, Athens, Lon-
don, Berlin and Brussels make clear that the dimensions of the opportu-
nity structure for illegal migrants have a clear spatial component (Mahler
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1995; Romaniszyn 1996; Burgers & Engbersen 1999; Alt 2003; Grzyma-
la-Kazlowska 2005). Opportunities for illegal residence in cities are lim-
ited to certain urban environments. It is the spatial proximity of labour,
social networks and housing that seems to determine why illegal mi-
grants live and work in particular city regions.
A new insight yielded up by this sub-study is that the presence of poor
singles contributes to the opportunity structure of illegal residence.
These single households represent a fourth, independent dimension in
this opportunity structure. This dimension has a clear spatial component
as well.
Research methods
This sub-study is based on the registered home addresses of all illegal
migrants apprehended in the Netherlands between 1 January 1997 and 1
October 2003. The data have been provided by the 25 Dutch police
forces and are taken from the Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem,
VAS, a national database in which all known aliens are registered. For
each municipality and neighbourhood (postcode area, i.e. an area that
contains on average roughly 2,000 households and 5,000 individuals),
the number of addresses were counted where, according to police data,
illegal migrants were living. This measure, which was called absolute
concentration, gives an indication of the local density of the illegal popu-
lation. It was linked to a database containing information on various de-
mographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the neighbourhood and
the share of private homeownership in them. This database with neigh-
bourhood characteristics was compiled by the Dutch Bureau for Statis-
tics (CBS) and is called Kerncijfers Wijken en Buurten 1999. The data
on private homeownership were supplied by the Ministry of Housing
and are taken from the research Geomarktprofiel 1998. As a measure of
the relative number of illegal migrants, hereinafter called relative con-
centration, the absolute concentration of illegal migrants was multiplied
by 1,000 and divided by the number of legal local residents. Next, the
socioeconomic characteristics of the neighbourhoods where illegal resi-
dence is common were identified. By means of multiple regression ana-
lysis, the relative concentration of illegal migrants was predicted on the
basis of such neighbourhood characteristics.
The fieldwork was conducted in Bospolder-Tussendijken in Rotterdam
and De Schilderswijk in The Hague in 2003. These neighbourhoods
were selected because police data indicated that illegal residence occurs
regularly there. Both neighbourhoods are part of multicultural districts
populated by many non-Western immigrants. Sixty-five per cent of the
residents of Bospolder-Tussendijken are immigrants, including many
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Turks, Moroccans, Cape Verdeans and Surinamese. De Schilderswijk
comprised 85 per cent immigrants, including many Turks, Surinamese,
Moroccans and Antilleans. Twenty key informants were interviewed by
my fellow researcher Dr. Marion van San and myself. These profes-
sionals regularly came into contact with illegal migrants and could often
indicate why, and how, illegal migrants reside there. They were employ-
ees of the alien police, the municipal authority and housing associations,
as well as community and social care workers. The interviews were con-
ducted with the help of a short topic list.
In addition, 65 illegal migrants from Morocco, Turkey, Bulgaria, So-
malia, India and Pakistan were interviewed, as well as 45 providers of
accommodation (Dutch, Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese and Somali).
In addition, five mixed couples, of whom one partner was staying in the
Netherlands illegally, were interviewed. The interviews with illegal mi-
grants and providers of accommodation were carried out by a team of
interviewers who were selected according to their ethnic background so
that the interviews could be held in the respondent’s mother tongue. All
had some form of higher education, useful interviewing skills and ex-
perience with the research groups concerned. They personally recruited
respondents with the help of key informants (police, social workers,
etc.), or searched for respondents in cafes, teahouses, mosques or in the
street. Respondents were asked to bring the interviewer into contact with
other illegal migrants or with their accommodation providers. The inter-
viewers made use of a questionnaire with open and closed questions.
Illegal migrants who took part in the research were given a financial
incentive.
Limitations
This sub-study has some limitations. First, the quantitative data primar-
ily give a picture of the illegal population that ran some risk of being
apprehended. Although the number of apprehensions, 107,322, was sub-
stantial, it was impossible to determine the extent to which the home
addresses of apprehended illegal migrants constituted a correct repre-
sentation of the home addresses of all illegal migrants who lived in the
Netherlands between 1997 and 2003. In a number of apprehensions no
home address was registered and sometimes the stated home address
proved to be the address where the person was apprehended or the ad-
dress of a police station or detention centre. Most of these complications
could be solved by checking and cleaning up the database.1 Registrations
without home address, for example, often involved illegal migrants who
were apprehended at the border and therefore had not yet taken up resi-
dence in the Netherlands. The addresses of police stations and detention
centres could be identified. In addition, it was examined how often the
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police had recorded the place of apprehension as the home address
while the arrested person was actually living somewhere else. It is not
likely that this happened very often. When the address was not regis-
tered, the place of apprehension could sometimes be used as an indica-
tion of the home address (such as in the case of house raids). Bias as a
result of incomplete or inaccurate registration of home addresses may
therefore be said to be limited.
Local police priorities naturally influence the number of local appre-
hensions. At the end of this sub-study’s research period (1997-2003)
raids became more frequent in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague,
as well as in some rural concentration areas. Employers were increas-
ingly subjected to checks by the labour inspectorate. Most illegal mi-
grants, however, are still apprehended in the course of regular police
work – i.e. as crime suspects or because of minor offences such as driv-
ing too fast or dodging public transport fares (Van der Leun 2003). This
is probably the reason why no indications were found for substantial
geographical differences in the risk of arrest.2
Although the results of the neighbourhood studies cannot be general-
ised as such, ‘qualitative completeness’ was aimed at (Hammersley &
Atkinson 1995; Lofland & Lofland 1995). Additional respondents were
searched until no more new types of accommodation were found, and a
complete picture appeared to have been formed of the reasons why ille-
gal migrants resided in these neighbourhoods. The limitations of the
separate research methods and sources were met as far as possible by
triangulation. The information provided by the professionals, landlords
and illegal migrants could be compared. The information obtained from
the people involved was compared with the quantitative results. This re-
inforced confidence in the validity of the findings.
Results
The distribution of illegal residence across Dutch provinces and municipalities
Illegal residence is not merely an urban phenomenon, for the greatest
relative concentrations were found in both the most and least densely
populated areas. There are illegal migrants in rural areas in the north of
the province of North Holland (A), and in the provinces of Brabant (B)
and Groningen (C) (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In rural areas illegal resi-
dence is primarily connected with the demand for seasonal workers in
the horticultural and agricultural sectors (De Bakker 2001). The regis-
tered addresses suggest that the presence of centres for asylum seekers,
Chinese restaurants and brothels are also important, albeit to a lesser
extent. The increased level of illegal residence in the south of the pro-
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vince of Limburg (D) is, in part, due to drug tourism from bordering EU
member states. Many illegal migrants there have French, Belgian or Ger-
man nationality and have usually lost the right of residence in the Neth-
erlands since they were declared undesirable aliens after causing nui-
sance related to drugs. Finally, a substantial proportion of illegal
residence occurs in municipalities with detention and deportation cen-
tres for illegal migrants and rejected asylum seekers – for example, in
Zevenaar (north of B), Ter Apel (near C) and Rijsbergen (near D). Appre-
hended illegal migrants often stay in these institutions for months and
often more than once (Van Kalmthout & Van Leeuwen 2004; see also the
conclusion of this book).
Figure 2.1 Spatial distribution of the illegal population across the Netherlands
(absolute concentration)
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
The description that follows is limited to illegal residence in urban envi-
ronments, not in detention. In addition, the focus is on illegal residence
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by non-Western third-country nationals (i.e. people from outside the EU
who are not nationals of states in North America or Oceania).
Figure 2.2 Spatial distribution of the illegal population across the Netherlands
(relative concentration)
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
The spatial incorporation of illegal residence in urban environments
It is common practice to use segregation indexes (S) to measure the ex-
tent to which two groups are spatially segregated from one another.
(Strictly speaking, the term ‘dissimilarity index’ should be used when
two groups do not constitute the total population.) The index indicates
the percentage of the group that should move in order to bring about a
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complete mutual mixing. The higher the index, the lower the extent of
mixing and the stronger the degree of residential segregation. The re-
sults are calculated at the level of postcode areas and should be inter-
preted with some caution, since postcode areas differ somewhat in size.
Figure 2.3 shows the extent to which the illegal and legal populations are
spatially segregated. Three curves can be distinguished which respec-
tively, from top to bottom, indicate the mixing with the Dutch native
population (S=52), the total urban population (S=48) and the non-Wes-
tern immigrant population3 (S=33). What becomes clear is that, com-
pared with ethnic minority groups, Dutch natives less often have illegal
migrants as neighbours. Approximately 60 per cent of the illegal mi-
grants live in city districts that house 13 per cent of all Dutch natives, 41
per cent of all non-Western immigrants and 17 per cent of the total legal
urban population. Furthermore, 80 per cent of the illegal urban popula-
tion lives in districts that house 31 per cent of the native population, 61
per cent of the legal non-Western immigrants and 35 per cent of the total
urban population (see the dotted lines in the figure).
Figure 2.3 Extent of residential segregation between the illegal population and
(segments of ) the regular population3
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
As expected, the illegal population is selectively incorporated in the ur-
ban landscape. Whereas some city districts house relatively large num-
bers of illegal migrants, most neighbourhoods house none or only a few.
This observation implies that illegal migrants usually constitute a much
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smaller proportion of the local population than the estimated national
average of 1 per cent and sometimes substantially higher – probably up
to about 6 or 8 per cent (see Leerkes et al. 2004).
The question is how the selective spatial incorporation of illegal mi-
grants can be explained. Table 2.1 gives a ranking of twenty neighbour-
hoods that house the most illegal migrants. The table contains only a few
Amsterdam and Rotterdam neighbourhoods, but this is mainly because
the local police record the home addresses of illegal migrants less often
than in other cities. The police in The Hague, by contrast, record them
quite accurately. In The Hague (48 per cent) the percentage of registered
residential addresses is twice as high as in Amsterdam (24 per cent) and
Rotterdam (21 per cent). Nationally, this figure is 30 per cent. If police
registration had been better, the Amsterdam and Rotterdam neighbour-
hoods would have been featuring prominently in this top twenty list (see
Leerkes et al. 2004).
The characteristics of the neighbourhoods provide an initial confirma-
tion of the theoretical expectations. Illegal migrants are often housed in
poor immigrant districts; the average proportion of non-Western immi-
grants for the twenty districts is 57 per cent versus 11 per cent for the city
as a whole.
Table 2.2 contains five linear regression models.4 The models show
that differences between neighbourhoods as to the rate of illegal resi-
dence depend on neighbourhood differences in the concentration of le-
gal non-Western immigrants, socioeconomic status, the size and form of
the neighbourhood economy, the share of private homeownership and
the concentration of single-person households. The first four models
test the extent to which the spatial distribution of the illegal population
corresponds with our initial theoretical assumptions. The independent
variables are indicators of the extent to which neighbourhoods contain
non-Western migrant communities (percentage of non-Western immi-
grants), economic opportunities (the relative number of establishments
engaging in commercial services, manufacturing and non-commercial
services) and housing opportunities (socioeconomic status of the neigh-
bourhood and percentage of private homeownership). It was examined
whether the fourth model could be improved with additional indepen-
dent variables. The percentage of single people did indeed have an addi-
tional effect (fifth model).5
In what follows, the quantitative results in Table 2.2 are discussed and
interpreted with findings that are of a qualitative nature.
The presence of non-Western migrant communities
Two statistical observations suggest that legal immigration tends to
bring about illegal chain migration. First of all, as Table 2.2 shows, the
SHADOW PLACES 57
effect of the proportion of immigrants in the neighbourhoods on the rate
of illegal residence hardly decreases when other neighbourhood charac-
teristics are incorporated into the model. A second indication is the set-
tlement pattern of illegal migrants from countries for which there are
large established ethnic groups, such as Turkey, Morocco and Surinam.
This pattern can be quite well illustrated with the help of a number of
maps of The Hague (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5). It turns out, for example,
that a relatively large number of illegal Turks live in the districts where
legal Turks live and that illegal Moroccans usually end up in the districts
with many legally resident Moroccans. This effect is somewhat stronger
for the Turks than for the Moroccans, which has to do with the stronger
social cohesion and networks of trust among Turkish immigrants (Eng-
bersen 2001; Staring 2001).
Figure 2.4 Distribution of Turks across The Hague
Left: First- and second-generation legal Turks (% of total population)
Right: Illegal Turks (relative concentration)
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
The fieldwork suggests that such causal connections can be direct and
indirect. First, it turns out that many respondents live in these neigh-
bourhoods because family or acquaintances, who usually took care of
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them after they arrived, live nearby. These established immigrants often
help illegal newcomers in their primary network to find a room or flat in
the neighbourhood. The indirect relations are mainly found among ille-
gal migrants who have no family members in the Netherlands. It turned
out that some had come to Europe with the help of human smugglers
and/or had gone through asylum procedures to no effect, often else-
where in the Netherlands.
Figure 2.5 Distribution of Moroccans across The Hague
Left: First- and second-generation legal Moroccans (% of total population)
Right: Illegal Moroccans (relative concentration)
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
They told us they preferred neighbourhoods with some ethnic variety
and where many people speak their language or dialect, making them
inconspicuous. In addition, they hope to benefit from the ethnic infra-
structure established by previous immigration flows: mosques (to pray
and meet people, and where free food is sometimes served during Ra-
madan), ethnic shops (where they can buy products from the country of
origin and can sometimes get a job) and coffee houses (to spend the day
cheaply and come into contact with people). The tendency to seek ac-
commodation near places where compatriots live – ‘ethnic self-segrega-
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tion’ (see Stepick et al. 2003) – is well documented for legal migrants
(Musterd et al. 1998; Van der Wouden & Bruijne 2001). That the pre-
sence of legal compatriots tempts illegal migrants to live in relatively
homogeneous ‘urban villages’ (Gans 1962/1982) is aptly illustrated by
the following excerpt from an interview.
I went to live in Bospolder-Tussendijken because my brother lived
here and because there are many Moroccans with a valid residence
permit in this neighbourhood who help me with all kinds of things
when I need them. This neighbourhood mainly has a social function
for me. I meet a lot of people with whom I make appointments and
chat about all and sundry’. (illegal Moroccan)
Certain groups of illegal migrants do not take up residence in deprived
immigrant neighbourhoods because they have family members or com-
patriots who live there, but rather because of the, in comparison to other
neighbourhoods, favourable supply of housing. This becomes more evi-
dent when the effect of neighbourhood socioeconomic status is included
in the analysis.
The socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods
Illegal residence is associated with low income in two ways. First, low-
skilled potential immigrants have little chance of obtaining a legal resi-
dence permit because the Dutch government has strongly discouraged
low-skilled labour migration for some time now (Van der Leun 2003).
Secondly, it is practically impossible to earn a high income without a
residence permit, because it precludes a work permit. It is therefore un-
derstandable that illegal migrants often end up at the bottom of the
housing market.
Table 2.2 indicates that the socioeconomic status of the neighbour-
hoods yields an independent negative effect on the degree of illegal resi-
dence.6 Two additional maps of The Hague confirm this observation
(Figure 2.6). Illegal Eastern Europeans usually live in neighbourhoods
where many illegal Turks and Moroccans reside (near A) and are thus
not spatially embedded in a legal Eastern European community. The few
legal Eastern Europeans in The Hague (staff of embassies and interna-
tional organisations) live primarily in the more upmarket city districts
(near B).
In the neighbourhoods where the fieldwork took place, an informal
commercial housing sector has emerged. This informal sector is particu-
larly important to illegal migrants who cannot fall back on the support of
family or friends in the Netherlands. Both in Rotterdam and in The Ha-
gue, landlords of mainly Dutch, Turkish or Hindu-Surinamese origin
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offer accommodation to indigent people, in general, and illegal mi-
grants, in particular. They rent out floors, rooms and beds. Premises
where ten to 30 people can rent a bunk bed are called ‘sleeping houses’
by the local residents. It usually concerns rundown houses. In the com-
mercial circuit, the price for a bed turns out to be about 150-250 euros
and the price for a flat is 600-700 euros. This is clearly more than the
amount paid by illegal migrants who live-in with their family or acquain-
tances, usually for free, or sublet a flat from a friend or family member
(150-400 euros).
Figure 2.6 Distribution of Eastern Europeans across The Hague
Left: First- and second-generation legal Eastern Europeans (% of total population)
Right: Illegal Eastern Europeans (relative concentration)
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
Although illegal migrants from Eastern Europe often live in rural horti-
cultural areas, some were also found in Bospolder-Tussendijken and, in
rather larger numbers, in De Schilderswijk. They were mainly Bulgar-
ians. The men usually spent the night in sleeping houses and were
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picked up by minivans in De Schilderswijk and taken to the greenhouses
in the nearby Westland area every workday (Engbersen et al. 2006). The
men slept in sleeping houses because of their relatively modest incomes,
but also because of the absence of established family members and com-
patriots in the neighbourhood. A lack of economic capital drives this
group to deprived neighbourhoods, while a lack of social capital makes
them dependent on the commercial circuit within these neighbour-
hoods, though the men also stayed in these houses more or less by
choice. The Bulgarians, for instance, told us that they had come to the
Netherlands first of all to earn money for their families. These labour
migrants, or ‘birds of passage’ (Piore 1979), aim for a temporary stay in
the Netherlands and hope to save as much money as possible. They are
therefore willing to make concessions as to how they are housed. This
phenomenon has also been observed among legally resident labour mi-
grants. In the nineteenth century, there were ‘migrant hostels’ for coun-
try folk who had moved to town (De Regt 1984; De Swaan 1988) and
many Mediterranean guest workers, who came to the Netherlands in the
twentieth century, lived initially in similar simple guesthouses (Boven-
kerk et al. 1985; Bolt & Van Kempen 2002). It may well be, however,
that the present-day sleeping houses are more overcrowded and run-
down than in the past, because illegal migrants are more prone to exploi-
tation. They probably have fewer alternative housing opportunities than
legal migrants had in the past and, moreover, have no rights if they com-
plain about the quality of their housing. The importance of cheap room-
ing houses and ‘flophouses’ (‘flop’ was slang for bed in the 1920s) is also
documented by scholars from the early Chicago School (see Anderson
1923/1967 and Zorbaugh 1929).
Economic activity
The compiled database enables us to examine to what extent illegal resi-
dence correlates with the neighbourhood economy. It was found that
there is indeed an elevated concentration of illegal residence in neigh-
bourhoods that contain more businesses in the commercial service in-
dustry. Activity in semi-governmental institutions (ministries, schools,
hospitals, etc.) does not influence the number of illegal migrants. The
latter observation is fairly unremarkable. After all, if semi-governmental
institutions do offer illegal migrants chances of work, it will be merely
indirectly, for example, through cleaning agencies located elsewhere.
These observations suggest that illegal migrants more often work in
service industries than in manufacturing – at least in their immediate
living environment. There are several explanations for this selective la-
bour pattern. First of all it is common knowledge that illegal migrants
often perform jobs with little social prestige, which do not appeal to the
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established working population (Visser & Van Zevensbergen 2001; Eng-
bersen et al. 2002). Whereas low-skilled industrial labour has been lar-
gely automated and transferred to low-wage countries over recent dec-
ades, such cost savings were often impossible in the more labour-
intensive service industries. Small and medium-sized enterprises, in-
cluding most ethnic shops, often depend on cheap and informal labour
in order to make their business pay (Stepick 1989). Over recent decades
in the personal service industry in the Netherlands many new migrant
enterprises have emerged that often have access to illegal migrants in
their personal networks, at least more so than Dutch industrial entrepre-
neurs (Kloosterman, Van der Leun & Rath 1998; Van Tillaart 2001). Ac-
cording to some professionals, some illegal migrants travel to the Neth-
erlands on tourist visas as labour migrants, to find jobs in ethnic shops
or small family businesses with the help of family and friends. Finally,
the risk of getting caught may differ per sector. Industrial enterprises are
generally larger than service companies. Checking small firms for illegal
workers may be inefficient.
The place of residence and place of work of illegal migrants are linked
in several ways. Several respondents told us that they took up residence
in the neighbourhood after they had found work there by asking around
(Engbersen et al. 2006). Others were unemployed for a while and stayed
in the neighbourhood after they ultimately found work there. For speci-
fic groups of illegal migrants the place of residence and place of work are
actually one and the same: they sleep at their workplace. Police data sug-
gest this occurs primarily in businesses that cannot provide illegal work-
ers with suitable accommodation in the immediate vicinity, such as Chi-
nese restaurants, which are often located outside migrant districts in the
Netherlands, and brothels in inner cities or rural areas. However, some
professionals told us that these practices sometimes take place in mi-
grant neighbourhoods as well. According to these informants, such
housing practices may indicate human trafficking and exploitation (see
also Van der Leun & Vervoorn 2004).
Economic activity may promote illegal residence, but the reverse may
also be the case: the presence of illegal migrants sometimes promotes
specific types of economic activity. In particular, in De Schilderswijk,
many small semi-legal and shady employment agencies have been re-
cently established to recruit illegal migrants (Zuidam & Grijpstra 2004).
The companies that make use of their services, such as the Dutch horti-
culture greenhouses in the nearby Westland, are often located else-
where. In this way the clients can profit from illegal migrant labour in
spite of government regulations and increased checks on illegal labour.
The companies themselves do not risk the increased fines, as the em-
ployees are formally employed by the employment agencies.
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The effects of the neighbourhood economy on the concentration of
illegal residence demonstrate the surplus value of multiple regression
analyses. The twenty districts with the most illegal migrants are charac-
terised by a low number of businesses in the commercial service sector
(see Table 2.1). It appears that the elevated rate of illegal residence in
these concentration areas is brought about mostly by the remaining di-
mensions of the opportunity structure of illegal residence, such as the
presence of ethnic minorities. Hence, it is likely that the rate of illegal
residence there would increase further if more small businesses were
set up. After all, it would then become more attractive to have a family
member come over illegally, as it is more certain that the follow-up mi-
grant will be able to earn his or her own living and will thus not consti-
tute a financial burden.
Private homeownership
The presence of private rental accommodation – indicated in Table 2.2
by the percentage of private homeownership, since geographical data on
private renting were not available – exerts an independent effect on the
degree of illegal residence as well. On average, more illegal migrants
turn out to live in deprived neighbourhoods with many immigrants and
private homeownership than in comparable neighbourhoods where
most of the housing stock is in the hands of housing associations, as is
the case in most concentration areas.
It can be assumed that it is easier to house illegal migrants in privately
owned houses than in houses that belong to housing associations (Bur-
gers 1998). There are two reasons for this. First, illegal migrants can no
longer be the main tenants of houses owned by associations. The imple-
mentation of the Koppelingswet, the 1998 law that made it possible to
limit the access of illegal migrants to public services, means that hous-
ing associations are now obliged to check the residence status of poten-
tial tenants in the population register (see Van der Leun 2003). Private
landlords do not have this obligation, so illegal migrants can rent in the
private sector, whereas they have only indirect access to housing associa-
tion houses as either informal sub-tenants or housemates. Secondly, pri-
vate premises can more easily be made suitable for occupation by a lar-
ger number of people than intended (see Botman & Van Kempen 2001).
It turns out that some landlords set up partition walls in their houses in
order to rent out as many small rooms or beds as possible. A small num-
ber of landlords in districts such as Bospolder-Tussendijken and De
Schilderswijk own hundreds of houses. In addition, there are many
small private landlords who rent out one or two houses to migrants who
lack residence permits.
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The positive effect of private homeownership is revealed using multi-
ple regression analyses. In the twenty concentration neighbourhoods
(see Table 2.1), most houses are owned by housing associations. It seems
that most illegal migrants follow the residential pattern of the legal, non-
Western immigrants with whom they live as housemates or subtenants.
At present most non-Western immigrants live in housing association
homes (Van der Wouden & Bruijne 2001). So the rate of illegal residence
would probably rise somewhat in these concentration areas, and in the
Netherlands in general, if established non-Western immigrants lived in
the vicinity of privately owned homes to a greater extent.
Singles
Personal relations between single people and illegal migrants have so far
not been given much attention in the literature though previous research
has documented that illegal migrants sometimes enter into relationships
with legal residents in order to obtain residence permits (Staring 1998;
Engbersen 2001). Furthermore, Burgers (1998) pointed to the reciprocal
character of some relationships, which he often encountered among ille-
gal prostitutes or ex-prostitutes.
The presence of single people indeed appears to increase the rate of
illegal residence even though it was suspected initially that the correla-
tion was spurious. Illegal migrants as well as singles are overrepresented
in poorer urban environments; like illegal migrants, many singles have
lower incomes than people with families or those who cohabit. And in-
deed, the effect of the percentage of singles on the concentration of ille-
gal residence decreases when the percentage of non-Western immi-
grants and the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood are
controlled for. Still, the effect of the percentage of singles does not dis-
appear.7 The positive correlation between the rate of illegal residence and
the percentage of singles therefore cannot be attributed entirely to the
fact that, as a rule, illegal migrants happen to live in neighbourhoods
with many singles and that the districts involved usually have a lower
socioeconomic status.
The neighbourhood studies confirm that there are differing connec-
tions between singles and illegal migrants. First of all, singles appear to
have an increased probability of subletting or partial subletting. The
Dutch rent rebate system enables people with comparatively low in-
comes to rent relatively large houses, parts of which can be sublet to
third parties. Furthermore, there is also the possibility that someone
who initially lived together with a partner continues to rent the house
after separation and sublets parts thereof. According to some profes-
sionals, local residents sometimes rent a self-contained dwelling in order
to become eligible for higher unemployment benefits, whereas they do
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not actually live there but re-let the dwelling to third parties. Some local
residents supposedly see renting a housing association house as a wel-
come opportunity to increase the family income. The formal tenant
moves in with his or her partner or relatives and sublets the housing
association flat to a third party at a higher price. Informal subletting of
social housing can be rather profitable, as the official rent of these sub-
sidised houses is lower than the market value (after deduction of the rent
rebate).
Besides subletting practices, there is also the matter of relationships
between singles and illegal migrants. Several professionals mentioned
that some legal residents have illegal partners. In their view, heterosex-
ual singles are at the very least providing accommodation for illegal mi-
grants of the opposite sex. These residents are quite often older men
who offer illegal young women a roof over their heads. They may well
be indigent single men with relatively few chances on the primary dating
market. An employee of a housing association in The Hague told us that
he encountered several cases each month involving residents officially
registered as singles – legal immigrants as well as Dutch natives – who
had their partners come over illegally or who felt obliged to let their part-
ners reside illegally in the Netherlands after a residence permit had ex-
pired, for instance because they could not prove that they would be able
to support their partner. In the Netherlands the criteria for having a part-
ner come over from outside the EU have recently become more restric-
tive (Chapter 1, also see Snel et al. 2005). Furthermore, the local alien
police regularly receive calls from people who claim to have ended their
relationships and indicate that their partners are now probably residing
illegally somewhere in the Netherlands, perhaps somewhere else in the
postcode area.
Determinants in combination and interaction
So far, we have seen that the spread of the illegal population is related to
the distribution of non-Western ethnic minorities, the distribution of
low-income and high-income households, the distribution of certain
types of economic activity, the distribution of privately owned cheap
housing and the distribution of poor single people. In other words: the
patterns of spatial incorporation of illegal migrants parallel the more
comprehensive allocation patterns among legal migrants, economic ac-
tivity and single households, as well as elaborating on them. And yet the
socioeconomic nature of the forces that determine the spatial incorpora-
tion of illegal migrants does not, as such, provide sufficient explanation
for the high degree of spatial concentration of the illegal population. Ille-
gal residence is concentrated in a limited number of environments pri-
marily because the opportunity structure of illegal residence is itself spa-
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tially concentrated. The dimensions of this structure exhibit the stron-
gest development in the cities (with the exception of private homeowner-
ship, which occurs relatively often outside the cities). In the cities the
separate dimensions are spatially concentrated in specific residential
areas. After all, legal ethnic groups are not evenly spread across all city
districts. And houses for indigent households, relevant types of econom-
ic activity and indigent singles are also spatially concentrated.
Secondly, the determinants of illegal residence are often concentrated
in the same neighbourhoods. High concentrations of non-Western im-
migrants and single people are after all characteristic of city districts
with a low socioeconomic status. Furthermore, economic activity in the
personal service industry is clustered in urban areas, although within
these areas it is quite evenly distributed. Private homeownership is, at
least in the Netherlands, concentrated in districts where the other di-
mensions of the opportunity structure of illegal residence are relatively
weakly developed. Private homeownership is more often found outside
the cities and, within the city, it is scarcer in poor districts than in afflu-
ent districts. This condition is in principle favourable for deconcentra-
tion of illegal residence. It might be the case that illegal residence in
privately owned houses also occurs in the more well-to-do districts (see
Mahler 1995). However, it is unlikely that this variant, in which a high
rent is paid by a large number of illegal migrants, occurs very often in
the Netherlands (see note 6).
Thirdly, there are interactions between the determinants. The statisti-
cal analyses assumed that each neighbourhood characteristic had a sepa-
rate effect and was independent of the other neighbourhood characteris-
tics. This division into independent factors does not do full justice to the
complex mutual dependencies in social reality (see Elias 1978). For ex-
ample, the cohabitation of a single person and an illegal migrant presup-
poses mutual contact. The opportunities for that depend, among other
things, on the extent to which single people and illegal migrants fall
back on the same neighbourhoods. Some respondents met their partner
in the neighbourhood.
Said is a 29-year-old Moroccan man from Rabat who came to the
Netherlands on a student visa in 1998. Family members who already
lived in the Netherlands were willing to receive him. At first he lived
with his uncle. Since 2000 Said has lived in the Netherlands without
a residence permit. He had discontinued his education and therefore
his temporary residence permit was withdrawn. Shortly thereafter,
Said met Marieke in a café in the neighbourhood where they both
lived. Marieke is a Dutch woman aged 28, who works as a reception-
ist for a small company. They fell in love and after a year Said moved
in with Marieke. As Said is unemployed, Marieke pays for their costs
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of living. They intend to get married before long. According to them,
it is a marriage of love, but they also intend to marry because they
believe that Said will not have to worry about his residence permit
any longer.
Furthermore, opportunities for illegal residence sometimes occur only
when illegal migrants have family in the neighbourhood, more particu-
larly family who have connections with employers. An example of such a
complex interaction effect is the settlement of illegal Bulgarians in the
Randstad, the urban agglomeration of Western Holland. They belong to
a Turkish-speaking minority group in the east of Bulgaria. Particularly in
the recent past, many Turkish agricultural labourers worked in the
greenhouses of the horticultural area called Westland (Braam 1994). An
informal process of ‘ethnic succession’ can currently be observed, in
which some upwardly mobile Turks serve as a ‘middleman minority’
(see Bonacich 1973) between the Dutch employers in the horticultural
sector and the Bulgarian newcomers. The settlement pattern of these
labour migrants presupposes the combined spatial proximity of estab-
lished Turkish immigrants, Dutch horticulturists and cheap private
houses in districts where such newcomers are inconspicuous.
There is a fourth reason for the spatial concentration of illegal resi-
dence. After some time, ‘shadow institutions’ (Scott 1985) or ‘bastard
institutions’ (Hughes 1951/1994) begin to develop in the concentration
districts, catering specifically for illegal residents in the neighbourhood.
These institutions are sometimes legal, and sometimes illegal. They in-
volve Dutch volunteers who teach languages in community centres, un-
qualified ‘doctors’ who provide medical advice and pharmaceuticals in
coffee houses, quasi-legal agencies that provide advice on how to obtain
a residential permit, temporary employment agencies that take care of
the required documents and jobs and so on. These informal institutions
have developed as a result of the ‘favourable’ climate for illegal migrants
to establish themselves, but are now an additional element of it.
Although it is difficult to demonstrate such complex effects using regres-
sion analyses, our statistical findings also suggest that the rate of illegal
residence is in part the result of the extent to which the independent
variables reinforce each other. Note that the trend line in Figure 2.7 – in
which the number of registered home addresses of illegal migrants per
1,000 legal residents, the indicator for the relative concentration of ille-
gal migrants, is compared with the predicted relative concentration of
illegal migrants on the basis of the neighbourhood characteristics (fifth
regression model; each circle in the figure represents an urban neigh-
bourhood) – is not linear, but exponential. This suggests that in concen-
tration areas the actual degree of illegal residence is somewhat greater
than would be predicted on the basis of the sum of the effects of the
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separate independent variables. (Note also that Figure 2.7 shows some
unexplained variance; it turns out, however, that the empirical anomalies
can be accounted for; they do not contradict our theoretical approach.)8
Figure 2.7 Predicted relative concentration in comparison with measured relative
concentration
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-
October 2003
Concluding remarks
On a theoretical and empirical basis it is plausible that the number of
illegal residents in neighbourhoods is determined by the scale on which
legal non-Western immigrants, specific economic activities, cheap hous-
ing opportunities and single people are present in neighbourhoods – as
well as by the extent to which these dimensions of the spatial opportu-
nity structure for illegal residence are coupled with one another in cer-
tain urban neighbourhoods. Not only do the aforementioned neighbour-
hood characteristics facilitate illegal residence, they also generate a
demand for it. Many illegal migrants satisfy economic and other needs
SHADOW PLACES 69
of family members, friends, partners and employers. Seen from this per-
spective, illegal immigration cannot be qualified as undesirable. It en-
compasses all types of migration that also have legal counterparts, such
as chain migration, labour migration, family-forming migration and asy-
lum migration. The foregoing warrants five hypotheses on the spatial
distribution and concentration of illegal migrants in other Western im-
migration countries (see Cornelius et al. 2004).
First, there must be sizeable groups of illegal migrants in other immi-
gration countries as well. After all, most Western countries have had a
migration surplus for several decades, which led to the settlement of a
large number of ethnic minority groups. We have seen that there are
direct and indirect causal relations between legal and illegal immigra-
tion. The other dimensions of the opportunity structure of illegal resi-
dence are also largely present in other immigration countries.
Secondly, it is likely that illegal residence is also spatially concentrated
in other immigration countries. In Western societies – since industriali-
sation in particular – the social classes exist in relative isolation and the
spheres of living, labour and consumption have become more segre-
gated (Lofland 1998; De Swaan 1988; Jargowsky 1997). Western coun-
tries have also always known ethnic segregation (Lofland 1998). The spa-
tial incorporation of illegal migrants follows such class- and ethnicity-
related separations among the legal population and builds on them.
Thirdly, the rate of illegal residence will differ by country. Although it
is hard to say exactly what the combination of factors will be in other
countries, one can observe that the dimensions of the spatial opportunity
structure are not equally well developed everywhere. For example, there
are national differences in the size of the post-industrial service sectors
(Musterd & Van Kempen 2000). And whereas almost 50 per cent of the
households in some northern European cities consist of singles –
although an increasing proportion of these singles are in the final phase
of life – married couples with children are still dominant in southern
Europe (Musterd & Van Kempen 2000). Countries such as Japan and
Greece have only recently become immigration countries.
Fourthly, country-specific variation in the composition of the illegal
population can be expected. The ethnic background of minority groups
is closely related to the European colonial past (Sassen 1999). This ex-
plains, for example, why many illegal Latin Americans live in Spain and
Portugal while the illegal migrants in France and England are predomi-
nantly of African and Asian origin. The extent to which the bottom of the
housing market is subsidised also differs, as does the degree of private
homeownership. For example, in Belgium and France, a large part of the
housing stock is in the hands of private owners (Musterd & Van Kempen
2000). The presence of private homeownership is particularly favour-
able for the illegal ‘forerunners’ without supportive social networks.
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They can rent directly from landlords, some of whom have adjusted their
houses specially for the purpose of leasing to illegal migrants. Illegal
newcomers are then less dependent on the goodwill of their extended
families, friends or acquaintances for accommodation. Social democratic
and corporatist welfare states such as the Netherlands, Germany and the
Scandinavian countries actually offer rather favourable housing condi-
tions for illegal follow-up migration. Newcomers with established family
or friends also benefit from this decommodification of the housing mar-
ket, as sub-tenants paying a ‘friendly price’ or as housemates (see Bur-
gers 1998). The official main tenants, who pay rather low housing costs,
will of course be more readily inclined to re-let their houses or parts
thereof to an illegal acquaintance or family member at a low price. They
can also afford to have an illegal newcomer stay for free more easily.
Fifthly, national differences in the extent of the spatial concentration
of the illegal population may also be expected, although it probably is a
spatially concentrated phenomenon everywhere. The extent of spatial
concentration depends on the degree of socioeconomic and ethnic seg-
regation among the legal population. The Netherlands has a progressive
tax system and pursues an egalitarian income policy on the housing
market as well, with all kinds of rent rebates and building subsidies.
These policies temper residential segregation according to income and
also promote, albeit indirectly and in unforeseen ways, a certain disper-
sion of the illegal population across a somewhat larger number of neigh-
bourhoods. In countries such as the US and Belgium, where the state
pursues a less progressive income policy through the housing market,
illegal residence will be less evenly distributed across the urban land-
scape than in the Netherlands.
The social and economic opportunities for illegal residence and the
willingness and necessity to make use of it will not disappear in the fore-
seeable future. Many developing countries will be facing an increase in
the number of potential emigrants as a result of continuous population
growth and limited economic prospects (Bauman 2004; OECD 2005).
On the demand side, there are also developments that promote both le-
gal and illegal immigration. For example, as a result of the globalisation
of social and economic life in an increasing number of Western coun-
tries, more ethnic groups will maintain transnational relationships
(Portes 1999; Snel et al. 2005). Yet this is certainly not the only determi-
nant of illegal residence that has found a strong foothold in society. Paid
personal services currently constitute one of the largest growth sectors in
Western countries. Furthermore, due to the implementation of neo-lib-
eral privatisation policies, an increasing proportion of the housing stock
is passing into private hands (see O’Loughlin & Friedrichs 1996; Thorns
2002). Finally, in Western city districts, more and more singles yearn for
a partner in life (Blok et al. 2000; Bauman 2003).
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It goes without saying that the uneven global distribution of life oppor-
tunities in a time of intensified globalisation is a root cause of migration
from poor countries to the Western world. Although emigration to a rich
Western country remains a pipe dream for most people in poor coun-
tries, many will continue to try their luck in countries such as the Neth-
erlands. This sub-study shows that, although illegal migrants are ex-
cluded by law from national territories and formal institutions, illegal
residence has become quite firmly embedded in the social and economic
structures of advanced societies.
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3 Against state rules against street rules?
Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated how and why most illegal migrants
live in deprived urban neighbourhoods. This spatial concentration of il-
legal residence in specific urban environments leads to questions that
have not been extensively dealt with in the literature on illegal immigra-
tion or in the literature on neighbourhood safety. Several studies have
analysed how illegal migrants are incorporated into their countries of
settlement (see for instance Mahler 1995; Engbersen 1996; Burgers
1998; Alt 1999; Ehrenreich 2002) and a handful of studies have focused
on the criminal involvement of illegal migrants (Scalia 1996, 2002;
McDonald 1997; Alt 1999, Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001; Zaitch
2002; Van Meeteren, Van San & Engbersen 2008), but no other study
has ever explored the consequences of concentrated illegal residence for
neighbourhood safety.
How safe are neighbourhoods where concentrations of illegal mi-
grants live? Is there more crime, or less? Do people feel more unsafe, or
less so? What is the impact of the presence of illegal migrants, and what
is the influence of the illegal residence status on these effects? These are
the main research questions in this second sub-study.
There are two central reasons for raising these questions. Firstly, it is
plausible that the presence of illegal migrants will impact neighbour-
hood crime and safety, though perhaps in complex and differential
ways. It can be hypothesised that illegal migrants are likely to shun po-
lice contacts more than legal residents do, which may have a deterrent
effect on offending. I mentioned in Chapter 1 that other researchers
have dubbed this assumed effect ‘the deterrence thesis’; I also argued
there that it seems to be related to internal border control by means of
secondary territorial exclusion. Conversely, a number of illegal migrants
appear to commit property crimes under the influence of having illegal
residence status; in the Netherlands, particularly, having illegal resi-
dence status increasingly bars people from most legal means of satisfy-
ing conventional needs (Engbersen, Van San & Leerkes 2006; see also
Chapters 5 and 6.) This second hypothesised effect is known as the mar-
ginalisation thesis; in Chapter 1 I argued that the effect appears to be
related to internal border control by means of institutional exclusion.
Similarly, illegal residence status and the various forms of border con-
trol that, to a large extent, define it, may influence the degree of compli-
ance with other formal and informal social rules that are known to be
important for neighbourhood safety, particularly subjective safety, such
as hanging around in public spaces or treating passers-by with subtle
aggression.
The second reason for conducting this explorative sub-study is Shaw
and McKay’s (1942) classic, often replicated finding that street crime is
much more prevalent in poor, ethnically mixed neighbourhoods with
high residential mobility rates – the sort of neighbourhoods where, as
we have seen in the previous chapter, illegal migrants tend to settle –
than in rich, ethnically homogeneous, meaning mostly white, stable
neighbourhoods. This also raises the question whether illegal residence
constitutes, in a more indirect way, an additional burden for the safety of
the poor and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods in the large cities. Even if
it would turn out that illegal migrants tend to comply with social rules
that are important for neighbourhood safety, their presence may erode
safety to the extent that illegal residence weakens neighbourhood organi-
sation even further. Illegal migrants are understandably less likely to re-
port social disorder to the police or to correct deviant behaviour by legal
residents in informal ways.
Traditionally, the social sciences have focused on objective aspects of
safety. How many residents commit crimes? How prevalent are crimes
in a neighbourhood? More recently researchers have also become inter-
ested in perceived safety, especially since research showed that perceived
safety and fear of crime are only to a limited extent determined by objec-
tive crime rates. This scientific interest has social relevance: fear of
crime and more diffuse feelings of social discomfort and annoyance
may harm the quality of social life, as they make people withdraw from
public space (Hale 1996).
This second sub-study tries to answer the aforementioned research
questions with data from a diverse array of sources. Beside police re-
cords, social surveys and administrative data, qualitative fieldwork data
were used that were collected in two urban areas that have high rates of
illegal residence.
The quantitative data are analysed first in order to assess whether, and
how, the rate of illegal residence is associated with indicators of objective
and subjective neighbourhood safety. Subsequently it is examined
whether the qualitative findings confirm the quantitative findings, and
whether the fieldwork provides additional information about the social
mechanisms that may produce the established statistical associations. In
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this way I hope to contribute to the integration of quantitative and quali-
tative perspectives in the literature on public safety (for the desirability of
this integration, see Hale 1996; Ditton & Farrall 2000).
Theoretical starting points
Illegal residence
As mentioned in Chapter 1, illegal migrants in the Netherlands come
from over a hundred countries. The largest groups are Turks, Moroc-
cans, Algerians and Surinamese, generally chain migrants with settled
family in Holland. In the course of the 1990s the numbers and propor-
tions of Eastern Europeans, mostly labour migrants, and rejected asylum
seekers have risen.
To understand the actual implications of having illegal residence sta-
tus we have to consider the opportunity structure for illegal residence as
a whole, i.e. more than simply the laws on immigration and illegal resi-
dence. The previous chapter demonstrated that illegal immigration is
incorporated into Dutch society in several ways, even though the mi-
grants concerned are increasingly excluded by the state. Differences in
social incorporation correspond to differences in life chances. Estab-
lished immigrants from some countries, for example, Turkey, have
formed closely knit social networks in the Netherlands. Illegal newco-
mers from these countries can usually count on support from settled
family members, other relatives, or people who are from the same town
or region in the country of origin. Examples of assistance are temporary
inclusion in the family, borrowing of health insurance cards and finding
a partner or a house. Minorities with a strong tradition of ethnic entre-
preneurship such as the Chinese and Turks also provide work opportu-
nities in ethnic niches. Those who happen to possess less social capital
(Bourdieu 1983; Portes 1998), such as illegal pioneers or chain migrants
from relatively fragmented ethnic groups like the Moroccans, have to
rely on their own resources to a greater degree. Previous research sug-
gests that they may more readily become involved in crime for this rea-
son (Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001).
Eastern European immigrants do not usually have ties with estab-
lished countrymen in the Netherlands. They often work for Dutch entre-
preneurs, in horticulture for example. Some occupy sought-after jobs,
albeit in the informal economy – think of the illegal plumber – but most
do work that is not highly esteemed by the legal population (De Bakker
2001). The geographical proximity of Eastern Europe and the smaller
political distance to the European Union (the migration laws with res-
pect to future member states of the European Union are relatively liber-
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al), make these circular migrants particularly attractive as seasonal work-
ers in Dutch horticulture.
The research period on which this sub-study focuses (1997-2003) pre-
dates the inclusion of countries like Poland and Bulgaria into the EU.
With an eye to this expansion, however, Bulgarians were allowed to visit
Schengen countries, including the Netherlands, without visas since
2001 (Van Gestel 2006) as have Poles since the early 1990s, though as
tourists they were not allowed to work. Those who stayed longer than
three months – which many did – could be arrested for illegal residence.
These spatial and political conditions have had, and still have, the unin-
tended side-effect of small groups of Eastern European ‘tourists’ travel-
ling to Western Europe with intent to commit crimes, mostly burglary,
car theft or pick-pocketing (Van Tilburg & Lammers 2004; see also
Chapter 6). In comparison to most other illegal migrants, Eastern Eur-
opeans from non-EU countries have lower costs, monetary and other-
wise, when they settle illegally, or when they return to the Netherlands
in the case of forced repatriation. Most illegal migrants have to bridge
larger geographical distances and must penetrate borders that are far
less porous. Such differences in migration costs and motives influence
behavioural opportunities and preferences in the Netherlands.
Crime and perceived safety in urban neighbourhoods
Safety has objective and subjective components. Objective safety per-
tains to victimisation i.e. the measurable recorded experience of becom-
ing a victim of a criminal act. Subjective safety concerns the assessment
by residents of the local crime and nuisance rate, and the extent to which
they feel safe, particularly in their own neighbourhoods (Vanderveen
2006).
There is no one-to-one relationship between objective and subjective
safety. People who live in comparable objective circumstances with re-
gard to crime, or who have become victims of a particular crime, usually
do not feel safe to the same degree (Hale 1996). It turns out, for in-
stance, that vulnerable residents are often more frightened than people
who consider themselves relatively invulnerable. This is the primary rea-
son why women, the elderly and singles tend to feel less safe than men,
young adults and cohabitants (Killias 1990). A further reason for the
weak connection between objective and subjective safety is that fearful
people reduce their chances of victimisation by avoiding risky situations
more than the more daring (Mesch 2000).
It is not only – nor even primarily – the crime rate that determines
subjective safety; other signs of disorder are more important (Taylor &
Hale 1986; Lewis & Salem 1986; Markowitz et al. 2001). Examples of
the latter are groups hanging around in public places and begging, being
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noisy, addressing strangers or showing symptoms of alcohol or drug
use. Since Goffman’s work (1963, 1971a) we know that people expect
from each other – and of themselves – that certain unwritten rules be
observed in public space. Transgressions can produce fear and unease.
Besides this, Goffman showed that the absence of shared behavioural
expectations – in sociology also known as anomie – can cause feelings of
risk and discomfort. Hence, norm violations on top of a lack of shared
norms as regards ‘what is appropriate’ in public space, may contribute to
a fear of crime. Signs of disorder that are, strictly speaking, physical –
such as rubbish in the street, graffiti, vandalised pay phones and bus
shelters – may cause anxiety in many residents, and may eventually in-
crease crime rates as more people withdraw from public space (Kelling
& Wilson 1992).
Shaw and McKay’s (1942) ecological studies demonstrated that a large
share of street crime and disorder occurs in socially disorganised neigh-
bourhoods: poor neighbourhoods with unstable residential populations
as well as much ethnic and cultural diversity (see for more recent studies
in this tradition Sampson & Groves 1989; Xu, Fiedler & Flaming 2005).
Such conditions complicate the establishing of contacts between resi-
dents; many social relations are temporary (Bellair 1997; Sampson, Rau-
denbush & Earls 1997). Consensus about respectable or acceptable
norms is therefore more difficult to achieve and the willingness on the
part of residents to protect and defend each other, each other’s property
or shared interests, for example, by correcting each other’s children, di-
minishes. Social disorganisation also hampers the efforts of specialised
agents of social control, like the police, to help preserve public order
(Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Velez 2001). As a result, there is less resis-
tance to anti-social behaviour, including crimes, committed by residents
and offenders from other areas. Groups that do not live up to widely
shared social standards – such as bohemians, petty criminals and home-
less people – often prefer disorganised areas and/or are successfully
barred from the better-organised neighbourhoods.
Stereotypes
In order to understand subjective neighbourhood safety, in particular, it is
necessary to pay attention to stereotypes about the, in a sociological
sense, assumed statuses of residents in a neighbourhood. Unlike villag-
ers, most city dwellers are strangers to one another. In public space peo-
ple need to employ fast and shallow assessments of others in order to
orientate themselves in social traffic; in everyday life, city dwellers de-
pend heavily on stereotypes, such as ethnic or sex stereotypes (Hamilton
& Trolier 1986). Such stereotypes are usually not based on experiences
with the particular stranger involved, but drawn from experiences with,
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or stories about comparable persons from similar social categories. Vi-
sual characteristics in particular, such as care for external appearances,
projected attitude, external care, clothing, or skin colour activate these
stereotypes.
In the United States young black men are strongly associated with
criminality. Because of this stereotype local residents tend to overesti-
mate the scale of neighbourhood crime in proportion to the degree to
which the number of local black youths increases, especially if they
themselves are white (Chiricos, Hogan & Gertz 1997; Quillian & Pager
2001). In Europe, too, minorities – particularly non-Western ones – are
traditionally associated with crime and disorder (see for example Van
Heek 1936; Angel-Ajani 2003). Such stereotypes tend to exaggerate
group differences (Elias & Scotson 1965; Van San & Leerkes 2001).
This raises the question of whether residents see illegal migrants as a
separate social type and, if so, to what extent they associate this type with
rule violation. Because illegal residence status is first of all an adminis-
trative feature that is not directly visible from the outside, it may well be
that other stereotypes that are associated with illegal migrants are acti-
vated in public space, for example, the stereotypes about non-Western
newcomers. We must therefore take into account perceptions of parallel
statuses among illegal migrants (see the next section). I will go into these
issues, which are hard to answer with the available statistical data, when
I report the qualitative findings.
The status-set of illegal migrants and legal residents
Sociologists use the term status to describe positions in the social struc-
ture to which specific behavioural expectations, or roles, are attached.
The strong or hierarchical variant of the concept refers to the position of
an individual or group in a social hierarchy, which is based on the rela-
tive degree of access to economic, political and cultural resources and
social esteem.
Most adults have a ‘status-set’ (Merton 1957): they must combine sev-
eral, sometimes conflicting, statuses and roles. For instance, a woman
who holds a managerial position has a different role and level of social
prestige as a manager than as a mother. This also applies to illegal mi-
grants. They have to deal with the illegal residence status and at the
same time with their role as a man or woman and, depending on the
circumstances, as an employee, a partner, a kinsman or a drug addict.
Engbersen (1996) has argued that the illegal residence status is a mas-
ter status (Hughes 1945) that overshadows parallel statuses. While it is
obvious that immigration statuses influence life chances greatly, at least
in a highly bureaucratised country like the Netherlands, it is question-
able whether illegal residence status has much direct weight in subjec-
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tive neighbourhood safety. It may be that local residents do not see illegal
migrants in their midst, but rather the more visible parallel statuses, like
foreigners, men, or poor. Thus, whereas the master status may dominate
illegal migrants’ behaviour, it may be that the environment reacts pri-
marily to parallel statuses.
Certain statuses, like the status of being poor are causally linked to the
condition of being categorised as an illegal migrant. Relatively poor mi-
grants from non-Western countries have a relatively small chance of ob-
taining a residence permit and, hence, a vanishingly small chance to
earn a high income, particularly in a country like the Netherlands. But
an illegal residence status is much less causally related to other statuses
(such as gender and age) if at all. Migrants as such tend to be young men
because older people and women are less mobile; illegal migrants – who
are, on average age, 30 years old – are no exception (see Van der Leun
2003). We must therefore take into consideration whether possible ef-
fects on subjective neighbourhood safety are closely connected with ille-
gal migrants as illegal migrants, when illegal residence might be seen as
an intrinsic threat or sign of disorder, with parallel statuses that may be
caused in part by residence status (for example, the status of drug ad-
dict), or with statuses that many of them have but are nonetheless quite
independent of these immigrants living in illegal residence (the status of
newcomer or male).
Finally, it is important to think about statuses in relational terms
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). From the perspective of subjective neigh-
bourhood safety the statuses of illegal migrants obtain most of their sig-
nificance in relation to the statuses of established groups. Status anxiety
constitutes a striking example of a relational effect. Because of changes
in the power balance, for instance as a new group makes its entry, an
established group may feel threatened in its social privileges. This per-
ceived threat is stronger the less certain the superior status claim of the
threatened group (Schwartz 1967; Johansson 1987; De Botton 2004).
Sometimes a status group feels threatened in its social prestige, even
though the power balance on which this claim rests is not immediately
at stake. This is because social esteem may, in part, spill over into the
social and physical environment (prestige contagion, Benoit-Smullyan
1944). Where some observers attribute feelings of insecurity to signs of
disorder and dilapidation, a social status perspective might attribute
them partly to status anxiety: many people do not want to be lumped
together with those whom they consider inferior.
Stereotypes about the status-sets of illegal migrants should also be un-
derstood in relation to the statuses of established groups. For instance,
Anderson (1999) has shown that in the United States the stereotypical
fear of black youngsters is amplified by their low social prestige in com-
parison to other social groups. Traditionally, the black middle class can
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claim more prestige than the white lower class, but is of lower standing
in the social hierarchy than the white middle class (Warner 1936). An-
derson’s study suggests ethnicity is still a significant separate dimension
of social stratification in the US, next to, and in interplay with, class dif-
ferences (cf. Berreman 1960; Shibutani & Kwan 1972; Anthias 1990).
Status anxiety has also been described in Dutch cities, in relation to both
class differences (De Swaan 1988; Wuertz 1990) and ethnic differences
(Bovenkerk, Bruin & Wouters 1985). For this reason I explored the ques-
tion as to what extent the arrival of illegal newcomers produces status
anxiety among at least parts of the settled population. Illegal migrants
are among the lowest socioeconomic strata in the country of settlement
and most originate from poor non-Western countries. They may have
low prestige and may be seen as intensifying the status competition for
life chances, such as labour and access to housing.
Data and analytical strategy
Quantitative sources
The quantitative analyses apply to the residents of 596 residential neigh-
bourhoods in the police regions that cover the metropolitan areas of the
four largest cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Ha-
gue and Utrecht. In line with previous research in the Netherlands (Van
Wilsem, Wittebrood & De Graaf 2006; Goudriaan, Wittebrood & Nieuw-
beerta 2006), a neighbourhood is defined in terms of a postcode area.
Such areas contain on average roughly 2,000 households and 5,000 in-
dividuals.
The Dutch Bureau for Statistics (CBS) provides demographic, social
and economic statistics data on these neighbourhoods on a regular ba-
sis. Data on homeownership were made available by the Ministry of
Housing.
Three variables were chosen to measure the level of social disorganisa-
tion in the neighbourhoods: the percentage of single-person households,
the percentage of homeownership and the percentage of legal non-Wes-
tern ethnic minorities. In the literature it is not uncommon to use such
established determinants, or at least correlates, of social disorganisation
to measure the extent of social disorganisation, rather than measuring
social disorganisation directly (see for example Wei et al. 2005). The per-
centage of legal non-Western ethnic minorities was chosen because in
the Netherlands it correlates very strongly with more complex and theo-
retically superior measures of ethnic heterogeneity that take into account
the mix of specific ethnic groups (Bernasco & Luykx 2003: 988-989).
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Estimates of illegal residence in the neighbourhoods were derived
from the VAS, a police database dedicated to the registration of foreign-
ers living in the Netherlands, including all apprehended illegal migrants.
The rate of illegal residence is indicated by the number per 1,000 legal
residents of registered residential addresses of illegal migrants who have
been apprehended by the police somewhere in the Netherlands between
January 1997 and October 2003. The number of individuals involved in
this sub-study is quite substantial: 10,497 apprehensions with a regis-
tered residential address in the 596 neighbourhoods. The records were
provided by the 25 Dutch regional police departments. The VAS mainly
contains data on illegal migrants who have risked apprehension for
some reason. Therefore the system is unlikely to be completely represen-
tative for all illegal migrants. We have seen, however, that good results
could be obtained using these data; it demonstrated statistical patterns
that confirmed theoretical expectations on the basis of qualitative re-
search conducted in the Netherlands and elsewhere (see Chapter 2).
In the Netherlands the aliens police have the primary responsibility
for the supervision of illegal migrants. This department has an impor-
tant role in detecting illegal residence and illegal labour though most
illegal migrants are apprehended during routine policing activities. Dur-
ing the research period specific raids became more frequent in Amster-
dam, Rotterdam and The Hague, as well as in some rural concentration
areas. These raids mainly targeted the overcrowded illegal sleeping
houses that were already mentioned in Chapter 1. Employers were also
increasingly subjected to checks by the labour inspectorate. As a result,
far from all apprehensions are related to crimes or misdemeanours; this
is only the case for slightly more than half of apprehended illegal mi-
grants. In 2003 eight per cent concerned misdemeanours like urinating
in public and fare-dodging; 43 per cent concerned crimes, mainly prop-
erty crimes, identity fraud and drug dealing, as well as some violence
(Leerkes et al. 2004; 24-25).
Because the likelihood of apprehension increases with the degree of
criminal involvement, criminal illegal migrants are likely to be overre-
presented in the police data. For this sub-study this selectivity is, how-
ever, partially compensated for by a lower likelihood of criminal illegal
migrants having a registered residential address: it turns out that rela-
tively few criminal illegal migrants have a residential address that has
been registered by the police.1 Although the number of targeted crack-
downs on illegal labour and illegal residence has increased in the cities
of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague (Boekhoorn, Speller & Kruijs-
sen 2004; Van Gestel 2006; see also Chapter 6), large geographic differ-
ences in the likelihood of apprehension were not found.
Assessments of neighbourhood safety were taken from the Police Moni-
tor, a comprehensive biannual national survey on criminal victimisation,
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fear of crime, local physical and social disorder and satisfaction with po-
lice services. To improve the reliability of the assessments the surveys for
the years 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003 were taken together. In the 596
neighbourhoods 78,927 respondents were interviewed over these four
years. Unfortunately, ethnic minorities are under-represented, in part
because the survey is administered in the Dutch language only (Schoen,
Defize & Bakker 2000). The participation of illegal migrants in the sur-
vey is possible, but unlikely for this and similar reasons.
Vulnerability is indicated by the following characteristics of the respon-
dents in the Police Monitor: being female, being middle-aged or older,
membership of an ethnic minority (Covington & Taylor 1991), unem-
ployment, low educational attainment and being part of a small house-
hold. The survey measures the number of victimisations of specific
types of offences during the past twelve months. For every offence except
residential burglary respondents were asked to report whether the of-
fence took place in their own neighbourhood or elsewhere. For the ana-
lyses reported here, only victimisation in the respondent’s neighbour-
hood is used (see Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics per offence type).
The criminal victimisation variable that is used in the analysis of sub-
jective safety is a factor score of two measures: ‘number of incidents of
criminal victimisation during past year’ and ‘number of types of inci-
dents of criminal victimisation during past year’.2 The ‘neighbourhood
victimisation rate’ refers to the average number of victimisations of any
type, experienced by other neighbourhood members participating in the
survey. It is thus an aggregated neighbourhood level variable.
The PM survey contains various items that tap subjective aspects of
public safety in residential neighbourhoods. Some specifically apply to
fear of crime, while others refer to annoyances such as noise nuisance,
or signs of physical deterioration or neglect. Using factor analysis, the
items were reduced to six dimensions that can be meaningfully inter-
preted. The six dimensions of subjective safety are listed below.3
– Feeling unsafe. Included items are ‘Do you ever feel unsafe?’, ‘Do you
ever avoid certain places because they are unsafe?’, ‘Do you ever re-
fuse to open the front door because it is unsafe?’, ‘Do you ever leave
things at home for fear of being robbed?’, ‘Do you ever take an alter-
native route to avoid going through unsafe places?’
– Perceived magnitude of property crimes. Included items are ‘How often
does this occur in your neighbourhood?’ for each of the following:
bicycle theft, theft from cars, theft of cars, burglary
– Perceived magnitude of physical deterioration. Included items are ‘How
often does this occur in your neighbourhood?’ for each of the follow-
ing: litter and dog droppings on street, vandalism, graffiti.
– Perceived magnitude of social deterioration. Included items are ‘How
often does this occur in your neighbourhood?’ for each of the follow-
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ing: people who are drunk, people who annoy others, people who
make threats, violent crimes, drug crimes.
– Perceived magnitude of nuisances. Included items are ‘How often does
this occur in your neighbourhood?’ for each of the following: noise
nuisance (except traffic noise), juveniles hanging around, nuisance
behaviour by immediate neighbours.
– Perceived magnitude of traffic nuisances. Included items are ‘How often
does this occur in your neighbourhood?’ for each of the following:
aggressive behaviour in traffic, loud traffic noise, speeding and traffic
accidents.
The following strategy is used for the quantitative analyses. First, I will
assess the extent to which there is a bivariate relationship between the
degree of illegal residence and aspects of subjective neighbourhood
safety. Subsequently, I assess whether these associations persist when,
in addition to the degree of illegal residence, measures of social disorga-
nisation and other determinants of neighbourhood safety are entered in
a multivariate model. If the degree of illegal residence affects neighbour-
hood safety when these risk factors are included in the model, there is
some circumstantial evidence that it could be a causal factor in neigh-
bourhood safety. If no association remains, the association between the
degree of illegal residence and neighbourhood safety is likely to be spur-
ious, and possibly caused by the fact that immigrants often have few
other choices than to live in neighbourhoods already disorganised and
unsafe to begin with. I repeat this strategy with regards to objective
neighbourhood safety.
In order to model the six dimensions of subjective neighbourhood
safety, I employ hierarchical linear models, a methodology that takes
into account that variables are measured at different hierarchical levels,
such as the individual or household and the neighbourhood level. In
order to model objective neighbourhood safety ordinary least squares
regression was used. In the latter analyses the percentage of juveniles in
the neighbourhoods is controlled for as a rough proxy for the concentra-
tion of potential offenders engaged in street crimes in the area (e.g. Gott-
fredson and Hirschi 1990). This control is unnecessary when modelling
subjective safety, as these models already include more precise measures
of victimisation and neighbourhood crime.
Victimisation surveys such as the PM supplement police records by
providing insight in the ‘dark number’ of crimes not reported to the po-
lice, and because they tap subjective aspects of public safety (Goudriaan
2006; Levitas & Guy 1996). But they do have their drawbacks. Minor
offences may still be underreported, because respondents have forgotten
them, or do not view the events as offences and sexual offences and do-
mestic violence are also likely to be underreported because respondents
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are unwilling or unable to talk about these experiences. Crimes against
businesses and organisations (shoplifting, commercial burglary, fraud)
and the more consensual crimes (prostitution, drug dealing) are not
touched upon in population surveys, although the latter may be reported
under the heading of subjectively perceived nuisance and social dete-
rioration. Davies, Francis and Jupp (2003) provide a comprehensive
overview of the restrictions that apply to victimisation surveys.
Table 3.1a Descriptive statistics (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neighbourhoods)
Min. Max. Average St. dev.
Independent variables:
Individual level
Sex (male=1) 0 1 0.47 0.5
Age (years) 15 98 48.5 18.1
Dutch by origin (self-categorisation) 0 1 0.89 0.31
Educationa 1 7 4.3 1.9
Employment (employed >15 hours/week) 0 1 0.5 0.5
Household size 1 15 2.3 1.3
Criminal victimisation (scale) -0.68 28.0 0.0 1.0
Neighbourhood level
Rate of illegal residence (number per 1,000) 0 130 2.5 4.7
Neighbourhood victimisation rate (number per 100) 0 6.3 0.75 0.4
% singles 6 79 29.9 14.0
% private homeownership 0 100 39.7 22.1
% non-Western migrants (first- and second-generation)b 1 82 17.4 17.5
% residents aged 14-25 3 30 12.1 2.9
a Includes primary education, lower vocational training, secondary general train-
ing, intermediary vocational training, grammar/high school, higher vocational
training and university.
b See note 3 in Chapter 2.
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS 1997-
October 2003; Geomarktprofiel 1998
Qualitative sources
Fieldwork was carried out in 2003 in the Bospolder-Tussendijken neigh-
bourhood in Rotterdam and the De Schilderswijk neighbourhood in The
Hague. Both neighbourhoods house many first- or second-generation
non-Western immigrants. The value of real estate is typically low. Many
Dutch citizens who could afford to have moved to the suburbs. The
neighbourhoods also have a sizeable student population.
In Bospolder-Tussendijken 65 per cent of the population is of non-
Dutch origin, mostly Turkish, Moroccan, Cape Verdean or Surinamese.
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Table 3.1b Descriptive statistics (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neighbourhoods)
Min. Max. Average St. dev.
Dependent variables:
Individual level
Feeling unsafe (scale) -12.5 18.1 0.0 10
Property crimes (scale) -17.4 11.2 0.0 10
Physical deterioration (scale) -17.9 13.2 0.0 10
Social deterioration (scale) -8.4 23.6 0.0 10
Nuisances (scale) -10.1 20.3 0.0 10
Traffic nuisances (scale) -14.4 13.2 0.0 10
Neighbourhood levelc
Total victimisation rate ( number per 100) 0 588 95.7 62.5
Theft, including: 0 200 34 24.8
Bicycle theft 0 200 6 5.7
Car theft 0 12.5 1.1 1.5
Theft from car 0 200 10.6 11.6
Burglary (including attempt) 0 143.5 10.7 8.4
Robbery 0 2.6 0.2 0.4
Pickpocketing 0 20 1.0 1.2
Other theft 0 100 4.5 4.5
Vandalism, including: 0 208.9 39.8 25.8
Purposeful car damage 0 180.3 31.2 20
Other vandalism 0 80.1 8.6 9
Violence, including: 0 166.7 4.3 7.1
Threatening with violence 0 166.7 3.8 6.5
Assault 0 37.6 0.5 1.9
Traffic crimes, including: 0 344.8 17.6 20.4
Leaving place of accident 0 33.3 2.5 3.7
Collision 0 100 13 14.4
Other crimes 0 326.7 2 11.7
c In OLS regression neighbourhoods are weighted proportionally to the number of
residents.
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS 1997-
October 2003; Geomarktprofiel 1998
In De Schilderswijk, 85 per cent of the population is of non-Dutch ori-
gin, mostly Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan and Netherlands-Antillean.
The neighbourhoods were selected because police data indicated that il-
legal residence is a common phenomenon in both. On top of that, they
appear to represent two faces of illegal residence. In Bospolder-Tussen-
dijken a relatively large percentage of known illegal migrants are ar-
rested because of crimes, while in De Schilderswijk the reason for appre-
hension is mostly illegal residence and illegal labour.
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Twenty professionals were interviewed who could provide a view as to
whether, how and why the presence of illegal migrants impacts neigh-
bourhood safety and liveability. They included police officers some of
whom were from the aliens police, representatives of municipalities and
housing corporations and neighbourhood social workers. Further, a
team of trained interviewers conducted interviews with 70 illegal mi-
grants from six different countries of origin and 45 landlords who pro-
vided accommodation to illegal migrants. The study, which was subsi-
dised by the Ministry of Housing, initially focused on the local housing
situation; illegal migrants were not asked to report on victimisation or
safety issues, but on issues of housing and reasons for settling in the
neighbourhood (for a more comprehensive description, see Leerkes et
al. 2004). The results of these interviews did, however, provide very use-
ful information about the ways in which illegal migrants are embedded
in the two neighbourhoods.
In addition, 101 sociology students from the University of Amsterdam
each interviewed a resident about social relations in the neighbourhood,
in general, and feeling safe or unsafe in the neighbourhood, in particu-
lar. These interviews contained some directed questions on illegal resi-
dence that were posed later during the interview, in order to allow spon-
taneous answers and associations to emerge during the first phase.
These interviews took place until March 2006, in part after the fieldwork
was finished. To increase sample variation the students, who typically
worked in pairs, were to interview a male and a female, a younger and
an older, a native and a non-native resident; the combination of charac-
teristics was not prescribed. The students recruited respondents by ring-
ing doorbells or buttonholing people on the street. Students were free to
choose either neighbourhood. Most interviews, 66, took place in De
Schilderswijk in The Hague. Interviews were held with 43 Dutch (23
male, 20 female), 25 Turkish (twenty male, five female), nineteen Mor-
occan (thirteen male, six female), five Surinamese (three males), two
Netherlands Antillean (one male, one female) and seven residents from
various other ethnic groups (three male, four female). About half the
sample was 30-55 years of age, one-third was above 55 and one-fifth was
below 30. In line with the demographic structure of the neighbour-
hoods, the older respondents were mostly Dutch, while the younger gen-
erations were predominantly of foreign origin.
The findings of the fieldwork should not be generalised to urban
neighbourhoods, because both neighbourhoods were selected precisely
because of the concentration and overrepresentation of illegal residence.
It is likely that the social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are
more pronounced and observable in the selected neighbourhoods than
they are elsewhere. Furthermore, the qualitative results were entirely de-
pendent on the views of residents and professionals in the neighbour-
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hoods and not based on direct observations. Illegal residence may have
various effects on the neighbourhood without the respondents being
aware of it. And the opposite is true as well: respondents might blame
or commend illegal migrants for certain phenomena, without the immi-
grants playing any substantive role in them. The quantitative analyses
have the advantage that effects of illegal residence are derived indirectly
from the registered level of illegal residence in the neighbourhood, and
do not depend on whether the residents are consciousness of possible
effects.
As in the previous chapter, the stories of illegal migrants, residents
and professionals could nonetheless be compared with each other and
with the quantitative findings. This triangulation provides additional va-
lidity, contributing to a plausible description and explanation of the rela-
tions between illegal residence and neighbourhood safety. The criterion
for plausibility is that interpretations are consistent with theory and sup-
ported by the empirical findings (Merton 1948).
Quantitative findings
Illegal residence and perceived risk in the neighbourhood
The analysis starts with an exploration of the relationship between illegal
residence and subjective neighbourhood safety. Table 3.2 shows the ef-
fects of the rate of illegal residence on six dimensions of perceived risk,
for five regression models that are increasingly comprehensive in terms
of the number of independent variables included. Table 3.2 shows only
the effects of the rate of illegal residence. Table 3.3 displays additional
information for model IV, the most comprehensive model.
Model I summarises the bivariate relations between the rate of illegal
residence and insecurity. It shows that perceived risk increases along
with any increase in the level of illegal residence, a conclusion that holds
for all six aspects of perceived safety. Illegal migrants are overrepre-
sented in neighbourhoods where residents feel less comfortable and
safe.
Should these lower levels of subjective safety be attributed to the pre-
sence of illegal migrants, to individual characteristics of residents, to
other neighbourhood characteristics or to all these factors simulta-
neously? The second model (II) assesses whether the differences in vul-
nerability explain neighbourhood differences in subjective safety. If that
were the case, vulnerable social groups would be overrepresented in
neighbourhoods with high levels of illegal residence. Yet a comparison
between models I and II shows that the effect of illegal residence on
subjective safety does not diminish when the individual characteristics
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indicating vulnerability are taken into consideration. It seems that resi-
dents of neighbourhoods with high levels of illegal residence are not in-
dividually predisposed to feel particularly unsafe. This is in line with the
observation that in fact the demographic structure of the neighbour-
hoods with the highest levels of illegal residence does not indicate vul-
nerability, since young males turn out to be overrepresented in such
neighbourhoods. For example, neighbourhoods where the concentration
of illegal residence is at least one standard deviation above the mean
have fewer people over the age of 65 (8.7 per cent against 14.2 in other
urban neighbourhoods) and more males (51.4 per cent against 48.7 per
cent elsewhere).
Table 3.2 Non-standardised effects of the rate of illegal residence on six measures of
subjective safety (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neighbourhoods)a
Model Feeling
unsafe
Property
crime
Physical
deterioration
Social
deterioration
Nuisances Traffic
nuisances
I 0.193*** 0.166*** 0.179*** 0.298*** 0.183*** 0.197***
II 0.192*** 0.167*** 0.179*** 0.299*** 0.183*** 0.188***
IIIa 0.079*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.206*** 0.092*** 0.132***
IIIb -0.040* -0.023 -0.030 0.002 -0.026 0.015
IV -0.042* -0.023 -0.028 0.002 -0.031 0.014
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
a Linear hierarchical regression models; all other effects not shown.
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS
(1997-October 2003); Geomarktprofiel 1998
Possibly the causes of the lower levels of safety should be sought in
neighbourhood characteristics. In model III our indicators for social dis-
organisation are added. Because the rate of illegal residence tends to be
relatively closely associated with the percentage of non-Western legal im-
migrants in a neighbourhood, a distinction is made between, on the one
hand, demographic and economic indicators (percentage of singles and
percentage of private home ownership in model IIIa) and, on the other
hand, an ethnic-cultural indicator (percentage of legal non-Western im-
migrants in model IIIb).
The outcomes of model IIIa show that the effect of the rate of illegal
residence on subjective safety decreases substantially when indicators
for social disorganisation are taken into account. It decreases to about
half the initial size when neighbourhood differences in the percentage
of single-person households and private home ownership are added to
the model. When the percentage of legal non-Western immigrants is in-
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cluded too (model IIIb), the effect of the rate of illegal residence disap-
pears completely, for all six dimensions of subjective neighbourhood
safety. Indeed, for one dimension, unsafe feelings, a small negative effect
is found.
Table 3.3 Non-standardised effects on six measures of subjective neighbourhood safety:
Full model IV (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neighbourhoods)
Independent
variables
Feeling
unsafe
Property
crime
Physical
deterioration
Social
deterioration
Nuisances Traffic
nuisances
Individual level:
Male -0.024 -0.168** -0.085 0.036 -0.109 0.023
Age 0.004 0.005* -0.005* 0.000 0.001 0.001
Native Dutch 0.087 0.006 0.183 0.195* 0.214 0.335***
Education 0.036 0.054** -0.002 0.006 0.049** 0.024
Employed 0.019 0.088 0.009 0.033 0.130 -0.033
Household size -0.029 0.050 0.001 0.045 0.009 0.050
Victimisation 0.076** -0.207*** -0.117*** -0.022 -0.011 -0.217***
Neighbourhood level:
% singles 0.082*** 0.055*** 0.026** 0.090*** 0.023*** 0.066***
% homeowners -0.021*** 0.021*** -0.034*** -0.002 -0.030*** 0.021***
% non-Western
immigrants a
0.066*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.140*** 0.059*** 0.059***
Victimisation rate 0.627** 2.783*** 2.459*** 2.756** 1.853*** 1.315***
Rate illegal residence -0.042* -0.023 -0.028 0.002 -0.031 0.014
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
a As per the definition of the Dutch Bureau for Statistics, non-Western immigrants are
either: 1) born in Turkey, Africa, Asia (except Japan and Indonesia) or South America or
2) are second-generation, meaning at least one parent was born in one of these regions.
Also see note 3 of Chapter 2.
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS 1997-Octo-
ber 2003; Geomarktprofiel 1998
The final version of the model (model IV) introduces individual and
neighbourhood level variables of victimisation. It turns out that both the
amount of individual victimisation and the level of criminal victimisa-
tion reported by other neighbourhood residents decrease subjective
safety on most of the six dimensions distinguished (Table 3.3). The inclu-
sion of the victimisation variables, however, has no further conse-
quences for the effects of the rate of illegal residence on subjective
neighbourhood safety.
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Table 3.4 Standardised effects of the rate of illegal residence on residents’ within-
neighbourhood victimisation rates (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neigh-
bourhoods) a
Dependent variables Model I Model IIa Model IIb Model III
Total victimisation rate 0.525*** 0.342*** 0.133*** 0.128***
Theft, including: 0.554*** 0.384*** 0.179*** 0.174***
Bicycle theft 0.406*** 0.210*** 0.070** 0.064*
Car theft 0.507*** 0.407*** 0.266*** 0.264***
Theft from car 0.608*** 0.455*** 0.190*** 0.186***
Burglary (including attempt) 0.282*** 0.240*** 0.203*** 0.198***
Robbery 0.325*** 0.181*** -0.007 -0.007
Pickpocketing 0.301*** 0.151*** 0.117** 0.116**
Other theft 0.173*** 0.041 -0.087 -0.092
Vandalism, including: 0.488*** 0.320*** 0.102** 0.091**
Purposeful car damage 0.509*** 0.348*** 0.111** 0.101**
Other vandalism 0.266*** 0.143*** 0.044 0.037
Violence, including: 0.228*** 0.122*** 0.052 0.049
Threaten with violence 0.223*** 0.117*** 0.063 0.061
Assaultb 0.196*** 0.099** -0.022 -0.024
Traffic crimes, including: 0.242*** 0.135*** 0.044 0.048
Leaving place of accident 0.319*** 0.238*** 0.102** 0.103*
Collision 0.239*** 0.142*** 0.008 0.014
Other crimes 0.028 -0.014 0.035 0.035
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
a Based on OLS regression analyses; all other effects not shown.
b Because the distribution of assault victimisation across neighbourhoods is very
skewed, a square root transformation was applied in order to approximate the
normal distribution.
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS 1997-
October 2003; Geomarktprofiel 1998
Illegal residence and criminal victimisation in the neighbourhood
This section focuses on the relation between illegal residence and objec-
tive neighbourhood safety. It discusses the results of ordinary least
squares regression models of neighbourhood characteristics on the with-
in-the-neighbourhood rate of victimisation of various types of crime.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 follow the same structure as Tables 3.2 and 3.3, but
have been transposed. Table 3.4 shows the effects of the rate of illegal
residence on victimisation rates for various types of crime. It does so for
four different models, each more comprehensive than the one before.
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The complete outcomes of model III, including the estimated coeffi-
cients of all independent variables, are presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Other standardised effects on residents’ within-neighbourhood victimisation
rates: Full model III (N=78,927 respondents; N=596 neighbourhoods)
Dependent variables % non-
Western
migrants
%
singles
%
home
owners
%
aged
15-24
%
illegal
residence
R2
Total victimisation rate 0.337*** 0.505*** 0.032 0.069** 0.128*** 0.615
Theft, including: 0.328*** 0.566*** 0.113*** 0.072** 0.174*** 0.659
Bicycle theft 0.211*** 0.719*** 0.098** 0.073*** 0.064* 0.667
Car theft 0.238*** 0.131*** 0.069 0.026 0.264*** 0.339
Theft from car 0.446*** 0.465*** 0.137*** 0.054* 0.186*** 0.654
Burglary (including attempt) 0.033 0.257*** 0.097 0.063 0.198*** 0.137
Robbery 0.345*** 0.308*** -0.010 -0.012 -0.007 0.286
Pickpocketing 0.058 0.492*** -0.025 0.007 0.116** 0.338
Other theft 0.212*** 0.350*** -0.003 0.037 -0.092 0.195
Vandalism, including: 0.319*** 0.429*** 0.015 0.132*** 0.091** 0.529
Purposeful car damage 0.353*** 0.375*** 0.011 0.133*** 0.101** 0.521
Other vandalism 0.131* 0.395*** 0.017 0.083** 0.037 0.249
Violence, including: 0.105 0.185*** -0.105* 0.038 0.049 0.134
Threaten with violence 0.086 0.193*** -0.111* 0.019 0.061 0.131
Assaulta 0.186** 0.113** -0.096 0.050 -0.024 0.112
Traffic crimes, including: 0.194** 0.252*** -0.022 -0.054 0.048 0.155
Leaving place of accident 0.251*** 0.229*** 0.066 -0.012 0.103* 0.173
Collision 0.285*** 0.242*** 0.040 -0.079* 0.014 0.148
Other crimes -0.091 0.070 -0.108 0.006 0.035 0.015
* p<0.10
** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
Sources: Dutch Bureau for Statistics; Politiemonitor Bevolking 1997-2003; VAS 1997-
October 2003; Geomarktprofiel 1998
The rate of illegal residence correlates positively with all measured types
of victimisation except ‘other crimes’ (see model I in Table 3.4). Evi-
dently, the presence of illegal migrants tends to be a feature of neigh-
bourhoods with elevated victimisation levels. Should high crime rates be
attributed to the presence of illegal migrants in these neighbourhoods?
We obviously cannot tell without adding controls for factors known to be
related to neighbourhood crime.
As in the previous section, on subjective aspects of safety, the effects
of the rate of illegal residence decline substantially when the percentage
of single-person households and the percentage of homeownership are
entered in the model (model IIa). The effects decline further when the
percentage of legal non-Western immigrants is included as an additional
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indicator of social disorganisation (model IIb). Yet unlike the results for
the subjective aspects of safety, the effects do not completely disappear
for all types of crime. The rate of property offences, in particular, still
turns out to correlate with the rate of illegal residence. Adding the per-
centage of juveniles (model III) reduces the effects of the rate of illegal
residence somewhat further for most types of crime.
Thus although most of the association between the relative number of
illegal migrants and objective neighbourhood safety is accounted for by
aspects of social disorganisation, the rate of illegal residence still appears
to have a modest independent effect on victimisation of most property
crimes. Further, the effect reduction differs substantially across crime
categories (compare models I and III in Table 3.4). It turns out that the
reduction for vandalism (81 per cent), other crime (80 per cent) and vio-
lent crime (79 per cent) is larger than for property crime (69 per cent).
These disparities may suggest that the presence of illegal migrants has
some impact on property crimes, but hardly on violence against persons
and objects.
Interestingly a similar pattern can be observed within crime cate-
gories: it turns out that the effect reduction is stronger for ‘other vandal-
ism’ (86 per cent) than for ‘car vandalism’ (80 per cent – car vandalism
is distinguished as a separate crime type because it sometimes concerns
attempted thefts from cars, and thus represents property crime).
Furthermore, it is stronger for ‘robbery’ (> 100 per cent) than for pick-
pocketing (61 per cent).
These figures do not necessarily imply, of course, that illegal residents
are responsible for the elevated property crime rates in the neighbour-
hoods where they life. The effects may also point at unmeasured causal
factors that are correlated, causally or otherwise, with illegal residence.
Possibly the rate of illegal residence is correlated with elements of social
disorganisation that have not been adequately measured with the indica-
tors used here. Such a correlation could have differing causes. It may be
that the rate of illegal residence increases social disorganisation beyond
levels indicated by the indicators that have been used in this sub-study
(percentage of singles, legal non-Western migrants and private homeow-
nership). This concern was, in fact, the second reason to conduct this
sub-study. Yet it could also be that unmeasured elements of social disor-
ganisation are not a consequence of illegal residence but are related to
illegal residence for other reasons. Perhaps high rates of social disorga-
nisation in a neigbourhood facilitate the local level of illegal residence
because of reduced social control.
It is nonetheless remarkable that these quantitative findings confirm
what is generally found about the involvement of illegal migrants in
crime; for this reason I am inclined to attribute the observed patterns to
offending by criminal illegal migrants. Chapter 4 shows that compared
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to legal persons of the same age and ethnic background, illegal migrants
are more likely to be involved in instrumental offences such as theft and
less likely to be involved in expressive offences such as assaults. Similar
patterns have been found for the United States (Wolf 1988; McDonald
1997) and Belgium (Van Meeteren, Van San & Engbersen 2008). In
Chapter 5 we will see that many instrumental offences among illegal
migrants appear to be aimed at meeting certain minimum living stan-
dards – standards that are perceived as elementary by the offenders and
the social networks of which they are, or used to be, a part – under the
prevailing restrictive conditions. This usually concerns theft, working
with somebody else’s papers in the formal economy or drug dealing
(these two offences are not measured by the Police Monitor because
there is usually no clear individual victim.) Further, a significant part of
the illegal population consists of foreign criminals who travel to the
Netherlands and other Western countries in order to commit crimes.
They also tend to commit property crimes (see Chapter 6).
An additional reason to attribute the positive effect of illegal residence
on property crimes to criminal illegal migrants is that we would expect to
find similar effects on violence and vandalism under the hypothesis that
the rate of illegal residence is merely associated with criminogenic fac-
tors that have not been adequately controlled for in this sub-study, such
as unmeasured social disorganisation.
The findings in Table 3.4 also appear to indicate that illegal residence
is associated with covert offences rather than with overt offences: as has
been said, the effect reduction turned out to be stronger for robbery than
for pickpocketing. Covert offences do not require overt physical contact
with a victim and are therefore more unlikely to lead to police contacts.
This preference for covert offences has some logic for illegal offenders.
It can be assumed that most illegal migrants will seek to minimise the
chances of police arrest in order to minimise the risk of expulsion.
Yet the fear of being expelled need not always inhibit crime, but may
in fact promote certain crimes. Note that the effect reduction of the
crime of ‘causing traffic accident and leaving scene’ (68 per cent) is low-
er than that of ‘causing traffic accident’ (94 per cent). Although this does
not constitute direct evidence of the involvement of illegal migrants in
traffic accidents, it is fairly probable that fear of contact with the police
leads illegal migrants to flee the scene after a traffic accident. Many ille-
gal migrants do not have the resources to own or access a car, but those
who do are not allowed to carry a Dutch driver’s license, will inevitably
be uninsured, and risk repatriation if the police find them.
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Illegal residence and neighbourhood safety in Bospolder-
Tussendijken and De Schilderswijk
The fieldwork focused on illegal residence in relation to subjective
neighbourhood safety, but also provides some additional insights on ille-
gal residence in relation to objective neighbourhood safety. The results
of our fieldwork help us interpret and comment on three main aspects
of the quantitative findings discussed. First, they make transparent the
reasons why the presence of illegal migrants appears to have only mod-
est effects on neighbourhood safety, particularly in its subjective dimen-
sion but also in its objective dimensions. Second, they show that the
consequences for neighbourhood safety of the presence of illegal mi-
grants are not unequivocal, and help explain why. They bring us closer
to a solution of the paradoxical finding that the rate of illegal residence
appears to increase the risk of property crime victimisation somewhat,
but does not decrease subjective safety; it even appears to increase sub-
jective safety somewhat. Third, the fieldwork results refine the statistical
results: they illuminate how the effects of the rate of illegal residence on
neighbourhood safety may vary across the types of illegal migrants and
the types of legal residents involved. In this section, in particular, I will
make heuristic use of the concepts of informal social rules, anomie,
stereotyping and status-sets, which were introduced in the section ‘theo-
retical starting points’.
Why aren’t the effects stronger?
Even in neighbourhoods with percentages of illegal residence as high as
in Bospolder-Tussendijken and De Schilderswijk, residents and profes-
sionals attribute unsafe feelings and discomfort primarily to phenomena
other than illegal residence. Table 3.6 presents the reasons most often
reported spontaneously (i.e., before specific questions about illegal resi-
dence had been asked). The three ‘causes’ reported most often are:
‘junkies’ (marginalised, problematic drug and alcohol users), ‘youths
hanging around’ (mostly boys, aged twelve to 25, often second- or third-
generation Moroccans and Antilleans, who gather on certain street cor-
ners) and ‘sexually obtrusive men’ (men approaching women with sex-
ual propositions). Only two residents attribute their unsafe feelings ex-
plicitly to illegal migrants. One Turkish girl and one Moroccan girl were
annoyed because youths sometimes approach minority girls on the
street or in schoolyards in order to make contact with potential partners
who could help them obtain a residence permit.
In order to understand why the degree of illegal residence has limited
effects on neighbourhood safety, and in order to stipulate the conditions
under which stronger effects are to be expected, it is helpful to describe
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why residents feel unsafe in connection with these three social cate-
gories.
The fear of drug addicts, youths hanging around and obtrusive men is
primarily due to their alleged involvement in norm violations, including
crime. It turns out that drug addicts are often associated with robbery
and pickpocketing, because they are assumed to be in need of money to
buy drugs. Youths hanging around are associated with physical assault,
robbery, threatening behaviour and sexual crimes. They are feared in
particular because they operate in groups, and may therefore join forces.
Women, in particular, feel unsafe because of the behaviour of sexually
obtrusive men, who are sometimes suspected of being potential rapists
and murderers. Although most respondents have never been victimised
by drug addicts, groups of youths, or obtrusive men, many report un-
pleasant encounters with them, because they violate informal street
rules quite frequently and openly.
Residents tend to interpret violations of informal rules as symptoms
of underlying deviant identities, and consequently as omens of more se-
rious dangers. The interviews suggest that at least three important infor-
mal rules are broken, although this street etiquette is rarely defined ex-
plicitly. Firstly, all three categories (drug addicts, youth groups and
obtrusive men) fail to comply with the rule of civil inattention (Goffman
1963). This rule dictates that participants in social traffic are expected to
show co-participants that they have been noticed, but if the co-participant
is a stranger, to do so only subtly. One ought to leave strangers in peace.
Youth groups and obtrusive men often fail to do so. Marginalised drug
addicts violate this rule when they ask passers-by for money or food.
Table 3.6 Neighbourhood-related ‘causes’ of unsafe feelings and discomfort amongst
101 residents in Bospolder-Tussendijken and De Schilderswijk
N
Drug users, dealers, alcoholics 18
Youth hanging around (especially of Moroccan or Antillean origin) 15
Men sexually harassing women, stalkers 9
Criminals in the streets 5
Dominant presence of a ‘hostile’ ethnic group (including ‘skinheads’) 5
Violent victimisation (assault and robbery in public space) 3
People behaving incoherently 3
Appearance of properties (boarded windows, windows with curtains closed) 2
‘Illegals’ 2
Unknown languages being spoken in the street 2
Shouting people in the street (‘they might as well be strangling someone’) 1
The second street law is the prescription that one must not appropriate
too much public space (‘privatizing public space’, Lofland 1973). Margin-
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alised drug users do not live up to this standard, since they live in the
streets most of the time. But this rule is violated predominantly by
youths who define their turf in public space at ‘hang-out spots’ (Clay
1973). They announce their territorial claims to outsiders by producing
noise, and may treat passers-by with verbal aggression.
The third rule prescribes the right dose of situational involvement
(Goffman 1963). A participant (like the noisy street youth) must show
neither too much involvement nor too little. This stipulation explains
why many residents feel unsafe when people use drugs or alcohol in
public, or appear to be confused. They are too much in their own world,
and therefore insufficiently conscious of the socially accepted definition
of the situation. They are both unreachable and unpredictable, and
therefore susceptible to transgressing other street rules or the law.
Fear of drug addicts, particularly, is connected to a fear of social degra-
dation. Their behaviour and proximity makes residents feel ashamed of
their own neighbourhood. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of the
nuisance behaviour displayed by minority youth groups and obtrusive
men. These fears prevail among native Dutch residents, as well as resi-
dents from well-established ethnic minorities like the Hindu-Surina-
mese. Ethnic groups of relatively high esteem fear being lumped to-
gether with groups of low esteem, since they share the same living
environment and sometimes other characteristics as well. The down-
wardly mobile, including certain segments of the local native Dutch,
tend to have a comparable income. The social climbers, such as those
from the minority middle class, have in many respects comparable a
physical appearance. The higher status groups tend to evade the lower-
status groups in order to mark the social distinction, for instance, by
giving these lower-status groups a wide berth or, eventually, by moving
to a ‘better’ neighbourhood. (Recall that the Police Monitor item ‘Do you
ever take an alternative route to avoid going through unsafe places?’ was
included in the factor ‘feeling unsafe’.)
Six reasons were found why residents do not associate illegal migrants
with neighbourhood safety more frequently. The first reason is that ille-
gal residence status is invisible. Residents cannot determine whether a
stranger has a residence permit or not. It may be that residents think of
the illegal residence status as an intrinsic threat or sign of disorder.
These opinions are, however, hardly activated in public space because
illegal residence may, at most, be assumed from certain presumed signs.
When asked for signs, residents primarily point to dosshouses, usually
in run-down blocks, where clients rent a room or bed (compare the flop-
houses in hobohemia as described by Anderson 1923). These premises
usually house between ten and 30 people, usually including illegal mi-
grants. Residents also mention having witnessed police crackdowns
aimed at tacking overcrowding. From time to time the police close down
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dosshouses because of nuisance or danger. Sometimes the aliens police
check whether local employers are employing illegal migrants. Other
signs are less frequently mentioned by residents: languages unusual in
the neighbourhood, behaviour (supposedly, illegal migrants are ‘timid’,
especially in the presence of police), their old-fashioned clothing, and
Eastern European car plates (some illegal migrants drive to the Nether-
lands by car or van).
Due to the limited visibility of illegal residence, some members of the
most-feared social categories (drug addicts, youth group members and
obtrusive men) may in fact be illegal migrants, and their illegal resi-
dence status may have contributed to their deviancy. This is one of the
reasons why the reported quantitative analysis is of importance: the pre-
sence of illegal migrants may influence neighbourhood safety even if
local residents are unaware of it. We will see that having illegal residence
status may indeed give rise to problematic drug use in some groups (see
Chapter 5). Sometimes it is also, to a more limited extent, associated
with behaviour that is typical for obtrusive men. However, it has hardly
any relation to the phenomenon of street youths.
The second reason is the limited number of illegal migrants. It is un-
likely that even in neighbourhoods like Bospolder-Tussendijken and De
Schilderswijk they account for more than 8 per cent of the population
(Leerkes et al. 2004). Therefore the presence of illegal migrants rarely
dominates activities and social relations in the neighbourhood. The
modest proportion also ensures that illegal migrants do not pose a great
psychological threat. As can be seen from the listing of residents’ images
of illegal migrants documented in Table 3.7, most residents are indiffer-
ent or ambivalent about illegal residence in their neighbourhood. Some
people support illegal migrants, for example, by providing language
classes as volunteers, even though they do not have other ties to the ben-
eficiaries. Illegal residence only became a prominent issue in De Schil-
derswijk when the relative number of illegal Bulgarians suddenly grew
strongly after visa requirements were eased, and became very visible at
some sites (See also Van Gestel 2006).
The third reason is the usefulness of illegal migrants for local resi-
dents. It turns out that a lenient attitude towards illegal migrants, and
the willingness to provide support, is not facilitated by their modest
number alone; sometimes the legal population depends on illegal mi-
grants. Numerous residents, for instance, profit economically from their
presence. Local shopkeepers profit from their capacity for work and the
additional clientele they represent. Private individuals exploit doss-
houses or sublet parts of their apartments. Furthermore, it turns out
that there are affective ties between legal and illegal migrants. The illegal
migrants who were interviewed – especially those from countries from
which previous migration flows originated – often had legal close rela-
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tives or a partner in the neighbourhood. It is not uncommon (even
among the native Dutch) for men or women to bring a foreign partner
to the Netherlands illegally, whereas others live with an illegal partner
whom they have met in Holland. An unintended consequence of the
restrictive immigration policy seems to be that to some degree family
reunion and family formation now occurs in clandestine ways (see also
Staring 2001).
Table 3.7 Perceptions on illegal immigrants in Bospolder-Tussendijken and
De Schilderswijk by having contact with illegal immigrants
Images* of illegal immigrants Bospolder-
Tussendijken
De Schilderswijk
They … Contact Contact
Yes No Total Yes No Total
‘have come here to work’ 9 4 13 22 8 30
‘keep more quiet’ 3 5 8 13 13 26
‘are people like you and me’ 5 3 8 11 8 19
‘commit crimes/are into crime’ 9 3 12 5 6 11
‘are being exploited/are pitiful’ 3 1 4 4 4 8
‘oust/displace legal residents’ 2 4 6 3 3 6
‘are nicer/more tidy’ 2 3 5 7 0 7
‘are illegal for a suspicious reason’ 1 1 2 0 4 4
‘harass women’ 1 1 2 1 2 3
‘cause nuisance by overcrowding’ 1 1 2 1 2 3
‘cause serious nuisance’ 2 0 2 1 2 3
‘tarnish good name of neighbourhood/group’ 2 3 5 0 0 0
‘live in unsafe buildings’ 0 1 1 4 0 4
‘use drugs’ 0 3 3 1 0 1
‘carry infectious diseases’ 1 0 1 0 1 1
Total 41 33 74 73 53 126
* Multiple images per respondent possible
The fourth reason is that illegal immigration does not increase anomie
substantially. Most illegal migrants rent a room or apartment for ex-
tended periods of time, or live-in with legal residents (see Engbersen et
al. 2006). The ethnic and cultural diversity also hardly increases because
of illegal settlement, at least in the selected neighbourhoods: concentra-
tion neighbourhoods tend to have very diverse populations, quite apart
from the effects of illegal immigration flows. And many illegal migrants
are from countries that have been a source of legal flows for some time
now, or are culturally not very distant from them. Nonetheless, some
evidence was found that anomie increases in the vicinity of dosshouses,
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also called turnover houses by the local residents because of their un-
stable populations.
Fifth: the tolerant attitude towards illegal residence is, in part, compa-
tible with a neighbourhood culture that puts up with light norm viola-
tions. It turns out that many respondents feel secure and at home there
in spite of elevated local crime rates. The interviewing students often
marvelled at the increased insensitivity to small norm violations which
this seems to require. It seems many local residents have become accus-
tomed to the prevailing circumstances, and those who did not have
moved. In these ways the neighbourhood conditions form and select re-
sidents who are not so easily annoyed by behaviour that is uncivilised
and antisocial according to upper and middle class Western standards
(see also Elias 1939). This is a matter of degree; we have seen that the
residents definitely value certain informal and criminal laws.
The sixth reason is that illegal status does not have unequivocal con-
sequences for rule transgression (according to the opinion and experi-
ence of residents and professionals). This also mitigates the resulting
effect. This final reason is explained in the next section.
Why is the effect not unequivocal?
It was found that the opinions on illegal residents are ambivalent and
conflicting (Table 3.7). On the one hand, many residents have the im-
pression that an illegal residence status promotes law-abiding behaviour.
By implication, illegal migrants are assumed to live quieter lives than
people who are more certain of their civil rights. On the other hand,
respondents (often the same ones) suppose that illegal migrants might
become involved in crime because they are not allowed to work and are
excluded from unemployment benefits.
While these perceptions are partially based on assumptions and stor-
ies in the media (which in turn appear to be influenced by sociological
research in the Netherlands, providing an interesting case of what Gid-
dens called the double hermeneutic), they are in several ways in keeping
with the available figures. It turns out, for instance, that the residents in
Rotterdam associate illegal residence with crime more frequently than
the respondents in The Hague (Table 3.7). The relative number of illegal
migrants who have been arrested because of crimes is indeed higher in
Bospolder-Tussendijken than in De Schilderswijk. The professionals at-
tribute this neighbourhood difference to the problem of unoccupied
dwellings and persistent drug tourism that used to plague the Rotterdam
area. Especially during the 1990s criminal illegal migrants who spoke
French travelled to Rotterdam in the wake of flows of drug consumers,
mostly French citizens. These users were attracted by the favourable
price and quality of the drugs available – as a trading nation, the Nether-
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lands is an important country of import and redistribution of drugs –
and, for them, Rotterdam was conveniently located in the south of the
country, a few hours driving time from France. Some North African ille-
gal migrants who initially came to the Netherlands for other reasons
found work in this black economy as well (Van der Leun 2003). The
opinions on the effects of an illegal residence status are also in keeping
with our own statistical findings: we have seen that the rate of illegal
residence has differing effects on crime rates, depending on the type of
crime. Victimisation from covert property offences, in particular, tends
to rise in connection with the rate of illegal residence (drug trade re-
mains largely undocumented in the PM data)
Although most residents are not personally acquainted with criminal
illegal migrants, the police officers maintain that criminal careers may
indeed develop amongst illegal residents, especially in cases of drug ad-
diction. Substance dependency usually corresponds with homelessness
and/or is preceded by a career as a clean street merchant (see also Chap-
ter 5). The police also point to the phenomenon of criminal migration
(see Chapter 6): on a limited scale, transnational banditry takes place,
mostly involving Eastern Europeans (for example, car theft). Both resi-
dents and professionals report activities by illegal sex entrepreneurs and
Eastern European prostitutes.
A larger number of respondents know illegal migrants who do not
commit crimes. They know – and the professionals confirm this – that
these people are generally very careful as a result of their precarious so-
cial position, in order to prevent expulsion. A Moroccan girl mentioned
how three of her illegal acquaintances kill most of their time in their
rooms or at a Moroccan café, hoping one day to marry. Unemployment
among Moroccan illegal migrants is quite high, since there are relatively
few Moroccan businesses in the Netherlands (see Burgers & Engbersen
1999). A Dutch woman remembers that she never had such quiet neigh-
bours as when there were illegal migrants on the apartment in the apart-
ment above hers. ‘It sometimes seemed as if they crept along their ceil-
ing.’
Some comments are in order about the assumption that illegal mi-
grants’ fear of repatriation always favours the safety of the local resi-
dents. According to the professionals some illegal migrants are apt to
leave the curtains closed so they cannot be seen. Observing unopened
curtains during the day is sometimes interpreted as an informal norm
violation that makes some neighbours and passers-by feel unsafe (see
Table 3.6). The assertion that illegal migrants live quietly should not be
exaggerated either. Eventually illegal newcomers find out that in the
Netherlands one rarely has to show an ID to the police, as long as one
remains within the law (see also Staring 2001). In addition, the police do
not always take great pains to repatriate illegal migrants. Random raids
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are prohibited. A community police officer in Rotterdam acknowledged
that there have been illegal migrants in the neighbourhood for years.
‘We don’t do anything about it as long as they don’t cause trouble.’ Refu-
gees, in particular, and migrants with strong social ties in the Nether-
lands such as family members or a partner, try to avoid expulsion. This
tendency is stronger among migrants who believe they will have few
opportunities to return. An official of the immigration service explained
that from time to time illegal Eastern Europeans turn themselves in vol-
untarily because they want to be transported back free of charge. Be-
cause the geographical distance to their country of origin is smaller, and
because of their status as future citizens of EU-member countries, East-
ern Europeans could take more liberties about being openly visible in
the neighbourhoods than other migrants who lack a residence permit.
They were sometimes associated with types of nuisance that are quite
atypical for illegal migrants. A square in The Hague was known locally
as the Bulgarenplein (‘Bulgarians Square’) for a while because every day
hundreds of Bulgarian men used to gather in front of a Turkish café. The
café served as a meeting point and illegal temp agency for horticultural
labour in a nearby area. Eventually the police intervened because of com-
plaints, mostly by and on behalf of women (see also Van Gestel 2006).
The ‘technically unexpellable’ are a second exception; typically they have
been put in Aliens’ Detention at least once, but later released because
they concealed their identity, or because their country of origin did not
cooperate with repatriation. My field work in the Aliens’ Detention facil-
ity suggests that seriously marginalised illegal migrants sometimes pre-
fer a temporary stay in detention to life on the street (see also Chapter 7).
In general, however, illegal migrants are more likely to comply with
state rules, precisely because they are not supposed to be in the Nether-
lands. The weak cannot take the same liberties to violate rules overtly as
the more powerful, legal residents (cf. Scott 1990; Collins 2008). The
fieldwork suggests that illegal migrants break formal state rules in a re-
served, secretive and selective way (there was already some evidence for
this), and exhibit the same patterns of compliance with unwritten street
codes. Violation of street etiquette may even provoke state action, espe-
cially in cases of escalation. Usually these rules are transgressed, if at all,
selectively, such as by illegal boys who approach potential marriage part-
ners. The exception here is the minority of illegal migrants who are ad-
dicted to alcohol or drugs and have become homeless: they may break
more than one type of social rule.
We have now come closer to solving the paradox that the rate of illegal
residence does not worsen subjective neighbourhood safety, even
though it appears to increase the number of property crimes. First, the
residents are relatively inured to minor norm violations; they do not very
easily feel unsafe, and may also be less likely to answer in the PM survey
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that much offending takes place in their area, even though this may well
be the case according to objective criteria. Second, illegal migrants do
not appear to violate unwritten street rules with high frequency, while
such overt deviant behaviour is a substantial factor in perceived neigh-
bourhood safety in spite of the increased tolerance for norm violations
that is typical for concentration neighbourhoods. Third, illegal offenders
are not very often involved in violence, while the association between
criminal victimisation and subjective safety tends to pertain to violent
crimes (Miceli, Roccato & Rosato 2004; Moore & Shepherd 2006).
Does it apply to all illegal newcomers in relation to all established residents?
We have seen that the presence of illegal migrants does not, in itself,
have serious and unequivocal consequences for neighbourhood safety.
The consequences depend on the degree to which legal residents believe
that illegal migrants contribute to norm violations, anomie and status
anxiety. Having an illegal residence status is anything but decisive in
these respects, partly because this status has different consequences for
different groups; the effects of the presence of illegal migrants on neigh-
bourhood safety vary across categories of illegal migrants. This section
briefly lists the main variants that pose a threat for nearly all residents,
and variants that are a threat to almost anybody. Subsequently two exam-
ples are noted that demonstrate how specific illegal newcomers can be a
threat to specific strata.
The contribution of an illegal migrant to neighbourhood safety corre-
sponds strongly with his or her position at three levels. The first is the
degree of criminality. Illegal migrants who work or who are supported by
family or friends are clearly less threatening than illegal migrants who
commit crimes or display antisocial behaviour. The latter are usually the
most underprivileged illegal migrants, as well as some circular migrants,
including transnational criminals (for instance, thieves from Eastern
Europe who expand their work terrain) who pose a threat to the social
order and, often threaten neighbourhood prestige.
The second is the degree of incorporation into regular institutions.
Illegal migrants who live-in with family or friends are less threatening
than illegal migrants who are housed in improvised and deviant ways,
who sleep in dosshouses, in vans or on the streets. According to the
professionals, unconnected illegal migrants also tend to invest less in
social relationships, and are usually less informed about neighbourhood
rules like waste collection times. Likewise illegal migrants who work in-
formally, for instance in bakeries, are less threatening than illegal mi-
grants who perform black economy functions like the drug trade.
The third is the degree to which the established mistake newcomers
for members of a dangerous established groups. Initially, it was as-
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sumed that many established residents might fear illegal migrants in
more or less categorical ways for being relatively underprivileged non-
Western foreigners. This is not the case. Most residents of Bospolder-
Tussendijken and De Schilderswijk are of modest foreign origin them-
selves. They do not share the negative ideas about ethnic minorities that
are prevalent among quite a few elderly Hollanders in the same neigh-
bourhoods, even though they realise that there is a connection in Dutch
society between ethnic origin and social status. Furthermore, it turns out
that most residents, including native Dutch youngsters and middle-aged
individuals, have gradually become more familiar with the multi-ethnic
character of the neighbourhoods One Dutch man said: ‘Yes, I had to
accustom myself to it, it does look different, you know. But they are not
so different after all, believe me on that one.’
Most residents, it seems, have become streetwise in this respect too;
they are quite capable of making distinctions, both between and within
ethnic groups. For instance, higher and lower groups are distinguished.
In particular, the groups of low esteem – and among them boys and
young men, especially – are associated with crime and disorderly beha-
viour. Also, according to most residents, there are elements in all groups
who contribute to society in positive ways. Interestingly, many respon-
dents are critical about certain aspects of the multi-ethnic composition,
while other aspects are seen as the most positive aspects of the neigh-
bourhood. The contributions to economic vitality and diversity (stores,
restaurants) are praised in particular. This implies that negative stereo-
types about visible parallel statuses will be activated mainly with regard
to specific groups of illegal migrants. Presently, young Moroccan and
Antillean males tend to be feared. Illegal newcomers from North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa risk being equated with them (in so far as their
clothing is not ‘old-fashioned’). However, this does not apply, for in-
stance, to illegal Asian and female immigrants. It is of little significance
in this respect that North African illegal migrants do not have an interest
in copying the behaviour of the delinquent boys.
Sometimes the established differ strongly in the degree to which they
consider a specific variant of illegal residence a threat. Such relational
effects reveal themselves, for example, in the evaluation of illegal males
and – partly in connection to their presence – the arrival of sex entrepre-
neurs. Admittedly, the chances of finding a partner increase for some
women as these men become established. Nevertheless, the arrival of
the men implies a higher risk of unwanted sexual approaches. Accord-
ing to one professional, Turkish women worry particularly about Bulgar-
ian sex entrepreneurs, since the prostitutes they bring to the Nether-
lands not only service Bulgarian illegal workers but also other men,
including Dutch Turks. Many prostitutes are from an underprivileged
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part of Bulgaria in which Turkish is spoken, so they can approach Turk-
ish men quite easily.
The second example also pertains to the relation between established
Turks and Bulgarian illegal migrants. In it, several variants of status an-
xiety come together. For instance, poorly educated Turks often fear los-
ing out in the economic competition with Bulgarians, who are suspected
of working below the usual labour price. Traditionally, i.e. since the early
1970s, many Turks worked in horticulture near The Hague (Braam
1994) and it turns out that some Turks fear that the arrival of criminal
Bulgarians will darken the name of the neighbourhood, in general, and
the reputation of Turks, in particular. Outsiders cannot readily distin-
guish between Turkish Bulgarians and Turks. The following edited frag-
ment from an interview with a Turkish Rotterdam resident shows how
different forms of status anxiety can occur simultaneously, and how they
can promote unsafe feelings:
Respondent: ‘If the Bulgarians weren’t here, we’d work and live
better.’
Interviewer: ‘Do you think they take your jobs?’
R: ‘Yes, of course. First I worked for, say, ten euros per hour. Then
three, four people could work there. But now those people work for
2.50 euros and they get the work.’
I: ‘Do you feel unsafe because of the illegals?’
R: ‘Yes, also for the reason that they do wrong things.’
I: ‘What kind of wrong things?’ [interviewer’s field note: Here he ges-
ticulated that I had to turn off the recorder; subsequently, he told me
about trafficking of women by illegal migrants.]
R: ‘In my view those illegals must leave.’
I: ‘Why?’
R: ‘Because they do bad things. And now we have less work. We live
here. This country is our country. This city is our city. We want to feel
safe in the street. Our children go to school here. We want our chil-
dren to feel safe here. I’m scared when I open the door for my chil-
dren to play in the street.’
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Concluding remarks
This chapter has demonstrated that illegal migrants are overrepresented
in relatively unsafe neighbourhoods, where considerable street crime oc-
curs and where residents feel relatively unsafe. Yet when individual and
neighbourhood variables that are known to determine neighbourhood
safety are kept constant, the effect of the rate of illegal residence on
neighbourhood safety diminishes. Is not associated with subjective neigh-
bourhood safety and liveability any longer; it was even found that the rate
of illegal residence may, if all other things are equal, somewhat decrease
unsafe feelings among local residents. It turns out that indicators of so-
cial disorganisation explain to a great degree the reduced perceived
safety in neighbourhoods where illegal migrants are concentrated.
Similar results were found with regards to the relationship between
illegal residence and objective neighbourhood safety. Yet a robust posi-
tive relation remained between the rate of illegal residence and covert
property crime rates in particular.
For several reasons, the opportunity structure for illegal residence is
concentrated in disorganised urban neighbourhoods that house a dis-
proportionate segment of non-Western minority groups and – though
the effect is less pronounced – poor singles (Chapter 2). Illegal migrants
and other poor newcomers find openings in unsafe neighbourhoods be-
cause many households with more social and financial resources tend to
move out of these neighbourhoods when they can. Therefore, the con-
centration of illegal residence is to a great degree not a cause but a con-
sequence of decreased safety: illegal residence does not generate neigh-
bourhood differences in safety; neighbourhood differences in safety
generate differences in the concentration of illegal residence.
The fieldwork suggests six reasons why the presence of illegal mi-
grants does not endanger neighbourhood safety much: (1) illegal resi-
dence status is barely determinable by strangers; (2) the relative number
of illegal migrants is, at least in the Netherlands, quite modest even in
concentration neighbourhoods; (3) there are economic and affective ties
between legal and illegal residents; (4) the presence of illegal migrants
does not increase anomie substantially; (5) the legal residents of the
neighbourhoods are relatively tolerant of minor norm violations; (6) hav-
ing illegal residence status has differential consequences for norm viola-
tions and crime.
There were two main reasons for exploring the relationship between
the concentration of illegal migrants in neighbourhoods and neighbour-
hood safety. First, it was supposed that illegal residence status may, un-
der certain conditions, exacerbate the violation of social rules, for in-
stance in the form of property crime. This sub-study found some
evidence that such an effect may indeed exist: we have seen that the rate
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of illegal residence increases property crimes, particularly covert prop-
erty crimes, when other factors are held constant. Of course we do not
know with certainty whether these elevated crime rates should be attrib-
uted to illegal offenders or to criminogenic factors that are correlated
with the rate of illegal residence, such as unmeasured social disorganisa-
tion. The second reason for conducting this explorative study was that it
can be assumed that illegal residence may promote a further decline of
social organisation, and therefore of safety. Yet, on the basis of this ex-
plorative study, we cannot rule out the possibility that concentration
areas contain many legal residents who commit such property crimes
and/or that these areas are attractive to non-resident thieves because of
reduced social control. Future studies could examine how many legal
offenders reside and/or offend in neighbourhoods with elevated levels
of illegal residence, as well as whether they tend to commit additional
property offences rather than other types of crime.
Although additional research is clearly needed, the qualitative data
suggest that the presence of illegal migrants does not necessarily pro-
duce a substantial decline in social organisation, since it often concerns
informal chain migration. This finding is valid under the circumstances
found in Bospolder-Tussendijken and De Schilderswijk. When the per-
centage of illegal migrants exceeds a certain limit, or when substantial
vagrant groups become part of the illegal population – which occurred
in the Rotterdam crack houses for a while – we can assume that there is
a higher chance of negative effects on social organisation and, therefore,
on neighbourhood safety.
The safety of illegal migrants deserves more research as well. This
sub-study at least suggests that we should worry about their safety. They
often live in unsafe districts. Many of them are young men and women.
Admittedly, young men do not feel unsafe so quickly, but they do have an
elevated risk of victimisation depending on their lifestyle – think of the
illegal men who start to sell drugs as a form of subsistence crime (see
Chapter 5). Young illegal women may have a higher risk of sexual abuse.
Because filing a charge with the police is more risky for illegal migrants
than for citizens or legal denizens, they may be ideal crime victims.
The state determines whether people’s stay in a country is legal or
illegal. In a highly bureaucratised country like the Netherlands it also
influences substantially the behavioural options people in its jurisdiction
have. Internal border control does not appear to have unequivocal conse-
quences for neighbourhood safety and liveability. Institutional exclusion
as an instrument of internal border control may, for some groups, con-
tribute to involvement in property crimes and possibly increases the risk
of problematic drug use (Chapter 5). Restrictive immigration policies
also occasion the formation of ‘bastard institutions’ (Hughes 1951) like
the false documents circuit. On the other hand, the risk of secondary
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territorial exclusion, in particular, appears to push most illegal migrants
away from violence and into complying with most informal street rules.
When in public space, most of them are pressured to behave like model
citizens. Precisely because illegal residence is, by definition, a violation
of immigration law, most illegal migrants cannot get away so easily with
the overt violation of other state and street laws. That is far from bad
news for neighbourhood safety and liveability, at least as it is perceived
by the established population.
Sanitation department at work at Bulgarenplein (‘Bulgarians square’)
in De Schilderswijk
Eastern European musician performing at the entrance of Haagse Markt
(‘The Hague market’) near De Schilderswijk
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Vacant houses closed with bricks in Bospolder-Tussendijken
Dutch woman in Bospolder-Tussendijken
Part 2
Illegal residence and crime

4 Embedded crimes?
Introduction
It appears that many, though not all, immigrant groups from poorer
countries are over-represented in street crime in the Netherlands (Junger
1990; Werdmölder 1997; Van San 1998; Bovenkerk 2001). The same is
true for other Western countries as well (cf. De Haen-Marschall 1997;
Tonry 1997; Waters 1999). The available studies also indicate that mi-
grants from specific countries commit, to some degree, specific types of
crimes.
Engbersen et al. have paid ample attention to the life strategies of ille-
gal migrants in the Netherlands (Engbersen, Van der Leun & Willems
1995; Engbersen & Van der Leun 1995; Burgers & Engbersen 1999;
Engbersen et al. 1999; Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001; Engbersen et al
2002). One of their key findings was that there are large variations in the
extent to which illegal migrants from different countries of origin come
into contact with the police through criminal activity. Furthermore, the
researchers found indications that the prevalence of crime among illegal
migrants appears to have risen since 1997 (Engbersen et al. 2002).
Although the latter increase will be analysed in Chapter 6, this chapter
will propose an alternative hypothesis to explain this increase.
A swift comparison of the results of the research on crime among
legal and illegal migrants suggests that there are similarities as well as
differences in the extent to which legal and illegal migrants from a parti-
cular country of origin come into contact with the police as suspects for
certain types of crime. Such similarities and dissimilarities, however,
have not been examined systematically, and have been for the greater
part neglected in explaining illegal migrants’ criminality patterns, as
well as the crime patterns among legal migrants.
The aim of this third sub-study is to reduce this gap through a sys-
tematic comparison of the crime rates among eleven groups of legal mi-
grants with indicators of the crime rates among illegal migrants of com-
parable age and country of origin. It also examines to what degree legal
migrants commit similar offences to those of their illegal compatriots.
Firstly, I will briefly repeat how crime involvement among illegal mi-
grants was understood when I started this study. In the next section, the
origin of the data and the research method is explained. Thereafter the
empirical results are presented and some concerns about the validity of
the data are discussed. Then the findings are related to some individual
examples of criminal illegal migrants who are reported in the literature.
Finally, the theoretical implications of the evidence are addressed.
The differential opportunity structure
Engbersen and Van der Leun (1995, 2001) found systematic differences
in the extent to which illegal migrants of differing nationalities come
into contact with the police as suspects in connection with criminal of-
fences. Suspicion of involvement in criminal offences accounted for 32
per cent of the apprehended Eastern Europeans, 54 per cent of the Alger-
ians and 65 per cent of the Moroccans. Illegal Turks had only a 4 per cent
chance of being apprehended as suspected criminals. For a good under-
standing of this sub-study it is useful to repeat briefly how Engbersen
and Van der Leun explained these differences.
Inspired by Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) theory of delinquent subcul-
tures, which aimed to integrate Mertonian strain theory with Suther-
land’s theory of differential association, these differences were explained
using the notion of the differential opportunity structure. Engbersen and
Van der Leun reasoned that, depending on their ethnic group, illegal
migrants have differential access to (1) formal institutions of the welfare
state such as the labour market, education, unemployment benefits,
housing and health care, (2) informal institutions such as the network
of family and friends and the informal economy and (3) criminal institu-
tions, or circuits. The latter idea particularly departs from Mertonian
strain theory, because it assumes that crime cannot be understood
purely by examining the degree of access to conventional ways to satisfy
needs which are regarded as legitimate in mainstream society. It is ar-
gued that crime is not always possible, even if there is motivation; illegal
opportunity structures should be taken into consideration as well.
The Dutch state gradually implemented the institutional exclusion of
illegal migrants as an instrument of internal border control so that, un-
like many categories of legal migrants, illegal migrants now have fewer
opportunities to work and cannot receive state scholarships, profit from
unemployment benefits, or rent houses or apartments for which a hous-
ing permit is required. Although unemployment is high among many
legal non-Western immigrant groups, legal migrants are not as system-
atically and legally excluded from life chances as are illegal migrants.1
The increased institutional exclusion of illegal migrants appears to have
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had a statistically positive effect on the involvement in crime among ille-
gal migrants. This rise will be analysed in Chapter 6. In this chapter I
will formulate an hypothesis aside from marginalisation to account for
this rise.
If state policies dealing with illegal residence are held constant then
illegal migrants’ survival chances are assumed to vary in direct relation
to the level of embeddedness or social capital of the illegal migrant and
the immigrant communities in the Netherlands on which the illegal
newcomer depends. Social capital, defined as the capacity of individuals
to mobilise certain resources from an established immigrant commu-
nity or a social network of which they are a part (Bourdieu 1983; Cole-
man 1990; Portes 1995), can provide illegal fellow countrymen with am-
ple access to the second dimension of the opportunity structure, such as
the informal ethnic economy, provided illegal migrants have social con-
tacts with members of the ethnic community and are able to receive
their support (Staring & Engbersen 2001). Legal migrants may also pro-
vide illegal migrants with some indirect access to the first dimension of
the opportunity structure by lending or renting out health insurance
cards or fiscal numbers (cf. Engbersen et al. 1999). For these reasons, it
has been asserted that criminality by illegal migrants is caused by socie-
tal marginalisation as a result of their illegal residence status, particu-
larly when a lack of access to formal institutions is aggravated by a lack
of social capital: ‘This study made very clear that illegal migrants with
little social capital commit crimes in order to survive’ (Engbersen 2001:
245). While illegal Turks are quasi-integrated in the Turkish community,
illegal Moroccans are more at risk of committing survival crime – this
term will concern us in the next chapter – because they ‘often have to
manage on their own’ (Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001: 63).
Hence, the tendency in most publications to understand illegal mi-
grants’ involvement in crime in a negative way, i.e. as a last option. Eng-
bersen and Van der Leun have, however, asserted that the chances of
illegal migrants becoming engaged in crime may, in part, be linked with
features of criminal circuits. They found that North African illegal mi-
grants made the best employees to occupy the lower echelons of the sale
of hard drugs to French drug tourists who travelled to Rotterdam to buy
and consume hard drugs, since many North Africans speak French (Van
der Leun 2002). But this is more a question of differences in human
capital than differences in social capital. The role of immigrant commu-
nities in providing access to criminal circuits has hardly been taken into
consideration so far.2
It was difficult to develop precise hypotheses from the marginalisation
thesis that could be tested using the evidence collected for this sub-study.
The data pertained to the group level and could not be taken as direct
indicators of the amount of social capital available to individual illegal
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migrants. It will, however, become clear why the following analyses indi-
cate that the current explanation must, in two ways, be incomplete: (1)
there is not always a negative relation between social capital and crimin-
ality and (2) an adequate understanding of crime involvement among
illegal migrants requires that additional factors are taken into considera-
tion besides the illegal residence status i.e. the consequences of the poli-
cies with respect to immigrants who are considered illegal by the state,
interacting with social capital in the country of destination. The impor-
tance of illegal residence status in explaining patterns of crime involve-
ment among illegal migrants appears to have been overestimated in pre-
vious studies.
Data and research method
The data on legal migrants were taken from the HKS, a database in
which the Dutch police register suspects. The HKS system contains all
official reports by the police, which describe offences (type of offence,
date, place) as well as features of the suspects (date of birth, sex, nation-
ality, country of birth). The data on apprehensions of illegal migrants
were taken from the Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem (VAS), the
database also used in Chapters 2, 3 and 6. It is designed to register all
foreigners who require explicit permission from the Dutch authorities to
enter and/or to reside in the Netherlands. All apprehended illegal mi-
grants – apprehended by the regular police or by specialised divisions
such as the aliens police – are documented in this system too. It is often
the VAS that determines whether a foreigner can be apprehended as an
illegal alien in the first place, because prior to their apprehension, illegal
migrants are either not registered, are already listed as illegal migrants
because of previous apprehensions or are known as formerly legal for-
eigners with expired residence permits. Possible additional grounds for
apprehension besides illegal residence, such as working without a per-
mit, using public transport without paying the fare, drug offences and
theft are filed in the VAS. These registrations of possible offences and
misdemeanours are excerpts from official reports filed in the HKS.
The data were initially gathered for two separate studies: (1) research
on delinquency among young immigrants aged twelve to 25 from rela-
tively recently arrived groups of legal migrants (Kromhout & Van San
2003) and (2) research on illegal migrants of all ages (Leerkes et al.
2004). For this study a secondary analysis of the former dataset was
combined with a primary analysis of the latter. Since the first research
was limited to young immigrants, and comparable research on older le-
gal migrants is not available in the Netherlands, the emphasis in this
sub-study had to be on young immigrants. Investigation was limited to
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eleven non-Western immigrant communities that are relatively large in
the Netherlands: Morocco, Turkey, Surinam, the former Soviet Union,
the former Yugoslavia, China, Somalia, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (see
Table 4.1).3
Table 4.1 ‘Legal’ suspects by country of birth and the corresponding group population
sizes as a whole (aged 18-24 years, 1999 and 2000)
Suspects
1999
Suspects
2000
Population
1999
Population
2000
Average
crime rate
1999/2000
Adjusted
crime
rate (A)
Adjusted
crime
rate (B)
Morocco 2,360 2,030 24,855 23,548 9.1 8.7 8.9
Turkey 749 580 22,450 19,980 3.1 2.9 3.0
Surinam 1,049 942 16,550 14,565 6.4 6.2 6.3
Yugoslavia 508 428 4,698 5,090 9.6 8.1 9.0
Somalia 340 293 3,535 3,680 8.8 8.5 8.7
Iraq 187 218 3,015 3,373 6.4 5.8 6.1
China 44 59 2,533 3,098 1.8 1.0 1.4
Afghanistan 67 78 2,143 2,860 2.9 2.6 2.8
Soviet Union 191 274 1,910 2,423 10.7 6.7 8.6
Iran 119 147 1,700 2,110 7.0 6.4 6.7
Ethiopia 70 55 1,018 1,043 6.1 5.8 5.9
Sources: Kromhout and Van San 2003; VAS 1999-2000
Residence status is not documented in the HKS. Accordingly, legal mi-
grants cannot be distinguished from illegal migrants in this system.
Therefore, Kromhout and Van San, who were interested in legal mi-
grants only, estimated the number of suspects with residence permits
by eliminating from their analyses all foreign-born suspects who told
the police they did not reside in the Netherlands. As the complete dataset
on illegal migrants was placed at my disposal, I was able to eliminate
illegal migrants from the analyses of Kromhout and Van San with great-
er precision. First, using the VAS data, I calculated per country of birth
the total number of illegal migrants who were apprehended for offences
and were between eighteen and 25 years old. These numbers were sub-
tracted from the number of legal suspects reported by Kromhout and
Van San (data adjustment A). In this way, the maximum distortion in
their figures could be corrected for. Next I calculated per country of birth
the number of illegal migrants who were in the required age category,
were apprehended for offences, and had told the police their residential
addresses in the Netherlands (data adjustment B). The best correction of
Kromhout and Van San’s overestimation of the number of suspects with
residence permits probably lies between the two adjustments.4
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Table 4.2 Reasons for apprehension of illegal immigrants (aged 18-24, 1998-2001)
Total number
apprehensions
Apprehensions
for offences
Apprehensions
for other reasons
% apprehensions
for offences
Morocco 3,008 1,065 1,943 35.4
Turkey 1,216 197 1,019 16.2
Surinam 223 131 92 58.7
Yugoslavia 816 325 491 39.8
Somalia 138 47 91 34.1
Iraq 224 67 157 29.9
China 423 88 335 20.8
Afghanistan 90 28 62 31.1
Soviet Union 1,281 427 854 33.3
Iran 105 51 54 48.6
Ethiopia 22 14 8 63.6
Sources: VAS 1998-2001
The ‘quantity’ of criminality
The data in Table 4.1, which were taken from Kromhout and Van San,
are ordered according to the size of the population of offenders and non-
offenders in the age group eighteen to 25. For methodological reasons
the age group twelve to eighteen is excluded here.5 In the right-hand
columns indicators for the crime rate are shown per country of birth.
The crime rate is defined as the percentage of a population registered in
the course of a year as suspected of at least one criminal offence. The
average crime rate is the average of the crime rates for 1999 and 2000.6
Table 4.1 demonstrates that the crime rate varies with national origin.
Whereas the crime rate approaches 10 per cent for countries such as
Morocco, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and the former Soviet Union,
it is 3 per cent or less for Turkey, Afghanistan and China. The data ad-
justments are particularly significant for the former Soviet Union (the
average crime rate fell from 10.7 to 6.7 and 8.6) and, to a lesser extent,
the former Yugoslavia (the average crime rate dropped from 9.6 to 8.1
and 9.0).
The figures indicate that delinquency is quite widespread among
youngsters in some immigrant communities, especially since the data
relate to the total population in the age category concerned, male and
female.7 A crime rate of 10 per cent for the total population between
eighteen and 25 years of age may sometimes imply that approximately
one-fifth of the male population is annually registered as a crime suspect
(cf. Van San & Leerkes 2001). Table 4.2 shows the number of apprehen-
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sions of illegal migrants from the selected eleven countries of origin. In
order to reduce the influence of random variation – the number of illegal
migrants aged between eighteen and 25 was quite small for some nation-
alities – a somewhat longer period of time was used (1998-2001).8 For
instance, 3,008 apprehensions of illegal Moroccans took place in these
four years.9 About 35 per cent of these were related to crimes,10 while for
Turkey, this figure was only 16.2 per cent. The remaining apprehensions
concerned illegal labour, using public transport without paying the fare,
illegal occupation of apartments, etc. In the Netherlands, these offences
do not fall within the criminal law.
The total number of illegal migrants per country of birth is unknown.
Only the total number of such immigrants, regardless of their country of
origin, has been estimated in previous studies. It is therefore impossible
to calculate precise crime rates per country of birth, as we did for legal
migrants. Instead, the percentage of apprehensions for offences was
used as an indicator of the prevalence of crime (see also Engbersen &
Van der Leun 1995, 2001). This crude measure suggests that crime is
much more prevalent among illegal migrants from Ethiopia, Surinam,
Iran, Yugoslavia and Morocco, than among illegal Chinese, Turks and
Iraqis. The former Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Somalia occupy an
intermediate position.
Figure 4.1 Crime rate among legal immigrants compared to crime rate indicators for
illegally residing countrymen aged 18-24; 1999-2000 (legal immigrants),
1998-2001 (illegal immigrants)
Sources: Kromhout and Van San 2003; Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeeem
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Unfortunately, in the absence of precise crime rates, it was impossible
to determine whether, compared to legal migrants, illegal migrants are
more likely, less likely, or equally likely to come into contact with the
police because of criminal offences. Yet, what we can establish in Figure
4.1, which plots indicators of the crime rates for the researched groups,
is that the crime rate for legal migrants can be used to predict the per-
centage of apprehensions of illegal compatriots on the grounds of crim-
inal offences (and vice versa). With residence status held constant, Ethio-
pian, Surinamese, Iranian and Yugoslavian immigrants are two to three
times more likely to be registered as suspects of criminal offences than
are immigrants from China, Turkey and Afghanistan. Table 4.3 confirms
that the correlation coefficient between the two measures is positive. It
varies between 0.34 (unweighted) and 0.74 (when the data are weighted
according to the relative size of the immigrant groups).
Table 4.3 Correlation coefficients between crime rates among legal and illegal
immigrants (aged 18-24) in eleven ‘ethnic’ groups; 1999-2000
(legal immigrants) and 1998-2001 (illegal immigrants)
Unweighted Weighted*
Unadjusted data 0.34 (p<0.31) 0.57 (p<0.14)
Adjusted data A 0.42 (p<0.20) 0.74 (p<0.11)
Adjusted data B 0.37 (p<0.27) 0.67 (p<0.13)
Without Surinam
Unadjusted data 0.39 (p<0.27) 0.78 (p<0.01)
Adjusted data A 0.44 (p<0.20) 0.76 (p<0.01)
Adjusted data B 0.42 (p<0.23) 0.78 (p<0.01)
Without false documents
Unadjusted data 0.53 (p<0.09) 0.40 (p<0.22)
Adjusted data A 0.58 (p<0.06) 0.43 (p<0.19)
Adjusted data B 0.55 (p<0.08) 0.41 (p<0.21)
Without Surinam and false documents
Unadjusted data 0.79 (p<0.01) 0.92 (p<0.00)
Adjusted data A 0.77 (p<0.01) 0.88 (p<0.00)
Adjusted data B 0.78 (p<0.01) 0.93 (p<0.00)
* The data are weighted according to the relative size of the immigrant community
(N=11; N=10 without Surinam).
Sources: Kromhout and Van San 2003; VAS 1998-2001
Some remarks on the validity of the association
The validity of the statistical association in Figure 4.1 can be questioned
on a number of grounds. Firstly, it may be argued that the connection is
merely the result of Kromhout and Van San’s inability to eliminate ille-
gal migrants from their analyses with certainty. The association may be
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the result of auto-correlation in as far as both datasets include illegal
migrants. The data adjustments, however, do not support such an argu-
ment, as the correlation becomes somewhat stronger when the correc-
tions for the possible inclusion of illegal migrants in Kromhout and Van
San’s data are taken into account (Table 4.3). In particular, the score for
the former Soviet Union becomes more in agreement with the general
trend.
A second objection could be that police data are always incomplete
and selective (cf. Brown 1988; Levitas et al. 1996). Self-report surveys
show that the actual prevalence of crime is much higher than official
police figures tell us. This problem of the ‘dark figure’ is intensified by
its non-randomness: some offences do not interest the police, some of-
fences are more easily discovered than others, et cetera.
Researchers in the field of ethnicity and crime tend to agree that while
police data represent a somewhat biased image of the ‘true’ crime rates
among ethnic groups (Bovenkerk, De Haan & Yesilgöz 1991; De Haan &
Bovenkerk 1993), selectivity of police data probably amplifies, but does
not cause, ethnic differences regarding crime (cf. Van San & Leerkes
2001). Admittedly, low status groups may be policed and punished to a
higher degree than high status groups (Black 1978), but in our case, all
the data pertain to immigrants from relatively poor countries; no com-
parison is made with the dominant, native population or with high sta-
tus immigrant groups from Western countries. In any case, no good al-
ternative to police data is available.11
For the sake of argument, it could nonetheless be assumed that police
data do not at all reflect the extent to which immigrants are involved in
crime. The scores for Turkish and Chinese immigrants may be low
merely because the offences committed by members of these groups do
not interest the police, or happen to have a relatively low chance of dis-
covery. In Figure 4.1, two exceptions or outliers can be observed: among
illegal Ethiopians and Surinamese, the percentage of apprehensions for
offences is higher than would be expected based on the crime rates for
their legal compatriots. Interestingly, selectivity by the police probably
explains the deviant score for Surinam (the deviant score for Ethiopia
will be addressed later). Many Surinamese speak Dutch as a first or sec-
ond language and are often considered Surinamese Dutch. Therefore,
Surinamese people are probably less likely to be apprehended for illegal
residence than illegal migrants from other countries. If we could control
for this bias, the position of Surinam would be more in accordance with
the general trend, because its score would shift vertically, i.e. towards the
trend line. Indeed, the positive association in Figure 4.1 becomes stron-
ger when Surinam is left out of consideration (Table 4.3).
For the rest, it is unlikely that the association is caused merely by po-
lice selectivity. If we assume, for instance, that the figures are biased
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because the eleven immigrant communities are policed differently, the
connection remains unexplained, since every point in the figure relates
to immigrants from the same ethnic group. If the police paid more at-
tention to some ethnic groups than others, the prevalence of crime
among legal Turks, for example, might be underestimated to a greater
extent than the crime rate for legal Moroccans. But in that case, the per-
centage of illegal Turkish immigrants apprehended for an offence would
probably be underestimated as well, as compared to the score for illegal
Moroccans. For similar reasons, it is impossible to account for the con-
nection by hypothesizing that ethnic groups are involved in offences
with differing chances of being caught. Again, the score for a particular
group of legal migrants would be biased in the same way as the score for
the corresponding group of illegal migrants: some countries of origin
would move up diagonally along both axes, while others would move
down a little, leaving the connection unchanged.
The association also remains unaltered if it is assumed that illegal mi-
grants are invariably involved in crimes with a lower or higher chance of
discovery than their legal counterparts: all scores would shift horizon-
tally to the right or to the left, or vertically up or down. Such shifts would
not alter the connection.
Moreover, the hypothesis of police selectivity cannot explain why legal
and illegal migrants tend to commit, to a considerable degree, specific
types of crime depending on their country of origin. This is the subject
of the next section.
The ‘quality’ of criminality
Across all ethnic groups, most offenders are engaged in petty crimes
such as theft. Less prevalent crimes such as rape and homicide add rela-
tively little to the total number of registered offences. Such distributions
are independent of the ethnicity of offenders. Next to such universal si-
milarities, several examples of criminal specialisation have been ob-
served. For example, suspects of Turkish descent are often apprehended
for violence in the Netherlands. This crime pattern is, in part, connected
with the tradition of honour vengeance in some parts of Turkey (cf. Bo-
venkerk & Junger-Tas 2000). Turks are also known to have substantial
involvement in heroin trafficking to Western Europe (Bovenkerk & Yeş-
ilgöz 1998). Suspects from South America are frequently apprehended
for cocaine trafficking (ISEO 2002). Offenders from Eastern Europe are
apprehended for theft and burglary more often than offenders from
other countries, but rarely for drug trafficking (Snel et al. 2000; Van
San, Snel & Boers 2002). Moroccan offenders are disproportionately en-
gaged in theft with violence (ISEO 2002) and marijuana trafficking (Van
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Gemert 1998). Suspects from several African countries have a much
higher chance of being apprehended for fraud than suspects from other
countries (Van San & Leerkes 2001).
Table 4.4 Types of offences committed by ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ crime suspects (aged 12-24); 1999-2000
(legal immigrants) and 1998-2001 (illegal immigrants)
N Sexual
offences
with
violence
Sexual
offences
without
violence
Violence Theft
with
violence
Theft
without
violence
Vandalism Traffic
offences
Drugs Other
offences
Former Yugoslavia 1,469 0.8 0 9.9 2.6 63.7 11.4 4.9 0.9 5.9
Cramer’s V=0.30 372 0.8 0 4.6 1.1 53 4.3 7.3 5.9 23.1
Somalia 1,258 0.6 1 15.4 6 51.9 14.2 2.9 0.8 7.1
Cramer’s V=0.34 53 0 1.9 7.5 7.5 17 5.7 3.8 1.9 54.7
Iraq 672 2.7 1 25.1 6 37.6 18 2.2 0.7 6.5
Cramer’s V=0.42 77 0 0 7.8 2.6 28.6 5.2 6.5 9.1 40.3
China 126 0 0 24.6 7.1 38.9 5.6 10.3 0.8 12.7
Cramer’s V=0.49 123 0 0 16.3 3.3 16.3 0.8 5.7 0 57.7
Afghanistan 191 5.8 4.2 23 1 33.5 17.3 7.3 0 7.9
Cramer’s V=0.74 26 0 0 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 96.2
Former Soviet Union 1,126 0.2 0 4.5 2.9 74.3 4.5 3.4 3.9 6.2
Cramer’s V=0.25 477 1.7 0 4.2 2.5 60.6 1.5 8.6 2.3 18.7
Iran 504 1.2 0.6 18.7 6.7 39.5 19 4.6 2.8 6.9
Cramer’s V=0.54 58 0 0 5.2 0 13.8 3.4 10.3 3.4 63.8
Ethiopia/Eritrea 205 1.5 0.5 13.7 12.7 38.5 14.1 7.3 1 10.7
Cramer’s V=0.49 16 0 0 0 0 18.8 0 0 6.3 75
Total legal immigrants 5,551 1.1 0.6 13.6 4.6 55.3 12.3 4.1 1.6 6.8
Total illegal immigrants 1,202 1 0.1 5.9 2.2 45.6 2.8 7.3 3.7 31.6
Total illegal immigrants
(aged 12-17)
162 0 0 5.6 4.3 46.3 3.1 4.3 3.7 32.7
Total illegal immigrants
(aged 18-24)
1,040 1.1 0.1 6 1.8 45.5 2.7 7.8 3.7 31.4
Nationalities for which ‘quality’ of delinquency is not specified by Kromhout and Van San:
Morocco 1,253 1.1 0.2 4.7 3.7 19.9 4.4 7.6 22.7 35.8
Turkey 241 1.7 0.4 13.3 1.7 15.8 5.4 17 18.7 26.1
Surinam 135 0 0 5.2 5.2 17 2.2 3 56.3 11.1
Sources: Kromhout and Van San 2003: 69; VAS 1998-2001
Table 4.4 specifies the types of crimes of which legal and illegal migrants
are suspected. For each country of origin the first row represents crime
suspects who are staying in the country legally, while the second row
represents suspects without legal residence status. It lacks data on legal
Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese, as Kromhout and Van San did not
specify the offences for these groups. Their research mainly focused on
delinquency among immigrant groups that are new to the Netherlands.
Also, Kromhout and Van San reported offences for the age category
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twelve to 25 years old as a whole, and did not present separate data for
suspects aged eighteen to 25. Therefore, Table 4.4 shows the apprehen-
sion reason for all suspects aged twelve to 25, even if for methodological
reasons it would have been preferable to restrict investigation to suspects
aged eighteen to 25.12
The data in Table 4.4 are in agreement with the literature: the selected
ethnic groups differ significantly, but not enormously, with regard to the
types of offences their delinquent members commit. For legal offenders
(Cramer’s V=0.14/p<0.00/calculated using eight ethnic groups), the as-
sociation between country of origin and offence committed is somewhat
weaker than for illegal offenders (Cramer’s V=0.20; p<0.00/calculated
using eleven ethnic groups), but this difference is not substantial and
may be due to the absence of data on legal offenders from Morocco,
Turkey and Surinam. A comparison of the way legal offenders as a whole
are distributed among the nine categories of offences with the corre-
sponding distribution for illegal offenders yielded Cramer’s V=0.33
(p<0.01). This figure indicates that there is a modest but significant as-
sociation between residence status and type of offence committed.13
Legal and illegal migrants’ offences can also be compared in a more
qualitative way. Regardless of ethnicity and residence status, the main
reason for apprehending offenders is ‘theft without violence’, whereas
sexual offences and ‘theft with violence’ are relatively rare. Secondly,
whatever their residence status, Eastern European offenders (from the
former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) have a higher than aver-
age chance of being apprehended for ‘theft without violence’: the police
have, respectively, a 63.7 chance and a 74.4 per cent chance of appre-
hending a legal Yugoslavian or Russian suspected of ‘theft without vio-
lence’, while the overall chance of apprehension on these grounds is only
55.3 per cent. For comparable illegal offenders, these figures are 53.0 per
cent and 60.6 per cent compared to 45.6 per cent. Thirdly, more than 13
per cent of apprehensions of Turkish illegal offenders concern violence,
whereas for people from other countries this proportion is only 5 or 6
per cent. Fourthly, more than 50 per cent of apprehensions of illegal
Surinamese delinquents concern drugs.
There are also significant differences. The first that strikes the eye is
the lower occurrence of violence among illegal offenders – both against
persons and goods. When Morocco, Turkey and Surinam are left out of
consideration – Kromhout and Van San did not publish separate data on
these groups – the rate of these crimes among illegal offenders is only
5.9 per cent and 2.8 per cent, compared to 13.6 per cent and 12.3 per cent
for legal offenders. Similarly, whereas the ratio of the number of sus-
pects of theft without violence compared to theft with violence is 12:1 for
legal offenders, this ratio is 21:1 for illegal offenders.
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The second difference is the elevated share of the category ‘other of-
fences’ among offenders who lack a residence permit (31.6 per cent for
illegal migrants versus 6.8 per cent for legal migrants) probably due to
the inclusion of ‘false documents’ in this category. About 87 per cent of
apprehensions of illegal migrants within the category ‘other offences’
concerns this form of fraud (figure not presented in table).
Separate analyses per country of origin reveal that the extent to which
the quality of crime among illegal migrants resembles the crime involve-
ment among their legal counterparts differs somewhat per ethnic group:
Cramer’s V varies from 0.25 for the former Soviet Union to 0.74 for
Afghanistan.14 This differing extent of resemblance appears to be
coupled with the differing size of the category ‘other offences’ per ethnic
group. Note that the latter category is especially large for illegal suspects
from Ethiopia, Iran and Afghanistan. These are precisely the three na-
tionalities in Figure 4.1 (next to Surinam) for which the crime rate for
illegal migrants is higher than would be expected based on the crime
rate amongst their legal compatriots. When apprehensions for false
documents were excluded from the analyses, the connection in Figure
4.1 became even stronger, especially when Surinam was also left out of
consideration.15
Theoretical implications
Similarities
There are two ways to account for the observation that the patterns of
crime among legal and illegal migrants resemble one another: (1) we can
look for common explanatory variables and (2) we can hypothesise that
the involvement in crime among legal migrants has a criminogenic ef-
fect on illegal migrants and/or vice versa.
As an example of the first strategy, we could speculate that marginali-
sation gives rise to crime among illegal migrants as well as among legal
migrants. This seems a valid argument since many poor newcomers in-
itially have to put up with a relatively marginal social position in the
country of destination, which is amplified in some groups by a lack of
social capital in their ethnic networks. For legal migrants the marginal
social position is then not the result of having illegal residence status, i.e.
of formalised social exclusion that is organised and legitimised by the
state. Rather, it is the outcome of other causes and processes of social
exclusion, such as social exclusion because of poor education or because
of ethnic discrimination in the labour market; one could argue that hav-
ing illegal residence status prevents such informal mechanisms of exclu-
sion from having an effect, for exclusion is already brought about by the
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state. For instance, Sansone (1992), who researched the ‘survival strate-
gies’ of Afro-Surinamese in Amsterdam, understood the involvement of
these legal migrants in the street trade in drugs as a reaction to condi-
tions of social marginality coupled with a lack of social capital. He also
observed that even if the involvement of these migrants in the lower and
relatively non-organised echelons of the drug trade was quite high at the
time, only a few men managed to rise in the criminal hierarchy. Sansone
argues that the extended but weak social networks of these Afro-Surina-
mese migrants impeded their success as businessmen in the formal
economy and in the illegal economy as well.
Yet this strategy still leaves unresolved the question of why criminality
tends to take the form of burglary among migrants from one country,
while violent honour vengeance is overrepresented among migrants
from another country. Precisely because there is ethnic diversity in
crime, many researchers in the field of crime and ethnicity believe that
several explanatory variables should be taken into consideration (cf. De
Haen-Marshall 1997; Tonry 1997; Kromhout & Van San 2003). A review
of the literature shows that different forms of ethnic criminality require
different explanations. For example, whereas many offences are con-
nected with high levels of unemployment and social exclusion, other
forms of crime only become possible when an ethnic group possesses
an extensive institutional infrastructure. In the latter circumstances
criminal compatriots have more opportunities to use companies to cover
up certain criminal activities such as the wholesale trade of drugs (cf.
Zaitch 2002), or to extort money from entrepreneurs. In addition, some
ethnic groups may have access in their country of origin, or diasporas, to
criminal resources such as guns and drugs, which are not so easily ob-
tained by members of other ethnic groups (Bovenkerk 2001).
Next to such structural factors, cultural aspects, even if they usually
interact with structural factors and are sometimes hard to distinguish
from them, also appear to play a role. For instance, ethnographers such
as Bovenkerk (1994: 59) and Van Gemert (1998) have stressed that in
comparable structural conditions, ethnic groups tend to develop differ-
ent strategies – including different criminal strategies. Van San (1998,
2002) also demonstrated the relevance of cultural aspects in crime pat-
terns. She found that delinquent as well as non-delinquent youths from
Curacao, as well as their mothers, although to a lesser degree, tended to
justify certain crimes that are relatively common among immigrants
who originate from the lower classes of that Caribbean island, particu-
larly stabbing in the case of certain insults or threats.
Given that crime patterns among illegal migrants reflect the criminal
involvement of legal compatriots, and given that a multitude of variables
are usually used to explain the differential involvement of legal migrants
in crime, offending by illegal migrants must be influenced by such addi-
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tional variables as well, either directly (strategy 1) or indirectly (strategy
2). Hence, criminality cannot be understood only as a uniform reaction
to strong marginalisation that is the outcome of social exclusion by the
state in combination with a lack of social capital.
So far, few criminal illegal migrants have been interviewed. Some re-
spondents confirm the marginalisation thesis. For example, in a non-
random sample of 165 illegal migrants, involvement in crime was asso-
ciated with features indicating a marginal existence in the Netherlands.
The twenty criminally involved migrants lacked relatives in the Nether-
lands more often than did the non-delinquent migrants, and they were
also more often homeless (see Burgers & Engbersen 1999: 255). Among
illegal migrants there may indeed be a negative empirical correlation
between social capital and crime. However, the ethnographic literature
has also reported examples of criminal illegal migrants who were em-
bedded in ethnic communities to a considerable extent. These suggest
that social capital gained as a result of ethnic incorporation does not ne-
cessarily reduce crime.
The latter examples can be divided into two ideal types. Both illustrate
the possibility of co-offending by illegal migrants and their legal counter-
parts (strategy 2). The first type pertains to criminal illegal migrants who
cater to the economic demands of parts of their ethnic communities,
albeit in ways that violate criminal law. This includes bicycle thieves and
illegal migrants who work in informal restaurants where they sell some
marijuana on the side (see Engbersen et al. 1999: 187/8). The consu-
mers of these goods are residents (often compatriots) of poor urban
neighbourhoods where such illegal migrants reside and operate. A cer-
tain degree of embeddedness in the local immigrant community is a
necessary condition for supplying goods such as cheap bicycles and mar-
ijuana.
Examples such as these are reminiscent of Mahler’s (1995) study of
immigrant life in poor neighbourhoods in the United States. She refers
to the activities of ‘claveros’ who obtain calling codes by ‘surfing’ callers
who use call cards at public phones, and who then sell these codes to
other (legal and illegal) immigrants who use them for international
phone calls: ‘They risk being caught in this line of business, but they
risk never meeting their goals if they pursue a straight and narrow tra-
jectory in the mainstream economy’ (Mahler 1995: 152).16 Although not
all immigrants make use of such illegal services, we could assert that
such crimes are functional for some members of these ethnic commu-
nities, given their socio-economic circumstances. Such offences are so
closely connected with these communities that it could even be argued
they are a feature of them.
The second type of embedded crimes concerns illegal offenders who
seize criminal opportunities as a result of contacts with criminal compa-
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triots who reside in the Netherlands with residence permits. In that case,
crime involvement appears to develop via processes of differential asso-
ciation (Sutherland 1937). Examples include an illegal migrant who was
recruited in Morocco by a Dutch-Moroccan owner of a coffee shop in
which marijuana is sold (reported by Engbersen et al. 1999: 219), and
illegal migrants from Colombia who were offered the opportunity by
their countrymen to make money in the cocaine business (Zaitch 2002:
232). In such instances, crime among illegal migrants is promoted by
social ties to criminal legal migrants: the involvement in crime could
not have taken place, at least not in the same form, without criminal
social capital, in this case contacts with criminal countrymen who live in
the Netherlands with residence permits. Social capital predominantly
implies an increase in the number of behavioural options, chiefly non-
criminal but also criminal (cf. Portes 1998).
Accounting for the dissimilarities
The observation that patterns of crime among legal and illegal migrants
are not completely identical needs to be accounted for as well. It is plau-
sible that the relatively low use of violence by illegal offenders, including
theft with violence, as well as their elevated use of false documents, is a
consequence of their precarious legal position in comparison with legal
migrants: secondary territorial exclusion is more of a threat for the for-
mer than for the latter.17 Illegal migrants face more difficulties in estab-
lishing themselves in the Netherlands, and for many illegal migrants,
deportation is a real risk given the state’s endeavour to implement sec-
ondary territorial exclusion, even though many apprehended illegal mi-
grants are not deported.18 As a result, criminality by illegal migrants, if it
occurs, appears to be more prudent and is primarily aimed at obtaining
income – it is ‘instrumental’ rather than ‘expressive’ (cf. Radcliffe-Brown
1952: 143; Van San 1998; Blok 2001).
The use of false documents appears to be most widespread among
illegal quartermasters from ethnic groups that are relatively new to the
Netherlands (Ethiopians, Iranians and Afghans). These forms of offend-
ing primarily appear to be a response to restrictive migration policy by
means of external border control. Illegal migrants from relatively settled
ethnic groups (from Turkey, Morocco and Surinam) do not require false
documents to the same extent, since it is often easier for them to reside
in the Netherlands by invitation, if only temporarily (Staring 2001).19
This can indeed be understood as a form of social capital in the country
of destination.
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Concluding remarks
This sub-study has demonstrated that both the quantity and the quality
of criminality among illegal migrants are associated with the involve-
ment in crime among legal migrants of comparable age and country of
origin. Still, these patterns are not completely interchangeable: illegal
offenders make use of false documents more often than legal offenders
do, and they appear to be engaged less frequently in theft with violence
and vandalism.
On the basis of the available data, differences in opinion about the
interpretation of the evidence are still possible, and additional research
is needed, especially ethnographic research on the individual level, and
on immigrants older than 24. For instance, the offences committed by
legal and illegal migrants and the motives for committing these offences
are not necessarily identical, even where their crime patterns resemble
each other. It could be, for instance, that legal and illegal migrants who
steal tend to take different types of goods, and for different reasons. It
could also be argued that illegal migrants have an interest in participat-
ing in criminal activities that are not especially risky, e.g. acting as look-
out during a burglary, while legal co-offenders, by contrast, may compel
illegal migrants to carry out the more risky activities, e.g. breaking and
entering. Interviews would have to be conducted and judicial dossiers
examined in order to determine the extent to which this is the case.
Nevertheless, given the similarity in crime patterns and given that sev-
eral variables besides, or in interaction with, societal marginalisation are
commonly used to explain offending patterns among legal migrants, it is
probable that similar variables, and interaction effects between these
variables, also influence illegal migrants’ crime involvement. Cultural
aspects, and differences in the availability of criminal resources in the
country of origin in particular, should also be taken into consideration.
Moreover, we should be aware that there is no hard and fast negative
connection between social capital and criminality, even if empirically the
association may indeed be negative. Several offences require some mea-
sure of social capital.
In this study, the two types of embedded crime identified illustrate
that incorporation in ethnic communities can give access to criminal in-
stitutions or circuits: (1) criminal activities that are, arguably, functional
for segments of poor immigrant communities of which criminal illegal
migrants are a part and in which they are to some extent embedded, and
(2) criminal activities by illegal migrants who are incited to commit
crimes by compatriots who reside legally in the Netherlands. Being em-
bedded in an ethnic community can apparently be connected with all
three dimensions of the differential opportunity structure, i.e. the for-
mal, the informal and the criminal institutions or circuits.
EMBEDDED CRIMES? 127
It seems that incorporation into ethnic communities does not have an
unequivocal effect on illegal migrants’ involvement in crime; such incor-
poration may only reduce the likelihood of illegal migrants embarking
on criminal careers in the Netherlands insofar as the crime rate in the
ethnic community is low. The likelihood of illegal migrants engaging in
criminal careers in the Netherlands, and the types of offences such of-
fenders may commit, vary with the involvement in crime of their legal
compatriots. This is an important observation, since involvement in
crime appears to be relatively widespread in some ethnic groups, espe-
cially among young males.
There are, as has been mentioned, empirical indications that illegal
migrants are increasingly engaging in various forms of crime in the
Netherlands. This study suggests that such growth may not be purely a
consequence of the exclusionist migration policies of recent years. The
increase could be also due to a heightened prevalence of crime among
legal migrants, on whom – for their own chances of survival – illegal
migrants may come to depend. This issue will be taken up in Chapter 6.
But first we will examine the life histories of a group of illegal migrants
who were held in Aliens’ Detention after having committed a crime in
the Netherlands.
Coda
In this sub-study, the percentage of apprehensions for crimes has been
used as a proxy for the prevalence of crime among illegal migrants. As a
consequence, the analyses do not reveal whether the crime rate for ille-
gal migrants is higher or lower than for comparable legal migrants.
Nonetheless, it is possible to calculate a more conventional crime rate
for the total illegal population of non-European origin, using Cruijf and
Van der Heijden’s 2004 estimations of the total size of the non-Euro-
pean illegal population in the Netherlands. This is done in Chapter 6.
Finally, the extent to which having illegal residence status tends to de-
press involvement in violence may even be underestimated somewhat
on the basis of this sub-study; the VAS data include a number of for-
merly legal migrants who have lost their residence permits because of
criminal activities in the Netherlands. Convictions for serious crimes –
often with a violent component – are overrepresented as a reason for
ending residence rights (see also Chapter 6). At the time (in 2004), I
lacked the proper data to include this aspect in the analysis.
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5 ‘I am just trying to live my life’
Introduction
Asylum migration to Western Europe increased sharply toward the end
of the twentieth century, particularly after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Because of this and other factors, the willingness to admit refugees de-
clined in the Western world (Schuster 2000). In the period 1995-2005
approximately 50 to 70 per cent of asylum requests were rejected in the
Netherlands (De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes 2006). Moreover, those
who are recognised as refugees increasingly receive temporary residence
permits (Doornbos & Groenendijk 2001).
Asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies lose their right
to stay in the Netherlands four weeks after the final rejection of their
asylum request.1 Persons who do not leave can be forcibly expelled.
There are a number of reasons why many of them do not leave, or are
able to delay their departure for a long period (see Engbersen et al. 2002;
Van Kalmthout & Van Leeuwen 2004).2 As a consequence, a sizeable
group of illegal migrants with an asylum background existed in the
Netherlands during the period of study. In 2005 it stood at between
17,500 and 30,000 people, 10 to 20 per cent of the estimated total illegal
population of the Netherlands that year (De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes
2006).
This chapter deals with three questions that have not been adequately
covered in the previous literature on illegal residence and crime, using
illegal migrants with a history as asylum seekers as a strategic research
group. First, it was unclear whether survival crime is a suitable term.
Before I conducted this study only a few criminal illegal migrants had
been interviewed. It was therefore impossible to draw any firm conclu-
sions about what illegal migrants are trying to accomplish by commit-
ting crime, and whether their motives can be covered by a single term.
Second, we do not know the degree of importance of the choices that
criminal illegal migrants make. Previous studies assumed that the op-
portunity structures to which an illegal migrant may or may not have
access determine whether or not he or she will be involved in crime.
This kind of explanation, while important, risks being too mechanical. It
neglects the question of how illegal migrants who commit crimes deal
with such opportunities and what their own contributions to the out-
come are. The third question that requires further study is whether the
criminality began in the Netherlands or earlier in their lives. At a time
when criminology increasingly searches for causes of criminality in early
youth and adolescence (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Samson & Laub
1993, 2005), little is known about criminal antecedents among illegal
migrants.
Theoretically, illegal migrants with backgrounds as asylum seekers
run an elevated risk of involvement in survival crime. Asylum migrants
are often pioneers who cannot rely on well-established co-ethnics when
they find themselves illegal residents. They therefore constitute a strate-
gic research group to test and refine the theories that have been pro-
posed so far. To this end the life stories of 26 male illegal migrants with
an asylum background and a record of offences were recorded at the
Aliens’ Detention unit in Tilburg. Three research questions underlie
this research, which was part of a more comprehensive study on asylum
migration and crime in the Netherlands (De Boom et al. 2006; Althoff et
al. 2006; Leerkes 2006).
– What were the men trying to accomplish with crime and what kinds
of offences did they choose for these purposes and what kinds of
offences did they not choose?
– How did their illegal residence status influence the men’s choices,
specifically with regard to the development of crime?
– To what extent had they come into contact with the police in their
countries of origin?
Previous findings and theory
De Haan (1993) introduced the term ‘survival crime’ in the Dutch re-
search on illegal residence. Survival crime is assumed to be a reaction to
extremely difficult living conditions (see also Sansone 1992). It is a way
of dealing with constant problems of livelihood and personal safety. The
term therefore is primarily used to refer to offending by illegal migrants
with very limited life chances. Internationally, the term is sometimes
also used in research on homeless people (for instance, Pain & Francis
2004). The idea that illegal migrants commit crimes in order to survive
is also mentioned briefly in Wolf (1988).
Before I started to conduct research in this field there were three em-
pirical indications for a negative connection between conventional life
chances and survival crime. First, there were considerable differences
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between ethnic groups. The previous chapter showed that Turkish and
Chinese newcomers, who are often supported by tight-knit ethnic com-
munities that are characterised by high levels of entrepreneurship in the
Netherlands, are less often suspected of crimes than North Africans,
who primarily depend on Moroccan migrant communities that, as
Dutch research shows, tend to be fragmented. As a result, Moroccan
illegal migrants have to fall back on their own resources to a greater ex-
tent. Second, in a group of 165 illegal migrants, involvement in crime
was reported more often by respondents who were homeless and/or did
not have kin in the Netherlands than by respondents who did have a
fixed domicile and family in the country (Burgers & Engbersen 1999).
Third, the number of crime suspects with an illegal residence status rose
markedly between 1997 and 2003, a period in which internal border
controls in the form of institutional exclusion of illegal migrants in-
creased considerably in the Netherlands (this rise will be analysed in
Chapter 6).
At the same time it has been suggested that illegal residence status
can curb rule violation (Van der Leun 2003). Such migrants can be as-
sumed to avoid police contacts as an adaptation to the state’s endeavours
to achieve secondary territorial exclusion: the risk of detention and ex-
pulsion that unwanted migrants face after they have managed to circum-
vent the primary external border controls. In Chapters 3 and 4, a number
of additional empirical indications have already been given for this deter-
rence thesis. For instance, the effect appears to reveal itself in the rela-
tively low involvement of illegal migrants in the expressive crimes of
violent assault and vandalism. Compared to instrumental offences in
which the offence is primarily a means to a particular end, such as iden-
tity fraud, violent assault and vandalism with their strong expressive
component are more often an end in themselves (see Van San 1998;
Cohn & Rotton 2003).
The previous chapter also demonstrated that there are significant eth-
nic differences in the types of crimes in which illegal migrants may be
involved. Initially this diversity was mainly explained by group differ-
ences in the degree of access to criminal circuits in the Netherlands. For
example, Engbersen and Van der Leun have shown that illegal migrants
who spoke French turned out to be relatively well equipped to assist with
the sale of hard drugs to French drug tourists who travelled to Rotterdam
to buy and use these drugs. In the previous chapter I argued, elaborating
on this insight, that illegal newcomers have higher chances of criminal
embeddedness as they encounter more offenders in their social net-
works, if a particular type of crime is relatively common among country-
men with legal status, for example (see also Kehla 1999; Zaitch 2002).
In that case social ties to legal and criminal inhabitants enable involve-
ment in somewhat more integrated and organised forms of crime, and
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do not necessarily function as a buffer against offending (cf. Weerman
1998). Because of a combination of factors, since the 1980s ethnic North
Africans have increasingly left their mark on the street trade in hard
drugs in the Netherlands.3 It seems likely that illegal newcomers from
North Africa can join this black economy more easily than illegal mi-
grants from other countries of origin.
A number of criminologists who have done research on legal mi-
grants have attributed ethnic diversity in criminality, in part, to cultural
or subcultural factors, although doing so was a taboo in academia for a
long time (see Van Gemert 1998). Today we still do not know whether or
how such factors may impact the degree and form of criminality among
illegal migrants. An exploration of the role of such cultural factors is one
of the purposes of this sub-study.
Finally, we do not know much about criminal antecedents among ille-
gal migrants in the countries of origin. Van der Leun (2003) interviewed
a few North African drug runners and found indications that their of-
fending had begun in the Netherlands. However, in his ethnographic
research on cocaine trade among Colombians, Zaitch (2002) found indi-
cations for continued criminal careers. Both types of offenders were re-
ported by Wolf (1988) in his explorative study in the San Diego area.
Research method
The vast majority of crime suspects are men. This holds true for crime
suspects among asylum seekers (De Haan & Althoff 2002) and among
illegal migrants (Engbersen et al. 2002). Women were therefore ex-
cluded from this study. The limited size of the interview group also
played a part in this selection, along with practical considerations: the
Tilburg prison is an institution for men.
The fieldwork on which this chapter is based was carried out in the
Aliens’ Detention unit of Tilburg prison in 2005. Initially all 110 detai-
nees with an asylum background and a record of offences were ap-
proached by letters in English, French, Arabic, Russian and Serbo-Croat.
The records of offences the men had committed were made available by
a department of the Ministry of Justice. In return for engaging in an
interview the respondents were offered a ten-euro phone card.
Because only five men responded, a more informal approach was cho-
sen which included a role for the clergymen of the institution (imams,
Catholic priests and Protestant ministers). An imam recruited three men
who had not responded to the letter. In addition, I was given the oppor-
tunity to introduce myself during two Islamic and two ecumenical Chris-
tian services. Such services are well attended.4 The willingness to coop-
erate with the research was high; 86 men registered. A further selection
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was made of 30 people who actually had an asylum history and a record
of offences. Ultimately, the target number of 25 could only just be
reached, since several of the men were expelled from the Netherlands
before the interviews could take place.
Most respondents were interviewed twice. An interpreter was present
with eight respondents.5 The remainder were sufficiently fluent in
Dutch or English. Many men had, or had had, a Dutch partner and/or
had taken language courses during the asylum procedure. The Africans
who were from former English colonies generally spoke English as a
first or second language. The interviews took place in rooms in the visi-
tors’ wing that are ordinarily used for meetings between detainees and
lawyers or representatives of external state organisations. The individual
interviews, which were semi-structured, lasted for between one-and-a-
half and two hours. Twenty respondents permitted me to record the in-
terviews.
The interviews were sometimes quite emotional, especially for the re-
spondents but in some cases for me as well. Several men were dejected,
angry, stressed or fearful, although there was also regular laughter. I of-
ten tried to break the ice with a joke. In other ways as well, I tried to put
the men at ease. The record of offences was put on the table (‘Did you
know this? This is what they say…’). To reassure the men once more that
this was a matter of scientific research, I put two books on the table
about illegal residence in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 1999;
Leerkes et al. 2004). It seemed to me that most respondents appreciated
the opportunity to tell their story in a setting where no moral judge-
ments or important decisions would be made about them.
Validity
The life-course approach has a number of methodological drawbacks
(Giele & Elder 1998). The same is true of prison interviews (see Kroese
& Staring 1993). People tend to rearrange their experiences, and they do
not remember everything. Questions about deviant behaviour can sti-
mulate socially desirable answers. Respondents may fear that talking
about unsolved crimes will lead to additional punishment. One respon-
dent indeed ended his cooperation after the first interview because he
did not want to take the risk that I was a policeman after all. Others were
less worried on that score. Some men even confessed to incidents for
which they had not been convicted. It is probable that strategic responses
may have occurred with regard to migration motives in particular. The
interviewees were no longer in the asylum procedure, but many had not
given up all hope that they would eventually be recognised as refugees.
Political motives may have been feigned or exaggerated. I suspect that
the risk of strategic response with regard to offending was lower as all
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respondents knew that I had their police and court records in front of
me. The hope of being granted a residence permit may have promoted a
conventional presentation of self – within the limits set by the record of
offences – but may also have led to greater openness. An institution psy-
chologist informed me that one respondent had gone on the rampage
after the interviews because he had hoped – in spite of information to
the contrary – that he would obtain a residence permit in this way and
that that was one of the reasons he had granted full cooperation.
Table 5.1 Respondent characteristics
Country Age Interviews Language Interpreter?
North Africa
A Algeria 22 1 Dutch No
B Algeria 35 2 Arabic Yes
C Algeria 37 2 Arabic Yes
Other Africa
D Sierra Leone 19 2 English No
E Sierra Leone 20 3 Dutch No
F Sierra Leone 22 1 English No
G Sierra Leone 23 1 English No
H Sierra Leone 25 1 English No
I Zaire/Congo 29 2 French Yes
J Zaire/Congo 32 2 English No
K Zaire/Congo 37 3 English No
L Liberia 29 2 English No
M Liberia 36 2 English No
N Angola 20 2 Dutch/English No
O (South) Mauritania 22 2 Dutch No
P (South) Sudan 24 2 English No
Eastern Europe (including former Soviet Union)
Q Former Soviet Union 22 2 English No
R Former Soviet Union 29 2 Dutch No
S Former Soviet Union 33 2 Russian Yes
T Former Soviet Union 36 2 Russian Yes
U Former Soviet Union 44 2 Dutch No
V Georgia 20 2 Russian Yes
W Former Yugoslavia 25 2 Serbo-Croatian Yes
Other Asia
X Lebanon 23 1 Dutch/Arabic Yes
Y Afghanistan 29 2 Dutch No
Z Iran 42 1 Dutch No
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Table 5.2 Overview of convictions and some pending cases per respondent
North Africa
A Insulting a policeman
B Shoplifting (multiple charges), car burglary, burglary in apartments
C Intended sale of hard drugs (one time)
Other Africa
D Travelling on somebody else’s passport, registering with the registry of births,
deaths and marriages as somebody else
E Street trade in hard drugs (one time)
F Working with somebody else’s document, cannabis use
G Forgery
H Leaving the Netherlands on somebody else’s passport
I Bicycle theft, fare-dodging
J Shoplifting (multiple occasions, with confederate), working with somebody else’s
papers, paying with counterfeit money (one bank note)
K Insulting a policeman, dealing in hard drugs, theft from an apartment, destruction
of a car, street robbery, dangerous driving
L Travelling with somebody else’s passport, driving without a driving license
M Theft, receiving stolen property, driving without a driving license, working with
somebody else’s papers.
N Shoplifting, driving under the influence of alcohol, theft from a residence, using a
false name
O Driving without a driving license, destruction
P Intended physical assault (asylum centre)
Eastern Europe (including former Soviet Union)
Q Shoplifting (six times), including two with violence during flight; pending:
undesirable alien
R Shoplifting (one time)
S Shoplifting (one time)
T Shoplifting (multiple occasions, with confederate), receiving stolen property,
burglary in office building; pending: attempted murder and homicide
U Rape, shoplifting (multiple occasions), breach of the peace
V Shoplifting, minor violent assault, insulting a policeman
W Minor physical assault, driving without insurance
Other Asia
X Dealing in hard drugs, shoplifting, destruction of a car
Y Rape and theft under threat (same incident), driving without a driving license
Z Thefts, attempted theft with burglary (residence, office building), pickpocketing,
destruction, not following a police order, street trade in hard drugs, drugs
nuisance, undesirable alien
Source: Justitiële Informatie
I tried to neutralise these problems of validity as much as possible,
although most are inherent to the research method. Criminal records
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were used as a memory aid. I strove for a confidential atmosphere. With
the life-course approach, this was not too difficult to achieve; I asked
about the integral development of the respondent as a person, not only
about that part of his life which had been important in the asylum proce-
dure or the judicial process. The length of the interviews and my similar-
ity in age to the respondents (I was 31) also promoted rapport. Leading
and suggestive questions were avoided; the interpreters were instructed
to omit signs of condemnation. Subjects like criminality and migration
motives, which might have made the interviewees feel threatened, were
often reserved until the end of the interviews. It is likely that the role of
the clergymen promoted trust as well.
Respondent characteristics
Sixteen of the men were born in Africa, seven were Eastern Europeans
and three were from Asia. The average age was 28 (Table 5.1). Most men
had been convicted for identity fraud, theft and/or drug-dealing (Table
5.2). All had an asylum background and were considered illegal aliens
by the Dutch state at the time of the interview.
I thought at first that each of the men had lived illegally in the Nether-
lands before they were apprehended and this was true for most of them.
They had lived with friends, resided without the knowledge of the
authorities in asylum centres or lived on the streets. Some were obli-
gated to report regularly to the aliens police as rejected asylum seekers;
such persons are called stampers by the aliens police. Formally they had
become illegal migrants who could have been apprehended and detained
in order to be expelled every time they reported to the police though
most of them were unaware of this. Some stampers had been receiving
elementary social support in an asylum centre or from the local author-
ities even though they were not formally entitled to it; others had been
forced to take care of themselves. A few became illegal migrants whilst
in prison when their asylum applications were rejected, in some cases,
in part, because of convictions.
The transitions between the residence statuses over time were less
rigid than I had initially assumed. Most had become illegal migrants
after their asylum application was rejected, though four respondents
had lived as illegal migrants in several European countries before re-
questing asylum in the Netherlands. Three respondents had held a
temporary residence permit as recognised refugees, which they failed to
extend in time because of absence from the Netherlands or personal
problems. Some men had been given the status of rejected asylum see-
ker and illegal migrant, but had managed to re-enter the asylum proce-
dure, at least temporarily.
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In what follows, the emphasis will be on illegal residence without gov-
ernment support. But I suspect the findings are also valid for stampers
and asylum seekers, at least to a considerable extent. Under the law
these three groups have a particularly marginal social position and other
variables which correlate with criminality, such as age and ethnic origin,
are comparable too.6 This is not to say that having illegal residence sta-
tus is unimportant. The interviewees tended to commit fewer crimes –
with the exception of violent crimes – when they had legal residence in
the Netherlands than in the periods during which they were illegal mi-
grants. Large-scale quantitative research suggests that the relative num-
ber of crime suspects is higher among rejected asylum seekers than
among recognised refugees and asylum seekers whose applications are
still being processed (De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes 2006). The con-
tent of many men’s criminal records would probably have been different
had they had full civil rights in the Netherlands.
Towards a typology of crime among illegal migrants
Illegal residence status and its consequences strongly contributed to
some of the men’s crimes. In other cases this status appears to have had
little or no influence. In Diagram 5.1, the offences are structured accord-
ing to their aims and, in connection with that, the influence of their
residence status, from strong and relatively direct (residence crime) to
very weak and indirect (other crimes). There are two intermediate cate-
gories. Subsistence crime and addiction-related crime are committed in
response to conditions that are, partly, an indirect consequence of illegal
residence status.
I will also address the question of why certain types of crime were
rarely committed by the men, if at all. The absence of certain types of
crime may be, among other things, an indication of a negative connec-
tion between illegal residence status or its consequences and crime.
The diagram’s primary purpose is to structure the data. It should not
be taken as expressing hard and fast rules. Crimes that are classified in a
certain way often have elements in common with crimes that are as-
signed to another category.
Residence crime
The aim of residence crime is to obtain residence in the Netherlands or
some other Western country. It usually takes place at national borders,
and can be aimed at entry and/or departure. These forms of residence
crime are associated with what has been called external border control in
Chapter 1. Besides this, there are variants which occur inside national
‘I AM JUST TRYING TO LIVE MY LIFE’ 137
borders; these are related to secondary territorial exclusion as an instru-
ment of internal border control.
Diagram 5.1 A typology of crime among illegal immigrants: convictions and
self-reported offences
Residence crime
– Entering or leaving the Netherlands with false documents, somebody else’s documents
(borrowed, stolen, bought) or without a document
– Not leaving the Netherlands after having been declared an ‘undesirable alien’
– Not being able to identify oneself in the Netherlands or showing a false document/
somebody else’s document (borrowed, stolen, bought) (law on identification)
– Recalcitrance during apprehension, ignoring a police order, flight to avoid arrest
– Giving a false name, including registering with the register for births, deaths and
marriages with a false name
Subsistence crime
– Working with false papers or somebody else’s papers
– Theft (mostly shoplifting)
– Drug dealing (mostly street vendor or drug runner)
– Receiving or resale of stolen goods (mostly clothes, cell phones, bicycles)
– Driving without a driving license and/or car insurance
– Fare-dodging
– Taking the law into one’s own hands (violence or destruction following an insult,
violence or threat in an attempt to collect a loan, forcing door of a landlord’s property)
Addiction-related crime
– Drug dealing (street vendor)
– Shoplifting
– Car burglary
– Burglary in residencies or office buildings
– Street robbery (one convicted respondents denies involvement)
Other crimes
– Sexual violence (sexual assault and rape)
– Violence in connection with mental disturbance (psychoses)
– ‘In good faith’ (non-Western migrants do not always know what is illegal in the
Netherlands)
– Insulting a policeman
– Youth delinquency (experimenting with drugs, driving under the influence/without a
driving license, shoplifting)
Since 1994 it has been obligatory in the Netherlands to be able to identi-
fy oneself at work, during specific events such as soccer matches, in case
of offences or misdemeanours and in case of suspected illegal residence.
On 1 January 2005 a general law on identification came into force, but by
then most of my respondents were already in detention. Residence
crime inside the Netherlands was rare among these men, since there
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was only a limited identification obligation before 2005. Although no
respondent had been convicted of it, some men had identified them-
selves occasionally with somebody else’s driver’s license or their old W-
document (a special ID for asylum seekers), for instance, during traffic
checks. It is likely that residence crime inside national borders is now
more common.
Many citizens of non-Western countries do not qualify for a residence
permit. Even for a tourist visa one must be able to demonstrate ‘ade-
quate means of support’. Otherwise one needs to find a guarantor. Many
illegal migrants with settled family in the Netherlands formally come as
tourists to the Netherlands (Staring 2001). My respondents had lacked
that opportunity because they did not have established kin or friends.7
Almost all respondents entered the Netherlands in irregular ways
though these are not necessarily illegal if the foreigner immediately re-
ports to the police and asks for asylum. Several of the Africans had
landed as stowaways in Rotterdam harbour. Most of the Eastern Eur-
opeans made use of smugglers who avoided all border controls over
land or provided false documents. The North Africans had been shipped
to Europe by a smuggler, or formally arrived as tourists at a time when
that was easier. The latter group came from regions from which people
have migrated to Europe for a considerable time (Sayad 2004). They
lived as illegal migrants in Spain, France, Belgium and/or the Nether-
lands before applying for asylum in the Netherlands, in two of the three
cases only after they had been detected by the authorities. Three respon-
dents had flown to Europe; one as a documented tourist, two with false
documents.
Later, several of the men tried to leave the Netherlands with invalid
documents because they did not see a future for themselves with an ille-
gal residence status in Holland but were unwilling or unable to return to
their country of origin. Two of the Africans tried to fly to Canada, a coun-
try which, so they believed, is more prepared to receive migrants; one
recalled that there were Canadian immigration programmes in Africa in
which potential migrants could enrol. Two men had tried to reach Swe-
den. S had been arrested in Germany three times; each time he was
transferred to the Dutch authorities. On the third occasion the German
police fined him for showing a false document. L wanted to fly to Swe-
den because he could not find work in the Netherlands.
A friend advised me to go to Sweden, to work in construction. Good
money, no taxes. I could live with Liberians. It was a question of how
to travel. My friend said, ‘Hey, there are a lot of junkies in the Red
Light district who sell passports.’ Eventually I ended up with a Dutch
guy who offered me a passport belonging to somebody who looked a
bit like me for 200 euros. So I called an African friend. She had 80
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euros. My buddy gave me 50 euros. When I started to beg around
like that in Amsterdam I soon had 200, 300 euros. I bought the pass-
port for 150 euros. Then I still had to arrange the journey. I thought,
‘I’ll try a small airport. Then they won’t catch me.’ In Rotterdam I got
a ticket for 50 euros. At the airport the customs guy said, ‘Man, you
look stupid! I am sure that’s not you!’ So he asks, ‘Is this your pass-
port?’ I say no [gives a somewhat melancholy smile, amused]. So he
says, ‘Sorry, I have to arrest you for trying to use somebody else’s
document.’ I said, ‘Go ahead; I am just trying to live my life.’
L had been counting on a temporary illegal stay in Sweden. He hoped to
earn enough money in Sweden to get himself a lawyer in the Nether-
lands. In the period when he had a temporary residence permit he be-
came a father. Although he no longer has a good relationship with his
Dutch ex-wife, he feels tied to the Netherlands because of his daughter.
Residence crime clearly touches on subsistence crime in this case. The
offence was aimed at residence in a Western country, but behind that
aim was the wish to comply with a standard which was thought of as
basic by the offender and the social environments in which he partici-
pates, participated, or wants to participate – in this case the norm that a
father should be able to see his daughter every now and then.
Subsistence crime
While residence crime is almost inherent in illegal residence, it does not
encourage the commission of other crimes to the same degree. Illegal
migrants who work in the informal economy are, admittedly, punishable
because they do not pay taxes, but they do not have to commit crimes in
order to make a living. This also applies to illegal migrants who are sup-
ported by family, friends or a partner. It is probably possible to stay alive
in the Netherlands without a social network, while still not violating the
criminal code. In case of subsistence crime – which should not be inter-
preted in a economic sense only8 – the offender intends to meet social
standards that are usually perceived as basic by himself and/or by others
who constitute the social networks in which he participates, participated,
or wants to participate. Many of the crimes committed were aimed more
at prevention or reparation of relative deprivation on account of social
comparison, including the situation in the past, than in response to the
absolute deprivation of hunger or illness. Illegal residence status had a
more indirect influence on these crimes, chiefly for the reason that this
status complicates earning a conventional income.
The respondents are not from countries of origin that are the source
of sizeable ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, and they had few oppor-
tunities to work informally in ethnic niches like takeaway restaurants
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and cleaning services. A few men did succeed in moonlighting some-
what through Dutch contacts. Three men’s offences consisted of work-
ing in the formal labour market with somebody else’s papers.
J had tried to make more of his life, after spending several years alter-
nating between freedom and detention as an illegal migrant. He fol-
lowed the advice he was given in prison and began looking for a girl-
friend. This worked out. Rather quickly the couple decided to live
together, out of love according to J, and also because he lacked housing;
the Dutch girl still lived with her parents. His girlfriend’s pregnancy in-
creased the pressure to earn money: ‘My girlfriend said, “Everybody
works, why don’t you?” ’ J arranged an ID from somebody with a work
permit and started to work as a garbage collector through a temp agency.
He paid 50 euros a week to the supplier of the document until the aliens
police intervened.
Many men stole in the Netherlands (Table 5.2). The thefts were mostly
surreptitious and unorganised, often shoplifting. Some stole food. N, a
physician’s son, spoke about the difficult period he went through after
his asylum request was rejected. He had to leave his room in the asylum
centre and was in danger of going downhill but wanted to limit his de-
gradation. He was keen on distinguishing himself from junkies and va-
grants, and did not look for food in litter bins because he found the prac-
tice dirty and unhealthy. He tried to take regular showers at the homes of
acquaintances. After a while he started feeling extremely ashamed that
he had to ask his friends for help so often. He began to ‘help himself’
and started shoplifting. In this sense, the thefts served to help pay for his
marijuana use, which increased sharply in that period. For instance, he
stole bras that he was able sell to a couple of Moroccan street boys who
had probably seen him begging in the street. However, most thefts were
not aimed at buying soft drugs but rather for himself. He was arrested
after stealing a sausage. Although he acknowledges that shoplifting gave
him a kick in a certain sense (cf. Katz 1988), he does not attribute the
thefts to a desire for excitement ‘My life went wrong and I knew I could
get into trouble.’
Most men intended to meet somewhat higher standards with crime
than the norm which prescribes that an honourable human being ob-
tains his food from a shop. Nonetheless, these standards are still consid-
ered basic. S, who became quite well-off in the car trade after the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union, stole a leather jacket in the local shopping
street. He knew he could sell it to an asylum seeker who was about to
marry. On the one hand he hoped to force a final decision about his
residence status with this incidental theft (‘Are you going to admit me or
will you send me away?’) since he had been repeatedly advised to submit
a new asylum application, even though all his previous requests had
been denied. On the other hand he hoped that the sale of the jacket
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would satisfy the appeal from his family to contribute to the funeral costs
for his father, who was terminally ill. He regretted his absence from the
funeral. Moreover, he believed he had failed as a son because he lacked a
good job and offspring: ‘My father died without having seen his grand-
children.’
The choice of becoming involved in drug dealing sometimes also qua-
lifies as subsistence crime. An assistant to an Algerian car mechanic, C
lived as an illegal migrant in various European countries for years, pre-
sumably without committing crimes. He managed to support himself
with odd jobs in the informal economy, like re-papering apartments and
installing satellite dishes. After reaching a certain age he searched for a
wife. Via the internet he met a divorced Algerian woman who lived in
Belgium. They got along well, visited her mother and committed them-
selves to entering into an agreement around Christmastime about how
to organise a wedding. But with the access to Europe within reach – by
marrying, C hoped to obtain a residence permit – he found that his sav-
ings were inadequate for a dowry.
I used to hang around Rotterdam central station when I was out of
work. Tourists sometimes asked me if I sold drugs. The police knew
me, but left me alone. They knew that I had been released from
Aliens’ Detention. Six weeks before Christmas, I approached a guy
who sells fake brands at the station and inquired about drug dealing.
He arranged a contact with an Arab dealer, who advised me to buy
drug balls for 450 euros. Later that day, to my surprise, I was appre-
hended while I was buying a shirt at the V&D [a department store]. I
hadn’t had the opportunity to sell one ball! The police said they had
mistaken me for somebody else. While I was doing time in prison,
many prisoners laughed at me. A dealer should know it is unwise to
carry all the balls. [A person who carries a limited number of balls
can pretend to be a user, which is not prosecuted in the Netherlands].
The judge was surprised by my criminal activities, because I was ille-
gal for years without committing offences. I told him what I am now
telling you. You can inquire about that if you wish.
Three more variants of subsistence crime come to the fore in B’s story:
receiving and resale of stolen goods, driving without a Dutch driver’s
license and taking the law into one’s own hands. B, who claimed to have
been a Mauritian opposition activist, met a Dutch girl, started to live with
her and had a daughter with her. The Immigration Services then pre-
sented him with a difficult choice. In view of his situation, he could
either opt for the asylum procedure, which would mean he could not
live with his girlfriend and his daughter, or choose for his relationship
and abandon the asylum procedure, perhaps temporarily. B preferred
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the latter option and became an illegal migrant. He expected that he
would be able to apply for asylum later; several of his acquaintances had
received refugee status at a later stage.
While his relationship lasted, B’s involvement in rule violation was
limited to driving without a license. He took driving lessons, first infor-
mally from a friend, later at a driving school. As an illegal migrant he
could not obtain a driver’s license. In that light he did not feel that a
driver’s license was necessary, since he believed he was a good driver.
His girlfriend appreciated it when he drove her to places. However, B
always complied with all other traffic rules because as an illegal he was
uninsured and could be fined if the police were to find out. Besides, he
wanted to avoid ‘unnecessary’ police contacts to minimise the risk of
being detained and expelled as an illegal migrant. His record of offences
appeared to confirm these claims: it did not mention other traffic infrac-
tions.
After a while his girlfriend found a new boyfriend. She wanted to end
the relationship, and although she did not insist that he leave the apart-
ment, B took the honourable way out and moved in with an asylum see-
ker friend a few blocks away. B cried as he said this. He managed to
make ends meet by selling African bracelets and other cheap goods to
youngsters of various ethnic origins with whom he went out regularly
and played street basketball. A friend who was still in the asylum process
shared his allowance money with him. Sometimes B bought stolen
goods, such as mobile phones. ‘You won’t let that go if you are illegal.
You can trade it or you can use it yourself. That’s a little bit bad. But not
very.’
B then got into a relationship with a Guinean asylum seeker and
moved in with her. Nonetheless, he was increasingly irritated by the lim-
itations of his illegal residence status. His ex-girlfriend allowed him to
see his daughter three times a week, but only when she was present. In
the street, too, his prestige was diminished now that many people had
found out he was illegal. ‘They didn’t really tell me to take it easy or
they’d go to the police. But they’d think less of you. And I could never go
too far ‘cause I’d think: “Oh, I am illegal, I need to take account.” I’m
blocked, so to speak.’ B applied for asylum once more, in vain. The frus-
tration about his position appears to have been released when he got
behind with his rent again.
One time we did not pay. I found myself in front of a locked door. My
girlfriend was with acquaintances in France. I called the landlord, left
a message on his voice mail; left a letter on the doormat. He didn’t
react to all those things! I knew him well, I often phoned him and
gave him the rent when he came. And my stuff was inside! Clothes,
shoes, a bag. Not much, but it was not about the money. These were
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my things and he didn’t have the right to change the lock. So then I
got angry and forced the door with a friend.
B did not consider contacting the police. Many non-Western newcomers
and even Dutchmen are unaware of what the role of Dutch institutions
is in such conflicts. In that sense this way of taking the law in one’s own
hands – based on the principle that a person ought to have control over
his possessions – is not specific to illegal migrants. At the same time B
noted that he did not have the opportunity to go to the police because he
was illegal. Formally he could have done so but risked detention and ex-
pulsion.
Addiction-related crimes
Various researchers have reported on the recent increase in the number
of illegal migrants among problematic hard drug users (Braam 2003;
Hoogenboezem et al. 2005). Five men came into contact with the police
after committing crimes in order to finance their hard drug use. T al-
ready took heroin even before emigrating. U was talked into hard drug
use in the asylum centre. There is a connection with illegal residence
status in three other cases. Z’s illegal residence status followed proble-
matic hard drug use; while living in the streets he failed to renew the
residence permit he had, and became illegal. The relationship was the
reverse in the two other cases, in which substance use was promoted by
homelessness, which was in turn, at least in part, caused by the potential
implications of the illegal residence status, i.e. illegal migrants’ exclusion
from the housing and labour market as an instrument of internal border
control. In the past the primary risk for the homeless was alcoholism,
but nowadays various other addictive stimulants circulate on the streets
(Anderson 1923). With the latter two respondents, subsistence crime in
the form of drug dealing preceded hard drug use. It may be that entre-
preneurs with higher positions in the supply chain try to persuade mar-
ginalised illegal migrants to become street vendors in the hope of simul-
taneously recruiting a consumer (hooking, Glaser & Strauss 1971).
In contrast to subsistence crime, drug-related acquisitive crime is not
aimed at fulfilling ‘basic’ social standards. The drug use is mostly a way
of coping with psychological problems. H, son of an Algerian construc-
tion foreman, tells how he became addicted to hard drugs in Rotterdam
at the age of 30. Some years earlier he had lost contact with his family.
After his arrival in Marseille in the South of France, H lived and worked
illegally in Paris for two years, without committing crimes, as an assis-
tant to a Jewish shopkeeper. In 1994 he drove to the Netherlands on the
chance of finding more opportunities there, and asked for asylum on the
recommendation of a travelling companion.
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H lived for five years without criminal convictions in various refugee
centres. In between he left the asylum centre for about a year and was
therefore out of the asylum procedure. At the time, he did not have
much faith that his claim would actually be recognised, and he started to
go around with a group of North Africans who had no permanent homes
or addresses. For the most part the men stayed with compatriots who
had residence permits. He then got involved in shoplifting. The stolen
clothes or electronic goods were, in part, sold for cigarettes, liquor or
marijuana. A policeman eventually pointed out to him that he had been
issued a temporary residence permit, but that document turned out to
have expired. Nonetheless, H was readmitted to a refugee centre. His
convictions stopped for some years. When he had exhausted all legal
remedies, he left the refugee centre with 50 euros in his pocket.
It seemed wise to go a big city, but I knew nobody in Rotterdam.
Sometimes somebody did me a favour and invited me to stay for the
night. Everybody said that it was impossible to get a job without docu-
ments in the Netherlands. And I ran into the wrong people once
more when I was on the streets. Mostly North African; I hardly spoke
Dutch or English. This is when I got into drugs. First dealing only.
Then using as well. We sold something, used up the rest. It was not a
life I was used to [smiles scornfully]. Sometimes I went to the Salva-
tion Army or St. Paul’s church [a Rotterdam church well known for
its assistance to marginal social groups] for some food, to shave, for
clothing. I started to steal when I couldn’t pay for my use by selling
drugs. Shoplifting first. But you soon find out that that doesn’t yield
enough. You use together and learn other things. Breaking into cars
for radios or cameras is already better. One day I met an African user.
Also illegal. He knew how to break into apartments. He was looking
for somebody who could be his lookout. Eventually we got caught. I
did a year in prison, then they brought me here.
H’s story illustrates once more that the greater part of the men’s crimin-
ality is incidental or episodic. It is not due to a permanent trait of their
personalities that exerts itself irrespective of the circumstances. At the
same time, although their behaviour is a response to conditions that can
be coupled with illegal residence, it is not inherent to illegal residence.
Other crime
Certain crimes had little or no connection with the offender’s social posi-
tion under the influence of having illegal residence status an the various
forms of border control that go hand in hand with it. The two rape con-
victs are cases in point. Ironically, they were the only respondents whose
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original partner was in the Netherlands. The Afghan Y attributed the
event to his alcohol and soft drug use, as a result of problems with the
payment of his allowance money as part of the asylum procedure. The
Russian U claimed that the woman, who had exhausted all legal reme-
dies herself, prostituted herself in the asylum centre and had presented
the coitus as rape in the hope of getting a residence permit as a victim.
(If this allegation is true, her strategy could be classed under the heading
of residence crime.) Furthermore, there are indications for a connection
between mental disorders and violence (see also Althoff et al. 2006).
While in the asylum seeker’s centre a Chechen T wounded a Yugoslav
with a knife. The offender suffered from hallucinations that started dur-
ing soft drug use. The man who went on the rampage after the interview
turned out to be using psycho-pharmaceuticals, though this was not
communicated to me before the interview, and had acted violently a
number of times in the course of the asylum procedure as well. One
respondent thought he was innocent when a local bicycle thief sold him
a bike at the asylum seekers centre. A North African youngster A in-
sulted the policeman who had fined him because his bicycle light was
not functioning. Finally, some men who came to the Netherlands as mi-
nors were involved in juvenile delinquency. For instance, N sometimes
drove the car of a classmate’s father, before he was eighteen. He had
learned how to drive on a parking lot behind the local soccer stadium,
where he met friends to drink and smoke at weekends.
For the most part, the men committed these other crimes in periods
during which they were legally residing in the Netherlands. This does
not imply that such crimes do not take place among illegal migrants.9
But within this research population, in as far as there is a positive con-
nection between these other crimes and the illegal residence status, illeg-
ality followed criminality rather than the other way round. In other
words: these men did not become involved in crime as a response to a
marginal social position after their asylum requests had been rejected
and they had become illegal migrants; it was rather the case that the
asylum requests by some of the men were rejected, at least in part, be-
cause of their crime convictions during their legal stay in the Nether-
lands as asylum seekers. Convictions are a counter-indication for obtain-
ing a residence permit and may even be a reason to withdraw a
residence permit that has already been granted. In specific cases a mi-
grant can also be declared an undesirable alien (such as Q and Z), in
which case continued residence in the Netherlands is not only illegal
but becomes punishable as a crime liable to a penalty of six months in
prison (see Chapter 6 for more information on what is known in the
Netherlands as residence termination). By terminating the legal stay of
migrants convicted of crimes, the state deliberately contributes to the
number of criminal illegal migrants and, therefore, to a positive connec-
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tion between criminality and illegal residence. This contribution is
stronger if such migrants continue to stay in the Netherlands as illegal
migrants in spite of the state’s assumption that migrants are more in-
clined to leave if their continued residence is defined as illegal or, in
case of undesirable aliens, punishable under criminal law.
Engbersen and Van der Leun (1995) have already pointed out that we
should pay attention to such deliberate changing of criminal migrants’
residence rights by the state if we want to understand the connection
between illegality and criminality. They nonetheless argue that this phe-
nomenon is of limited importance in understanding the relationship be-
tween illegality and criminality among non-Western migrants, because
during their research period, i.e. the early 1990s, the deliberate chang-
ing of residence rights mainly pertained to Western European offenders.
These constituted a very specific group of mainly EU citizens who were
declared undesirable aliens after causing drug-related nuisance in the
Netherlands. In spite of European integration, which promotes the free
traffic of goods and persons within the EU, citizens from other EU coun-
tries can still be declared undesirable aliens and, hence, become illegal
migrants if they are convicted of certain crimes. It turns out that the
deliberate changing of criminal migrants’ residence rights also increas-
ingly involves non-Western offenders. Therefore, to understand the rela-
tionship between illegality and criminality among migrants from non-
Western countries – on which this book focuses – it is increasingly rele-
vant to pay attention to such deliberate changing of residence rights.
This will be done in the next chapter.
Types of crime not present: external and internal social control
The men’s records of offences rarely mention violent assault and vandal-
ism, particularly in the periods of illegal residence.10 The relative ab-
sence of certain types of crime which could have been committed by
men in their position is remarkable. The research group is quite small
in this case, but police figures, too, suggest that illegally resident crime
suspects are significantly less likely to be involved in violence and vand-
alism than their legal counterparts with similar ages and country of birth
(see Chapter 4; for the low involvement of illegal migrants in violence in
the United States see also McDonald (1997) and Wolf (1988); for Bel-
gium see Van Meeteren, Van San & Engbersen (2008)).
This provides additional evidence for a differential effect of illegal re-
sidence status on criminality. Involvement in crime may arise under the
influence of illegal residence status, but such involvement usually re-
mains selective. Certain rules are violated, but other rules are observed
more closely. B, for instance, drove without a driver’s license, but fol-
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lowed other traffic regulations as much as possible. In social traffic too,
he was restrained to a greater degree: ‘I am blocked, so to speak.’
The low involvement in certain types of crime is, of course, not merely
a question of social opportunity and external social control, given illegal
residence status, like the deterrence thesis argues (see Chapter 1). Social
control also comes from inside; it is also internalised by previous sociali-
sation. This is made particularly clear by the observation that the men
have consciously and unconsciously avoided crimes of the sort that
would have been, on the face of it, opportune and performable variants
of subsistence crime. None of the men were, for instance, convicted of
robbery. Most respondents found crimes such as bag snatching too im-
moral – ‘Street robbery is an ugly thing to do.’ Several respondents never
even considered that crimes such as street robbery or hold-ups were an
option (‘No, never thought about robbing people. No [makes a hissing
noise]. Dear me [laughs]. No, that never occurred to me. The car, yes
[driving without a driving license].’ [laughs] ).
Even the hard drug users recognised internal constraints with regard
to their criminal behaviour. H was the lookout, but could not bring him-
self to break into apartments. The burglar, too, had no residence permit;
apparently he had come to a different decision. The man who became a
heroin user in the asylum seeker’s centre was only convicted of shoplift-
ing, though for a considerable number of cases. He claimed that he was
not a violent person. He also stated that, in his mind, shoplifting is not
as immoral as stealing from individual citizens. ‘Then I only thought:
not against people.’
Most of the men were convicted of victimless or consensual crimes. In
the case of victimless crimes there is no clear individual victim; identity
fraud primarily impairs state authority. With consensual crimes the vic-
tim colludes in the offence, for instance, drug dealing. The men who
were convicted of theft mostly limited themselves to shoplifting. Earlier
research yielded similar indications. De Haan (1994) counted one illegal
migrant among the violent street robbers in the Amsterdam neighbour-
hood De Bijlmer, although illegal migrants probably represented several
per cent of the residents there (Leerkes et al. 2004). German research
reaches a similar conclusion (Alt 1999: 305):
Die überwältigende Mehrheit von ihnen möchte selbst dann, wenn
sie zur Begehung von Straftaten keine Alternative sehen, wenigstens
‘so wenig kriminell wie möglich’ sein. (‘The overwhelming majority
of them would like to be “as little criminal as possible”, even when
they did not see alternatives but to commit crimes’; translation by the
author).
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Some of this reluctance to engage in violent street crime may perhaps be
associated with the social backgrounds of international migrants. Long-
distance migration, in particular, tends to involve people who do not be-
long to the lowest social strata in their countries of origin (see also Chap-
ter 1).11
Criminal antecedents
I focused on the men’s experiences in the Netherlands, but asked
whether or not the respondents had committed offences outside of the
Netherlands. For most men this does not appear to have been the case.
This is indicated by their answers, but also by the nature and timing of
the offences for which they were sentenced. People who have had police
contacts since childhood tend to commit property crimes as well as vio-
lent crimes, often minor offences as well as serious offences (Gottfred-
son & Hirschi 1990; Beke, Van Wijk & Ferwerda 2000). It turned out
that the men’s criminality had usually not started immediately after emi-
gration. Besides this, the crime involvement of many of my respondents
had an eposidoc character; after settlement in the Netherlands there was,
as a rule, a negative connection between involvement in crime – particu-
larly property crimes and drug trafficking – and conventional opportu-
nities, for example, an income through the asylum procedure, informal
work, a temporary residence permit or income via a partner.
Two men reported police contacts because of incidents that would be
considered crimes in the Netherlands as well.12 T had been incarcerated
in several Russian prisons. In his case there was not really a question of
criminal emigration (Bovenkerk 2002) – he did not come to the Nether-
lands in order to commit crimes – but he did continue his old behaviour
of shoplifting and burglary, both related to hard drug use. Eventually he
was involved in a serious violent assault in connection with the decline
of his mental health. The man who went on the rampage after the inter-
view had been detained in Georgia once for theft. Six men admitted po-
lice contacts in their countries of origin because of political activities,
evasion of conscription, desertion, or refusing to carry out an order as a
soldier. Furthermore, some men had committed crimes for which they
had not been convicted. An African told how he wandered in the bush
with some friends after the rebels had driven him out of his village. They
sometimes sneaked into farms to steal food. In addition, I spoke to four
alleged child soldiers or rebel helpers who claimed to have been forced
to participate in looting and, in one case, murder. None of these respon-
dents was involved in crime in the Netherlands to any significant extent;
their records of offences show only light property crime or fraud. (Per-
haps the term survival crime is more appropriate to describe forced vio-
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lence by child soldiers in Africa then to describe the crime involvement
among illegal migrants in Western countries such as the Netherlands.)
In sum, it seems there is no unequivocal connection between criminal
antecedents and crime in the Netherlands. The possible trajectories that
can be distinguished analytically appear to occur in reality too: 1) a clear
past history of criminality with a clear continuation thereof, 2) a clear
past history of criminality that ends, at least in that form i.e. the child
soldiers, 3) no criminal history and little or no criminal behaviour in the
Netherlands, for instance one conviction for working with somebody
else’s documents and 4) no criminal history and several police contacts
in the Netherlands. The second, third and fourth variants are most pre-
valent among the men. Althoff et al. (2006) also conclude that criminal
antecedents are not the rule among criminal asylum seekers (see also De
Haan & Althoff 2002).
Theoretical interpretation
Status dilemmas and crime
The preceding analyses show that the men were not merely passive
bearers of the illegal residence status and the various forms of border
control that define it, and nothing else. Their social position was also
determined by other social statuses in their status-sets, such as father,
son or boyfriend (the notion of the status-set is taken from Merton’s
(1957), see also Chapter 3). Above all, we must understand the men as
migrants: their aspirations resemble traditional familial group values in
the country of origin as well as values that are characteristic of the mili-
eus in which they move in the Netherlands. An uncle tries to arrange a
good and safe future for his nephew in Europe, a son is expected to con-
tribute to his father’s funeral costs, a bridegroom is expected to pay a
dowry, a boyfriend wants to chauffeur his Dutch girlfriend around.
Illegal residence status, and the marginal social position that may re-
sult from it, may hamper the observance of these basic social standards.
Hence, the men were frequently confronted with status dilemmas
(Hughes 1994). The social expectations and opportunities that are
coupled with the illegal residence status may be at odds with parallel
statuses such as that of a father or fiancé. The milieus in which the men
move confront them with these status expectations; but they are also im-
posed on them internally. People who seriously disappoint their interna-
lised status expectations risk tensions with the social environment and
within themselves.
Each man has to respond to these institutional contradictions in his
own way: ‘I am just trying to live my life.’ The interviews indicate that a
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certain weighing usually occurs: in order to maintain one standard, con-
cessions are made in other norms, at least temporarily (cf. Matza 1964).
Accommodation of conflicting behavioural standards takes place in so-
cial life continuously, and must take place if social traffic is not to stag-
nate (Goffman 1969, 1971b). Sometimes this is also the case – to a great-
er degree – during illegal residence. The men sometimes substituted
criminality for conventional behaviour.
When dealing with these phenomena, where individuals identify with
conventional ambitions but do not have sufficient resources to realise
them in conventional ways, criminologists often refer to Merton (1938:
672-682). His strain theory was primarily related to the American situa-
tion where deprived groups aspired to be upwardly mobile. A more mod-
est social dream is also observable among some of these men. The North
Africans, in particular, did not leave home because of safety concerns;
their coming to Europe, and the residence crime this usually involved,
was primarily aimed at upward social mobility. Their subsistence crime
appears to have been inspired – at least to a greater degree than among
most of the other men – by a desire to get ahead in the world. In most of
the other cases criminality appears to have been aimed at preventing or
reducing social descent. These offenders did not know beforehand that
they would become illegal migrants. They tried to hold on to a standard
and identity that had been a guarantee for them in the past: safety or a
certain standard of living in the country of origin and/or the Nether-
lands, as an asylum seeker or recognised refugee (cf. Newman 1999).
The respondents tended to sacrifice standards to which they are not so
deeply attached, at least in comparison to other options. Legal jobs would
have been preferable for many men, compared to black labour; working
black is more attractive than crime. Minor offences were preferred to the
serious offences that would appear to be a step too far for the men,
whose consequent shame and condemnation would be too great, both
by their own conscience, and within their social environment. Such
crimes would create a strong new tension between their aspirations and
their actual identity, even if they might help reduce the initial tension
between illegal residence status and the parallel statuses. It seems that
these men aimed at a golden mean.
Unlike residence crime and subsistence crime, addiction-related
crime does not modify the status dilemma by selectively substituting
criminal alternatives for conventional behaviour. Still, the objective of
substance abuse may be an apparent resolution of the tensions that sta-
tus dilemmas cause. This coping behaviour does not seek to manipulate
the external causes of such tensions, but to check their emotional conse-
quences. While residence and subsistence crime can be regarded as
problem-oriented coping, substance use is seen as evasive emotion-or-
iented coping (Billings & Moos 1981). In criminology too, problematic
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drug use tends to be understood as a response to limited opportunities
for normal social functioning. The adaptation does not have an innova-
tive character i.e. new ways to old goals, as is often the case with resi-
dence and subsistence crime, but amounts to a withdrawal from normal
social transactions (compare retreatism in Merton 1938).
Status dilemmas and culture
By interpreting the men’s offences as behavioural reactions to status di-
lemmas I have tried to link the current structure-oriented perspective to
a more actor-oriented viewpoint that does justice to aspects of interpreta-
tion and socialisation. One of the reasons this is important is that there
are similarities as well as dissimilarities in the extent to which given
social conditions come to take on the meaning of a status dilemma. This
is because a status is a position in the social structure to which certain
behavioural expectations, or roles, are attached. These behavioural expec-
tations are not completely inherent to the status, but can vary between
cultures and subcultures.
Several of the men, for example, landed in Rotterdam without much
in the way of money, family or friends. The Lebanese respondent X
found his inability to pay rent for pension accommodation a sufficiently
alarming prospect to become a street trader in hard drugs. The man had
spent most of his youth with Italian clergymen in conditions of relative
prosperity. As a teenager he was part of a group of alternative Italian
youngsters who frequently smoked soft drugs. A respondent from South
Sudan who grew up in a poor family and claims to have travelled to
Europe with the help of the church, lived for a considerable time in the
streets of Rotterdam on just 30 euros, eating bread and sardines and
drinking cola, without committing crimes. Eventually a stranger offered
him illegal work. The observation that C was prepared to deal drugs for
his wedding suggests that the meaning of a given situation may also
differ per group. Although the incapacity to contribute to a wedding
would be degrading to most fiancés, the giving of a dowry (the mahr) is
a strong cultural prescription in certain Arab countries (Douwes 2003).
Paying attention to such aspects of interpretation and socialisation en-
hances our understanding of the behavioural reactions of the men, in-
cluding their criminal strategies (cf. Van Gemert 1998; Van San 1998;
Van San & Leerkes 2001; Bovenkerk 2001). Their experiences in the
country of origin seemed to affect offending in the Netherlands, even
though most of the men had probably not come to the attention of the
police as a result of criminality. As has been said, the men did not per-
ceive all the possibilities that were within their reach. Neither did they
follow all the strategies that they perceived. A good example of a beha-
vioural improvisation for which previous socialisation appears to have
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created the preconditions was given by the Serbian respondent W. He
collected broken televisions in local electronics stores and sold them to a
repairer. He rewarded the shopkeepers for their kindness with inexpen-
sive supermarket pies. He was familiar with this sort of trading; he used
to collect and sell cardboard with his parents and other gypsies in Bel-
grade. Among the West African respondents, we may observe additional
indications of a connection between ethnic origin and behavioural stra-
tegies. The men had relationships with Dutch partners with remarkable
frequency and often had children with them. Unlike most of the other
respondents they could communicate with these women in English, but
we also know that polygyny – a man having several partners without
necessarily being married to them – is quite common in West Africa
(Collins 1988: 104).
Although the men were mostly convicted for minor offences, they did
not commit precisely the same types of crimes. The Africans were more
frequently convicted for fraud. The records of offences of the Eastern
Europeans almost exclusively relate to theft. Two of the three North Afri-
cans sold hard drugs (Table 5.2). Similar ethnic patterns are observable
in the police data on all apprehended illegal migrants (Chapter 4; De
Boom et al. 2006).
Previous research suggests that ethnic differences in the forms of
criminality are, at least in part, connected to differences in access to op-
portunity structures, including criminal opportunity structures (also see
Chapter 4). Interestingly, the interviews suggest that this diversity may
also have been encouraged by differences in perception and evaluation
of criminal strategies. The African respondents at least appeared to be
relatively accepting of fraud with government documents, including var-
iants in which some other respondents were involved. However, they
declared themselves very strongly opposed to drugs. O said: ‘I didn’t
want to do drugs, although I knew people who were dealing.’ Some men
added that thieves were severely beaten in their places of origin. It ap-
peared that the Eastern Europeans found theft relatively acceptable in
the circumstances, especially when large enterprises were the victims.
The North Africans who were dealing drugs found involvement in this
trade less reprehensible than theft. Ethnic differences in perception and
evaluation of criminal strategies may be a cause of ethnic differences in
criminal opportunity structures. It can be assumed that legal and illegal
migrants will try to produce criminal opportunities they ‘value’ and are
familiar with, at least in comparison to other criminal options.
Such ethnic differences may be connected to social circumstances in
the countries of origin. For instance, many African countries are rela-
tively unstable and corrupt by international standards – see for example
the Transparency International index – and consequently certain forms
of government regulation may have less legitimacy for African migrants
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(cf. Kehla 1999). The cultivation of hemp traditionally constitutes an im-
portant source of revenue in the Riff Mountains (Van Gemert 1998).
Concluding remarks
Three research questions served as a guideline for this study. These will
be answered in this section. A number of remarks on the term survival
crime and the representativeness of the findings will close this chapter.
1. This sub-study increases our insight into the preferences of criminal
illegal migrants with an asylum background. It turns out that criminality
in this group is in part aimed at residence in the Netherlands or other
Western countries. Residence crime usually takes the form of identity
fraud or illegal border-crossing. It tends to be a response to practices of
external border control by the state. Beyond that, many men made cer-
tain minimum demands on the quality of their illegal residence, which
they could not always satisfy in conventional ways either. I therefore find
it useful to make an analytical distinction between residence crime and
subsistence crime. The most common forms of subsistence crime are
working with somebody else’s papers, theft from shops, or street dealing
in drugs. A third category was found. Addiction-related crime, which is
aimed at the consumption of illegal drugs to cope with psychological
problems, also appears to develop from illegal residency in the context
of a policy of institutional exclusion as an instrument of internal border.
The latter crimes particularly can be more socially disruptive and person-
ally intrusive for the victims, particularly in the case of car and house
burglary. Finally, a rather heterogeneous residual category was noted
which included sexual violence, violent assault in connection with men-
tal disorders, insulting policemen and the like.
The men did not commit all types of crimes that could have been fea-
sible variants of residence crime, subsistence crime or drug-related
crime. They preferred minor and non-violent offences. That preference
stems from a combination of external and internal social control. Many
men desired to reduce ‘unnecessary’ police contacts and wanted to limit
the chances of deportation, which conforms the deterrence thesis. Si-
multaneously, they were inclined to sacrifice relatively light social stan-
dards. Standards prescribing people not to murder or rob other people,
are valued very highly in almost all social environments. On account of
their previous socialisation in conventional environments, the men
probably committed fewer and less serious crimes than we would expect
based on their limited access to formal and informal institutions in the
Netherlands.13 More research could profitably be done on cultural simi-
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larities and dissimilarities in the perception and valuation of behavioural
strategies involving crimes.
2. It appears that aspects of the restrictive immigration policy often
played a role in the circumstances that led the men to commit crimes.
With residence crime this share was greater and more direct than with
subsistence crime and addiction-related crime. In the case of the latter
two types of crime, the connection with illegal residence status runs to a
greater degree via the outcome of processes of marginalisation in the
Netherlands, particularly economic deprivation and homelessness. Ille-
gal residence status hardly contributed to the residual category of other
crimes, if at all. It appears that the men mostly, but not exclusively, com-
mitted offences of this sort during periods when their residence was
legal.
Social capital modifies the relationship between illegality and crimin-
ality; social support tends to smooth the edges of social exclusion by the
state. In the previous chapter I argued that is true for practices of exclu-
sion by means of external border control. It appears that embedded ille-
gal migrants are relatively likely to be visa overstayers; they do not have
to hire a smuggler to enter the country of destination illegally. In this
chapter we have seen that social capital in the country of destination
tends to decrease the likelihood of involvement in subsistence and addic-
tion-related crime, which is, potentially, the outcome of institutional ex-
clusion as an instrument of internal border control.
However, the interviews also suggest that embeddedness does not ne-
cessarily diminish the chances of engaging in criminality, even in the
case of conventional social networks. It turns out that social integration
often comes at a price – if people want to belong to a group they need to
position themselves according to the roles that are expected of them in
the social relationship. This is a new insight in this field. If social psy-
chology is right, i.e. if strong social relations increase the chances of
problem-oriented coping, while a lack thereof tends to be coupled with
emotion-oriented coping or its avoidance (Billings and Moos 1980), so-
cial embeddedness in conventional milieus will curb drug-related crime,
but may sometimes promote residence and subsistence crime, at least in
cases where an offender does not have legal sources to maintain his so-
cial relationships, for instance because these relationships do not give
access to such resources.14 It seems thus that the effects of social em-
beddedness as such should analytically be distinguished from the effects
of social capital.
The men certainly made choices even though their opportunity struc-
tures were limited. For that reason, the relationship with the illegal resi-
dence status must not be conceived of as entirely deterministic. No
doubt some rejected asylum seekers return voluntarily to their country
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of origin, in so far as they receive a laissez passer. It is possible that others
who stay in the Netherlands expect less and accept more limiting social
conditions like not consuming food from the supermarket and not driv-
ing a car. Some men created legal opportunities that other men did not
perceive, such as giving pies to shopkeepers in exchange for broken tele-
visions.
3. Although no records of offences have been collected in the countries
of origin, it is probable that most men did not have police contacts there
because of criminality. This is the impression given by their comments
and by the timing and nature of the majority of the crimes for which they
have been convicted.
Survival crime?
The interviews confirm that term ‘survival crime’, if it is of any value,
must be understood in a broad, sociological sense; simply staying alive
is usually not at stake (cf. Engbersen 2001). But even then the concept
has its drawbacks. The term inevitably evokes associations with survival
in a biological sense – particularly outside of the social sciences – and
cannot easily be stripped from its normative connotations. In my opin-
ion, it’s use implicitly suggests that we should forgive illegal migrants
their crimes, ‘because they have only committed these in order to sur-
vive’. Which is not to say that there cannot be a humanitarian problem
in regard to this group, in addition to a crime problem.
The descriptive value of the term is also dubious. Some men tried to
be upwardly mobile with the aid of crime. They tended to commit ‘devel-
opment crime’ rather than survival crime. Addiction-related crimes are
not aimed at preserving the old identity either. Perhaps we should use
the more neutral term adaptation crime, or some other term, to denote
that offending can be a reaction to the, potentially, very limiting condi-
tions as a result of having illegal residence status, with residence crime,
subsistence crime and addiction-related crime as possible particulars
thereof. We could use the term adaptation conformism to denote that
illegal residence status – in so far as it goes hand in hand with secondary
territorial exclusion – may also curb rule-breaking, particularly with
more expressive offences that do not help to continue illegal residence
with a certain standard of living, such as violence, vandalism, an aggres-
sive driving style or being loud-mouthed.
Representativity
The findings cannot be generalised with certainty because of the limited
size of the research group. Statistical representativity, however, was not
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the main objective of this sub-study. The primary aim was to gain an in-
sight into the qualitative diversity within the phenomenon (Hammersley
& Atkinson 1995). Nonetheless, even with these 26 respondents, hardly
any new types of offences and motives were encountered as additional
respondents were interviewed. This suggests that the diversity in the po-
pulation is not very great. In that case the men do perhaps constitute a
fair reflection of all criminal illegal migrants with an asylum background
or in a similar situation. Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen (2005) also
carried out field work in the Tilburg prison. The overwhelming majority
of the 61 illegal migrants they spoke to, only some of whom had an asy-
lum background, had not committed crimes or had been convicted for
relatively minor and unorganised crimes. Police figures on all appre-
hended illegal migrants also indicate that minor and apparently instru-
mental offences constitute a large majority of the apprehensions for
crimes.15
It is nonetheless probable that the situation of rejected asylum seekers
differs from other groups of illegal migrants in certain respects. In com-
parison with the informal chain migration that we can observe among
ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, asylum seekers will depend to a
greater degree on residence crime to establish themselves in the Nether-
lands. Further, they will be more inclined to continue travelling to try
their luck in other Western countries.
The income position of illegal migrants with an asylum background
appears to differ less from other groups than expected. Some men still
obtained benefit payments or housing, even from local governments,
after the rejection of their asylum applications, or shared the allowances
of friends who remained in the asylum process. In addition, they mana-
ged to partially compensate for the lack of established family by entering
into relationships with singles in the Netherlands.
The respondents presumably differ most from the migrants who
move to the Netherlands in order to commit crimes and/or to flee prose-
cution for crimes. An unintended consequence of the relatively open
borders after the end of the Cold War and the ongoing expansion of the
European Union is that there are now fewer barriers to Eastern Euro-
pean criminals, for instance, coming to commit crimes in Western
Europe. Such offenders, a substantial number of whom lack a residence
status, are often involved in instrumental crimes as well, including bur-
glary, car theft and circulating counterfeit money (Weenink et al. 2004).
But we are not yet in a position to say whether these crimes should also
be understood as residence crime, subsistence crime or addiction-re-
lated crime, or whether the restrictive immigration policy in the Nether-
lands contributes to their prevalence. The next chapter, which reports the
findings of the fifth and final sub-study, will pay more attention to such
forms of criminal migration and cross-border crime.
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The Aliens’ Detention of the Tilburg prison, seen from the car-park
Illegal immigrants playing football in the Aliens’ Detention of the Tilburg prison
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6 The rise in crime
Introduction
There are indications that there has been a rise in crime among illegal
migrants in the Netherlands. Previous analyses of police data have
shown that, while in 1997 31 per cent of apprehensions involving such
migrants were related to crime, this share had increased to 38 per cent in
2000 (Engbersen et al. 2002). In 2003 the figure was 45 per cent
(Leerkes et al. 2004) and in 2004 it went up to 49 per cent (Boekhoorn
et al. 2004). The crimes concerned are mostly theft, identity fraud and
involvement in drug dealing. Illegal residence as such does not fall un-
der Criminal Law in the Netherlands (ACVZ 2002) and will thus not be
counted as a crime here.
Like in the previous two chapters this sub-study critically examines the
marginalisation hypothesis. To what extent can it explain the rise in
crime? Specifically, I will try to falsify the marginalisation thesis by tak-
ing five important alternative hypotheses into consideration that have
never been fully investigated. Three alternative hypotheses have already
been discussed in the previous chapters to some extent; two are intro-
duced in this chapter.
Firstly, we have seen that criminal activities may lead to the status of
being an illegal migrant instead of the other way around. Legal migrants
may loose their residence permits because of offending in the Nether-
lands. Illegal migrants may be declared undesirable aliens, after which
their continued presence is punishable as a crime under Dutch law.
Hence, the rise in the number of illegal migrants registered as crime
suspects may be due to the changes in the way the state reclassifies mi-
grants under different residence statuses.
Secondly, a part of the illegal population may have migrated to the
Netherlands with the intention of committing crimes. In these cases,
criminality is not the result of an unforeseen process of marginalisation
after settlement in the Netherlands. In the period under study, migration
opportunities for nationals from former European colonies were steadily
curbed, while border controls with respect to Eastern Europe were eased,
at least to some extent. As I will explain in the next section, both develop-
ments may have contributed to the number of illegal migrants commit-
ting crimes upon or shortly after arrival, increasing the total number of
illegal migrants suspected of crimes.
There is a third explanation that has not been given much attention in
the previous four sub-studies: the rise in crime may also be an effect of
developments in crime detection and reporting by the police. Crime as
such may increasingly have been detected and/or registered by the
Dutch police, or the police may have given higher priority to apprehend-
ing and documenting criminal illegal migrants. Special teams in which
various branches of government work closely together have been formed
for this purpose in all the largest cities and, in particular, in Amsterdam,
since 2002. Whereas in the past illegal migrants primarily risked appre-
hension at work, the national government is increasingly addressing a
whole array of social problems including the clandestine infrastructure
surrounding them public disorder in mixed neighbourhoods, tracing
doss houses and the like.
Fourth, as we saw in Chapter 4, the rise in the crime figures may have
been brought about by a simultaneous increase in crime among legal
migrants. The chances of illegal migrants engaging in criminal careers
in the Netherlands appear to depend, at least in part, on the number of
criminal illegal migrants they encounter in their ethnic social networks.
The final alternative hypothesis, which has not figured prominently in
the previous chapters, is demographic. The rise in crime may be a side-
effect of demographic changes with regard to the composition or size of
the illegal population. It could simply be that the number of young male
illegal migrants has increased between 1997 and 2003.
Data on all illegal migrants apprehended in the Netherlands between
January 1997 and October 2003 were analysed for this sub-study. These
police data were linked to administrative data from the Dutch Immigra-
tion and Nationalisation Service (IND) on all foreigners who have been
declared ‘undesirable aliens’ between 1997 and 2003, or lost their resi-
dence permit in that period in other ways because of criminal activities.
These primary data sources were compared with existing police figures
and Cruijff and Van der Heiden’s (2004) estimates of the size of the
illegal population in the Netherlands.
The marginalisation thesis, already explained at some length in the
introductory chapter, will not be repeated here. The alternative hypoth-
eses will be described in more detail in the next section. Subsequently,
the data sources and research method will be explained and the results
presented. This chapter’s conclusion summarises the main findings of
this final sub-study.
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Specification of the alternative hypotheses
Reclassification
The first alternative hypothesis understands the rise in crime as the re-
sult of changes in the way the Dutch state classifies certain migrants as
‘illegal migrants’, while the actual behaviour of migrants may have chan-
ged little. For instance, migrants can be declared ‘undesirable aliens’.1
For a legal migrant this can be done when he or she has committed a
crime for which three or more years of imprisonment can be inflicted.
Illegal migrants can be declared undesirable aliens more easily.2 Unde-
sirable aliens, once so declared, are not allowed to be in the Netherlands
for five years, or ten years in the case of a conviction for drug trafficking
or serious violence. If they are found in the country within this term,
they are treated as illegal migrants. In addition, being in the Netherlands
as an undesired alien constitutes a crime which is punishable with im-
prisonment up to six months. Furthermore, the residence permit of
criminal foreigners may be withdrawn and extensions of the permit re-
fused, if the crimes committed are not serious enough to declare the
foreigner an undesirable alien or if the person has a family in the Neth-
erlands.3 In this sub-study the term ‘status reclassification’ will be used
as a sociological synonym for the aforementioned forms of changing re-
sidence statuses by the state. Status reclassification is an aspect of inter-
nal border control that should be distinguished analytically from the in-
stitutional exclusion of illegal migrants, on which the marginalisation
thesis focuses: an important difference between this third aspect of in-
ternal border control and the two aspects that are central in this study,
i.e. institutional exclusion and secondary territorial exclusion, is that sta-
tus reclassification should primarily be understood as a state response to
migrant crime; the two main types of internal border control, on the
other hand, are analysed as a condition to which migrants adapt in ways
that increase or decrease crime and public safety in the country of desti-
nation.
The criteria for reclassification were relaxed in July 2002; from then
on, legal migrants with less than five years of residence in the Nether-
lands became at risk of losing their residence permit for less serious
crimes (ACVZ 2005). Moreover, the government made more use of sta-
tus reclassification between 1997 and 2003, and a number of policy proj-
ects were implemented in order to promote the ending of residence
rights of criminal aliens.
Status reclassification may increase the number of crime suspects
with illegal residence status in three ways. First, undesirable aliens may
in fact re-enter or remain in the Netherlands. If they are arrested they
contribute, per definition, to the total number of crime suspects with
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illegal residence status. Second, we can expect that additional offending
will be relatively common among former legal migrants who have been
declared undesirable aliens, should they remain. After all, past offending
is the best-known predictor of future offending (Gottfredson & Hirschi
1990; Laub & Sampson 2003; Blokland 2005). Third, legal migrants
who have been detained because of crimes may end up as a crime sus-
pect in the apprehension data on illegal migrants after their residence
permit is withdrawn. Such offenders may be re-apprehended in prison
on the grounds of illegal residence, just before they are transferred to the
Aliens Custody where the expulsion procedure starts. The initial appre-
hension reason (for instance a burglary or murder) may not be erased, as
policemen customarily register the most serious apprehension reason in
the data on illegal migrants (see next section). In theory, an increase in
status reclassification might also reduce the number of crime suspects
with illegal residence status, but this effect is probably small.4
Criminal migration and cross-border crime
Crime does not have to be the outcome of processes in the country of
destination. Foreign criminals may decide to cross borders in order to
smuggle illegal goods, to seize criminal opportunities in the country of
destination, or to escape prosecution. Migrants with no further criminal
intentions after settlement may also use false documents to cross the
border in order to circumvent external border controls (Torpey 1999;
Kyle & Siracusa 2005). In the literature the terms ‘criminal migration’
and ‘cross-border crime’ are often used to denote such phenomena (Ben-
yon 1996; Van Duyne 1993; Gaylord 1999; Vagg 1992). Although there
are substantial differences among these various forms of criminal mi-
gration and cross-border crime, they can all be contrasted with the mar-
ginalisation thesis; in case of criminal migration and cross-border crime,
offending is intended beforehand and not related to practices of institu-
tional exclusion.
Criminal migration and cross-border crime are understudied in rela-
tion to illegal migration, but there are reasons to believe that various
forms of criminal migration and cross-border crime do occur among
illegal migrants. Moreover, their prevalence may have increased in the
Netherlands in the period that was studied for this sub-study (1997-
2003).
First, the use of false documents to enter the Netherlands is increas-
ingly common among illegal migrants, particularly among non-Eur-
opeans who lack social ties in the European Union and have fewer op-
portunities to overstay tourist visas (as was argued in Chapter 4).
Tourists from poorer countries usually have to prove sufficient financial
means or have to find a sponsor in the country of destination (usually a
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family member, friend or partner). A visa can be refused if the issuing
embassy fears that the ‘tourist’ will settle illegally. Since the 1980s the
list of countries requiring a visa to enter the EU has been expanded
(Bigo & Guild 2005).
Second, external border controls with respect to Eastern Europeans
were eased considerably in the 1990s because of the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain and the European Union’s eastern enlargement. In the early 1990s
visa requirements for short visits were already dropped for a number of
countries such as Poland (an EU member state since 2004), and in 2001
the visa requirements for short visits were dropped for Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, both EU member states since 2007.
An unintended consequence of the relaxation of external border con-
trols has been an increase in Eastern European offenders committing
crimes in Western Europe, such as house burglary and car theft (Bort
2000; Von Lampe 2004; Weenink & Huisman 2003). A significant pro-
portion of these offenders are reported to be illegal migrants (Weenink
et al. 2004). Criminal migration and cross-border crime also appear to
occur among non-European migrants. Turkish migrants are found to
play an important role in the distribution of heroin in the EU (Bovenkerk
& Yesilgöz 1998), while cocaine trafficking is run, to a considerable de-
gree, by South American m Haagsemarkt igrants (Zaitch 2002). The re-
lation with illegal immigration, however, is unclear. Zaitch (2002) re-
ported that some Colombian drug traffickers established themselves
illegally in the Netherlands simply because they were unable to obtain a
residence permit.
Policing
The rise in the number of illegally residing crime suspects could be a
consequence of improved crime detection or crime recording by the
Dutch police, due to a general trend in criminal law enforcement and
registration. Between 1999 and 2002 the police forces were expanded
considerably in the Netherlands.5 In addition, Wittebrood and Nieuw-
beerta (2006) have demonstrated that in the period under study the
Dutch police became more active in recording crimes, in part because of
technological advances. Hence, the rise in crime among illegal migrants
should be compared to possible increases in the number of documented
crime suspects in the population at large.
Furthermore, the increase might be due to the police giving a higher
priority to detecting and/or recording offending by illegal migrants, so
as to meet public concerns about unwanted immigration and crime or
to carry out ‘law and order’ policy decisions by the national government.
During the period of study it became less controversial in Dutch society
to argue that immigrant crime is a social problem. Clear indications of
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changing public opinion regarding this theme can be found in the Inter-
national Social Survey Program (ISSP). As part of the ISSP, two repre-
sentative surveys on national identities were carried out, in 1995 and
2003, respectively. In 1995, 37 per cent of the Dutch respondents
(N=1,823) agreed or agreed strongly that immigrants increase crime
rates. In 2003, this percentage had gone up to 44.7 per cent (N=2,089).
(The survey shows similar trends in most other Western countries for
this period.)
In most cases the police target crime suspects regardless of residence
status (Van der Leun 2003). They often do not know in advance whether
a criminal suspect is living in the country legally or not. However, there
are two exceptions to this rule. First, it could be the case that the police
have deployed more personnel over time to trace identity fraud by illegal
migrants. Another exception occurs when criminal illegal migrants are
specifically targeted. In the Amsterdam area in particular – and to a les-
ser degree in other urban areas – specialised teams have been formed
since 2002 to arrest illegal migrants who are heavily involved in criminal
activities and to target the criminal organisations surrounding them. Be-
tween 1997 and 2003 the Amsterdam police deployed five coordinated
actions under the name ‘Spirit’, in which approximately 400 illegal mi-
grants were arrested in total. Not all these arrestees are criminal illegal
migrants because of what the police call ‘bycatch’: usually a substantial
number of non-criminal illegal migrants are apprehended who find
themselves in the vicinity of the criminal illegal migrants who the actual
targets (for instance in a housing block or café). The first Spirit action
took place in September 2002.
Further, it could also be that the residence status of foreign crime sus-
pects is registered more accurately by the police (Boekhoorn et al. 2004).
It is unknown to what extent police officers actually began to do this in
the period of study, but if they did, crime suspects who were likely to be
registered as ‘aliens’ in the past – without a further specification of their
residence status – increasingly have been registered as ‘illegal aliens’,
adding to the rise in crime under study.
It should be noted that the political pressure to reduce illegal resi-
dence by increased policing of illegal migrants – adding to practices of
secondary territorial exclusion – mostly built up in the period 2002-
2006, i.e. largely after the period under study here. In 2002-2006 a suc-
cession of centre-right cabinets governed the Netherlands. By 2006 this
had culminated in the conclusion of a ‘performance contract’ between
the Ministry of Justice and the police regions, in which the police obli-
gated themselves to apprehend 12,000 illegal migrants in 2007.
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Ethnic embeddedness and demographic changes
In Chapter 4 I showed how involvement in crime among illegal mi-
grants is, to some extent, positively connected with involvement in crime
among legal migrants of comparable age and country of origin. It is
likely that this association is partly the result of processes of differential
association: newcomers without a residence permit may become in-
volved in types of crime they encounter among the more established
migrants in their social networks. Ethnic networks in the country of des-
tination – including criminal networks – constitute important resources
for newcomers, particularly for illegal migrants (see also Zaitch 2002).
Therefore, we should investigate whether the rise in crime among illegal
migrants is connected to a simultaneous rise in crime among legal mi-
grants.
Finally, the rise in the number of crime suspects could be a by-product
of developments in the composition of the illegal population or its size.
Demographic changes may affect crime figures, for involvement in
crime correlates with sex, age, ethnicity and the degree of urbanisation
(Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Junger-Tas, Marshall & Ribeaud 2003;
Thornberry & Krohn 2003; Van Dijk, Manchin & Van Kesteren 2007). It
could be that the share of young males from certain ethnic groups and/
or the degree of urbanisation has grown between 1997 and 2003. It
could also be that the number of crime suspects has merely increased
proportionally to an increase in the illegal population.
Data sources, research method and validity
Data sources
The data on apprehended illegal migrants have been provided by all 25
Dutch police forces and are taken from the Vreemdelingen Administra-
tie Systeem (VAS), the national database in which all known aliens are
documented. Migrants who have been handed over by other government
agencies (for instance the Labour Inspectorate) and those who have been
apprehended by the police are included in it as well. The entries include
information on nationality, sex, age, arrival date in the Netherlands, date
of apprehension and the most serious apprehension reason. Between
January 1997 and October 2003, 107,322 apprehensions were registered.
Of these, 93,030 concerned non-EU nationals (including nationals of
countries that have become EU member states after 2003). About 70
per cent of these are males aged between twenty and 40.
The reasons for apprehension are usually classified into five cate-
gories (cf. Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001): (1) infringements of the
Aliens Act, which are mildly punishable or not at all; (2) common mis-
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demeanours that are usually punished with a fine, such as fare dodging,
driving under the influence of alcohol, illegal prostitution and the like;
(3) crimes for which a term of imprisonment of up to four years can be
imposed, such as shoplifting, car and house burglary6, vandalism and
staying in the Netherlands as an undesirable alien; (4) crimes for which
a term of imprisonment of four or more years can be imposed, includ-
ing robbery and physical assault; and (5) crimes mentioned in the
Opium Law, which range from large-scale drug trafficking to petty deal-
ing or mere drug possession (due to registration practices, such drug
crimes cannot be classified in terms of seriousness). The latter three
categories are felonies (misdrijven). These are generally considered ‘crim-
inal activities’ in Dutch society, while illegal residence and misdemea-
nours are not (see also Van der Leun 2003). In about one-third of the
apprehended third nationals living in illegal residence the reason for ap-
prehension was a suspicion of a felony.
Some of the illegal migrants in the database are brought in by the
Aliens Police. Some illegal migrants, such as rejected asylum seekers,
have resided legally in the Netherlands before becoming illegal mi-
grants. They are required to report to the Aliens Police on a regular ba-
sis, where they may eventually be apprehended to be expelled. Others
are apprehended by or handed over after border controls, workplace
checks, or housing inspections in disadvantaged urban areas. Most ille-
gal migrants are apprehended by the regular police; they are either crime
suspects or fall into the hands of the police as ‘additional catch’ when
people are asked to show ID in the course of regular policing activities.
As was mentioned, special teams occasionally target criminal illegal mi-
grants, particularly in the Amsterdam area.
The arrival date in the Netherlands is registered in the VAS in about 55
per cent of the cases. Persons who initially stayed legally in the Nether-
lands have often had previous contacts with the authorities (for instance
when arriving at the airport). In these cases the arrival date may have
been present in the database before the actual date of apprehension as
an illegal migrant. For recidivists, i.e. illegal migrants who are registered
more than once in these VAS data as ‘illegal aliens’, the first apprehen-
sion date may have been registered as the arrival date. Sometimes the
police rely on statements by the arrestee about the arrival date if these
are deemed sufficiently reliable.
The IND, being a special branch of the Ministry of Justice, provided
me with information on status reclassification. They listed all persons
who have been declared undesirable aliens or who lost a residence per-
mit because of crimes in other ways during the period 1997-2003. These
data were linked to the VAS data, using unique ‘foreigner numbers’.
In addition, I used other data sources for specific tests: statistics on
registered crimes among the Dutch population, in general, and among
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legal (non-EU) migrants. Finally, the demographic hypothesis was exam-
ined with the help of Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s (2004) estimations of
the size of the illegal population, which make use of the capture-recap-
ture method. This method was initially developed by ecologists to esti-
mate the size of animal populations that cannot be observed in their
entirety (for a discussion on the validity of this method in the social
sciences see Van der Heijden et al. 2003).
Research method
In this study I focus on apprehensions for crimes. The three criminal
categories mentioned in the previous section were re-arranged into four
types of crime: ‘property crimes’,7 ‘false documents’, ‘drugs’ and ‘other
crimes’. The rationale for basing the categories on the content of the
crime committed rather than its seriousness is that offending in re-
sponse to marginalisation usually concerns subsistence crime and
crimes to finance drug use (this was been described in the previous
chapter). These are usually property crimes, possession of false papers
(working in the formal economy with somebody else’s papers) and drug
possession and trafficking. If there is still a rise in crime after controlling
for the alternative hypothesis, it should mainly be visible with respect to
these three types of crime in particular, rather than for the category
‘other crimes’ (mainly violence against persons and goods or being in
the Netherlands as an undesirable alien).
For every year since 1997 – the first year for which reliable digital data
were available – I assessed the number of suspects for each of the four
types of crime (the analyses were also done at the apprehension level,
yielding similar results). The analysis is limited to illegal migrants from
countries that were not, at the time, EU countries, including Poland (EU
member since 2004) and Bulgaria (EU member since 2007). The data
for the first three quarters of 2003 were extrapolated to 2003 as a whole
by multiplying all 2003 figures with 12/9.
The hypotheses explained above primarily serve heuristic ends.
Although they sometimes overlap, they draw attention to different me-
chanisms that may contribute to the number of crime suspects with ille-
gal residence status. In order to put the marginalisation thesis to a criti-
cal test, the alternative hypotheses were operationalised, i.e. defined in
measurable terms, in ways that put the marginalisation thesis at a disad-
vantage rather than favouring its corroboration.
The indicator for status reclassification is the sum of all crime sus-
pects in the VAS in the period 1997-2003, concerning persons: (1) who
have been declared undesirable aliens in these years, (2) who applied in
vain for a residence permit and/or lost this permit in the period exam-
ined due to criminal activities, but who were not declared undesirable
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aliens, or (3) who have been apprehended as undesirable aliens in these
years but were not declared undesirable aliens in this period (but appar-
ently earlier). These are wide-ranging criteria. The indicator includes il-
legal migrants who have been declared undesirable aliens after having
committed subsistence crime or addiction-related crime under the influ-
ence of institutional exclusion as an instrument of internal border con-
trol.8
A suspect was counted as a case of criminal migration or cross-border
crime if the crime was committed within three months after the date of
entry to the Netherlands, or if the person had committed any other crime
within three months. The underlying assumption is that such offenders
start offending quite quickly after arrival, while offending in response to
marginalisation tends to develop more gradually. The period of three
months is, of course, somewhat arbitrary, though immigration policy
generally uses this period to distinguish between short and long resi-
dence. The analyses were also done using other periods, varying from
one to six months, yielding similar results.
When controlling for the reclassification and criminal migration hy-
potheses, all crime suspects that indicated instances of status reclassifi-
cation or criminal migration were excluded from the annual totals. The
policing, embeddedness and demographic hypotheses were examined
by comparing the trends on illegal migrants with general developments
in documented crime in the Netherlands.
Validity
While illegal immigration is an inherently difficult subject for empirical
research (Cornelius 1982; Rodriguez 1987), it has become clear over the
years that qualitative fieldwork can yield important results (see for in-
stance Mahler 1995; Staring 2001; De Genova 2007). The previous sub-
study contributed to that qualitative body of research. Yet, as we have
seen in Chapters 2 through 4, the VAS data provide valuable additional
quantitative insight into illegal residence – especially but not exclusively
in relation to crime involvement.
All arrested illegal migrants are fingerprinted in the Netherlands.
While illegal migrants may be registered with different aliases, each of
them is assigned a unique foreigner number by the Aliens police that
will identify them regardless of the stated names.9 The VAS database
labels individuals with these unique foreigner numbers, increasing the
validity of the apprehension data for scientific purposes.
Nonetheless, it has often been noted that police data are problematic
for scientific purposes. First, there is an unknown and substantial
amount of crime that never appears in police files (Felson 1994). Metho-
dologically, this ‘dark number’ can be reduced by using self-report stu-
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dies, yet for undocumented migrants this is unrealistic. In the vast litera-
ture on police data, three main sources of bias are mentioned.
First, the likelihood of the public reporting a crime to the police in-
creases with the visibility of the crime. Hence, police data are more ade-
quate when dealing with communal crimes than with, for example, orga-
nised crime, environmental, or white-collar crimes. This implies that I
am unable to draw specific conclusions about illegal migrants’ involve-
ment the latter crimes on the basis of police data. (But for a number of
reasons it is unlikely that illegal migrants are heavily involved in these
crimes; if desired see note 5 in the concluding chapter of this book).
Second, the likeliness of being stopped by the police varies across
space and time. Police data inevitably mirror patterns of police surveil-
lance. Attention of law enforcers commonly concentrates on strategic
sites, such as train stations or crime-ridden areas, increasing the likeli-
hood of being apprehended there. Moreover, suspects frequenting lower-
status neighbourhoods are likely to run a higher risk of being appre-
hended than suspects in other parts of cities (Smith 1986). As these low-
er-status neighbourhoods also tend to be where illegal migrants are con-
centrated, they may have a higher likelihood of being stopped by the
police if they engage in crime there.
Third, police apprehensions are often suspected to be selective with
respect to migrants. In the UK and the US, questions surrounding ‘ra-
cial profiling’ or ‘ethnic profiling’ have generated fierce debates over the
years (Tyler & Wakslak 2004; Waddington, Stenson & Don 2004). Mi-
grants are more often stopped and searched than would be expected on
the basis of their share in the population. So far, in the Netherlands, little
evidence has been mustered for the proposition that the police differen-
tially arrest by ‘foreign appearance’ (Aalberts 1990; Rovers 1999; Boe-
khoorn et al. 2004). However, it must be noted that recent and sound
research is lacking. In any event, the implications are limited in this
sub-study, as the data on illegal migrants were compared with police
data on comparable legal migrants.
In sum, police data have their drawbacks, but are nonetheless the
most suitable data to study patterns of criminal activity among illegal
migrants, in particular when possible problems of selectivity and bias
are taken into account (cf. Hagan & Peterson 1995; Tonry 1997), as I do
in the form of the control for the policing hypothesis. The police statis-
tics are then a useful source of information, at least for this sub-study’s
main purpose: critically examining the marginalisation thesis by analys-
ing trend data.
Two specific limitations of this study should be mentioned. First, the
validity of the registered arrival dates could not be tested against other
measures. In particular, the self-reporting of arrival dates may be proble-
matic. Some people may have claimed that they had just arrived in the
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Netherlands in the hope of evading punishment, although length of stay
makes no difference in this respect. Still, others may have reported ex-
tensive residence in the Netherlands in the vain hope of legalisation. Yet
in this sub-study we are primarily interested in how rates of criminal
migration have developed over time, and there is no reason to assume
that biases in self-reported arrival dates have changed during the studied
period. Second, the share of criminal migration and cross-border crime
for the cases with no registered arrival date is uncertain, though it is
unlikely that this share is very high.10
Testing the alternative hypotheses: results
Table 6.1 starts with an overview of crime suspects between 1997 and
2003. In 1997 the police registered 3,170 crime suspects illegally resid-
ing in the Netherlands. In 2003 this figure had risen to 7,337 (2003 in-
dex: 231). The table includes figures for the total number of additional
crime suspects with illegal residence status for the years 1998 up to and
including 2003, in comparison to the hypothetical situation in which the
number of such suspects would have remained stable. It shows that
11,939 additional crime suspects were registered in these six years (See
N in Table 1: (3,247 – 3,171) + … (7,337 – 3,171)).
Table 6.1 also includes estimations of the annual crime rate among
illegal migrants and comparable legal migrants. The crime rate is the
percentage of the population registered as a suspect annually. For the
figures on the crime rate among illegal migrants the estimations by
Cruyff and Van der Heijden (2004) of the total size of the illegal popula-
tion were used. Note that during the 1990s the crime rate among illegal
migrants was lower than among legal migrants, which confirms the de-
terrence thesis. However, by 2003 it had become increasingly equal to,
and may even have surpassed, the crime rate among legal migrants, in
particular in comparison to the first generation (3.4-5.8 per cent > 3.7 per
cent).
Control 1: Reclassification
Table 6.2 shows that 5,580 non-EU nationals were declared undesirable
aliens between 1997 and 2003. An additional 1,375 lost their residence
permit or saw their applications otherwise refused because they were
considered a threat to public order. It is clear that status reclassification
has become more common since 1997: compared to 1997, the annual
number of cases had almost doubled by 2003.
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Table 6.2 Undesirable alien resolutions and (other) residence terminations, non-EU
nationals (1997-2003)
Undesirable
alienb
Other
residence
termina-
tionsc
New
reclassi-
fications
total
In VAS*
(property
crimes)
In VAS
(false
docu-
ments)
In VAS
(drugs)
In VAS
(other
crimes)
In VAS
(any
crime)
1997 732 37 769 54 0 10 54 (21)d 101
1998 709 37 746 65 2 17 71 (27)d 132
1999 744 29 773 65 2 56 99 (53)d 201
2000 710 60 770 103 2 167 121 (57)d 353
2001 657 333 990 115 9 275 187 (80)d 557
2002 903 449 1352 215 10 250 340 (92)d 705
2003a 1,125 430 1555 159 4 68 396 (63)d 497
Total 5,580 1,375 6,955 776 29 843 1,268 (393)d 2,546
* Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem (‘Foreigner Administration System’)
a VAS data for 2003 have been extrapolated for 2003 as a whole.
b Some persons have been declared undesirable aliens more than once in this
period; such persons were only counted once if this happened in the same year.
c Only those cases are counted that concern persons who have not been declared
an undesirable alien in the same year; only the first case is counted in case of
several instances of other residence terminations.
d The figures in brackets concern the number of cases in the VAS when apprehen-
sions for ‘undesirable alien’ are not counted.
Sources: Netherlands Immigration and Naturalisation Department; VAS
1997-October 2003
Not all reclassified migrants end up in the VAS data, but a substantial
number do: they represent about 2,500 crime suspects. About one-third
of these appear to pertain to cases of status reclassification before 1997:
these crimes involve suspects apprehended as an undesirable alien be-
tween 1997 and 2003 at least once, but who were not reclassified in
these years.
In order to control for the effects of status reclassification, all cases in
the VAS involving ‘reclassified’ suspects were excluded from the ana-
lyses (Table 6.3, Control 1). Developments in status reclassification do
indeed appear to explain, to a limited extent, the increase in the rise of
crime under study: whereas for all cases the crime index in 2003 was
231, the crime index for the non-reclassified cases was 223.
As expected, the levelling-off of the rise in crime as a result of this first
control mainly occurs for 2001, 2002 and 2003, when status reclassifica-
tion became more prevalent. The decrease is also most pronounced for
the category ‘other crimes’, which includes arrests for residing in the
country as an ‘undesirable alien’, as well as violence.
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Table 6.3 Crime suspects among (non-EU) illegal migrants after controlling for alter-
native hypotheses (1997-2003)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 ΔN
After control 1 (reclassification)
Property crimes 1,168 1,184 1,267 1,454 1,798 2,537 2,765 3,997
False documents 481 515 471 1,275 1,892 1,909 1,677 4,853
Drugs 658 650 528 478 629 1,022 1,171 530
Other crimes 796 811 817 801 823 1,058 1,295 829
Any crime 3,069 3,115 3,048 3,970 5,098 6,443 6,840 10,100
Index 100 101 99 129 166 210 223
After control 2 (migration by foreign criminals)
Property crimes 936 925 939 1,043 1,220 1,817 2,069 2,397
False documents 311 358 204 495 688 841 715 1,435
Drugs 296 339 312 333 320 457 567 552
Other crimes 734 708 732 668 612 839 1,055 210
Any crime 2,246 2,289 2,157 2,508 2,808 3,880 4,352 4,518
Index 100 102 96 112 125 173 194
After control 3a (general policing)
Property crimes 936 925 930 1,033 1,162 1,594 1,669 1,697
False documents 311 358 202 490 655 738 577 1154
Drugs 296 339 309 330 305 401 457 365
Other crimes 734 708 725 661 583 736 851 -140
Any crime 2,246 2,289 2,136 2,483 2,674 3,404 3,510 3,020
Index 100 102 95 111 119 152 156
Control 5b (demographic growth)
Property crimes 936 974 1,257 1,215 1,107 1,398 1,464 1,799
False documents 311 377 273 576 624 647 506 1137
Drugs 296 357 418 388 290 352 401 430
Other crimes 734 745 980 778 555 646 746 46
Any crime 2,246 2,409 2,886 2,921 2,547 2,986 3,079 3,352
Index 100 107 128 130 113 133 137
a Extrapolated figures are on the basis of data until 1 October.
b These figures have been calculated based on the assumption that the estimation
by Cruyff and Van der Heijden for 2003 would be the same as for 2002.
Sources: VAS 1997-October 2003; Immigration and Naturalisation Service Data;
CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl; online data by the Dutch Central Bureau for
Statistics; visited April 2007)
Control 2: Criminal migration and cross-border crime
Of all crime suspects with a registered date of entry in the Netherlands,
37 per cent committed at least one crime within three months of their
stay in the Netherlands (Table 6.4) and 33 per cent committed at least
one crime within four weeks. The proportion of criminal migration and
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cross-border crime differs considerably according to the type of crime.
This diversity is more easily demonstrated if we specify the crimes
somewhat further. Three types of criminal migration emerge: drug traf-
ficking (81 per cent), false documents (56 per cent) and aggravated prop-
erty crimes with burglary or violence (29 per cent, particularly by Eastern
Europeans at a rate of 40 per cent).
Table 6.4 Number of (non-EU) crime suspects with illegal residence status, appre-
hended at least once for a crime within three months of arrival. 1997-2003a
Property
crimes
with
burglary
and/or
violence
Other
property
crimes
False
documents
Drug
trafficking
Drugs
other
Other
crimes
Any
crime
1997 136 (20) 98 (17) 170 (35) 16 (50) 346 (54) 77 (9) 840 (26)
1998 151 (23) 112 (19) 157 (30) 19 (33) 295 (48) 111 (13) 840 (26)
1999 180 (26) 163 (24) 269 (57) 22 (48) 224 (42) 99 (11) 943 (29)
2000 220 (30) 210 (25) 780 (61) 6 (55) 252 (40) 153 (17) 1,609 (37)
2001 338 (35) 267 (28) 1,209 (64) 30 (58) 498 (58) 256 (25) 2,578 (46)
2002 437 (31) 332 (24) 1,069 (56) 504 (90) 238 (33) 267 (20) 2,816 (39)
2003b 373 (26) 339 (22) 964 (57) 376 (85) 257 (32) 272 (17) 2,555 (35)
1997-2003b 1,717 (29) 1,436 (24) 4,600 (56) 973 (81) 2,054 (45) 1,213 (17) 11,844 (37)
of which:
Europe
(non-EU)
1,385 (40) 990 (32) 1,342 (56) 75 (75) 303 (26) 520 (26) 4,616 (40)
Africa 189 (12) 263 (14) 1,654 (53) 273 (74) 679 (33) 386 (13) 3,333 (30)
Asia
(including
Turkey)
81 (17) 126 (19) 1,099 (57) 70 (87) 224 (40) 223 (15) 1,802 (36)
Latin
America
60 (16) 48 (12) 493 (67) 524 (85) 778 (64) 61 (12) 1,943 (52)
North
America/
Oceania
2 (7) 9 (19) 11 (43) 31 (100) 70 (74) 23 (30) 146 (49)
a Figures between brackets pertain to the percentage of suspects apprehended with-
in three months of stay as a percentage of all crime suspects in this category with
illegal residence status.
b Extrapolated figures are on the basis of data until 1 October.
Source: VAS 1997-October 2003
The use of false documents upon entry appears to be quite common
among all non-Western third-country nationals. Asians (with the excep-
tion of Turkey) and Sub-Saharan Africans are somewhat over-represent-
ed. National disparities are more pronounced for drug trafficking and
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aggravated theft, i.e. theft in combination with burglary or violence. Lati-
nos represent about one in ten crime suspects with illegal residence sta-
tus, though also represent about half of all suspected drug traffickers
who committed a crime within three months. Criminal migration in-
volving aggravated property crimes is most prevalent among Central
and Eastern Europeans. No less than four-fifths of suspects of aggravated
crimes who offended within three months of stay, concern what are, or
were at the time, nationals from non-EU countries (mostly Poles, Roma-
nians, Lithuanians and citizens of the former Republic of Yugoslavia).
These nationalities constituted about one in three crime suspects with
illegal residence status.
These figures clearly demonstrate that the marginalisation hypothesis
cannot explain all crimes committed by illegal migrants, because a sub-
stantial proportion of illegal migrants start to offend upon arrival or soon
after. Moreover, it appears that forms of criminal migration and cross-
border crime have increased, particularly after 1999. While in the mid-
1990s about a quarter of all crime suspects were suspected of having
committed a crime within three months of arrival, by 2001 this share
had almost doubled. The subsequent fall after 2001 may be related to
the growing importance of marginalisation effects and status reclassifi-
cation.
In the second and subsequent controls, all those suspected of commit-
ting at least one crime before three months of stay were excluded from
the analyses (Table 6.3). As a result, the crime index for 2003 dropped
further from 223 to 194. The decrease is most pronounced for ‘false
documents’ and ‘other crimes’, which include violence. The crime index
for ‘drugs’ is hardly affected because most illegal migrants apprehended
for drugs are not apprehended for drug-trafficking but for drug dealing
(a form of subsistence crime, as well as a way to finance drug use, see
also Table 6.4).
Control 3: Policing
The possibility that the rise in the number of crime suspects is due to
changes in policing strategies and/or crime recording practices should
also be taken into consideration. As has been said, general (a) as well as
specific (b) developments in policing should be taken into consideration.
(3a) The total number of crime suspects in the regular population in-
creased by 24 per cent between 1997 and 2003 (Table 6.5). Apart from
developments in crime tracing and recording, it should also be pointed
out that the number of criminals may actually have increased in the legal
population, for instance because of population growth (the Dutch popu-
lation indeed grew by approximately 5 per cent between 1997 and 2003).
But since we want to put the marginalisation thesis to a critical test, I
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have assumed that the increase in the number of crime suspects illegally
residing in the Netherlands is completely due to general improvements
in crime detection and recording. Hence, the number of such crime sus-
pects was divided by the crime index in the legal population, i.e. by de-
velopment in the general police figures. For instance, the number of
suspects in 1997 was divided by 1, the number of suspects in 2001 by
1.05 and so on (see the index in Table 6.5). As a result of these adjust-
ments, the 2003 crime index for illegal migrants was reduced from 196
to 156. Still, the rise in crime suspects with illegal residence status is
considerably more pronounced than in the legal population.
Table 6.5 Total number of crime suspects in the Netherlands (1997-2003)
Year Total population Crime Suspects Crime rate (%) Crime index
(suspects)
1997 15,567,107 266,292 1.7 100
1998 15,654,192 266,978 1.7 100
1999 15,760,225 268,717 1.7 101
2000 15,863,950 270,212 1.7 101
2001 15,987,075 280,070 1.8 105
2002 16,105,285 302,895 1.9 114
2003 16,192,572 329,470 2.0 124
Source: CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl; visited April 2007).
(3b) There are two exceptions to the rule that the police target crime sus-
pects regardless of residence status. First, it could be the case that the
police have deployed more personnel over time to trace identity fraud by
illegal migrants, although the prevalence of identity fraud may also have
actually increased as an adaptation to the law on identification, or as a
subsistence crime in an effort to gain fraudulent access to the formal
labour market. Another exception occurs when criminal illegal migrants
are specifically targeted, as for instance in the Amsterdam area.
For these reasons, I excluded all known cases concerning false papers,
not just the cases committed by early offenders, these were already ex-
cluded when controlling for criminal migration and cross-border crime.
Due to this additional control, the crime index for 2003 dropped only
marginally from 156 to 154 (figures not in table). Apparently, increased
policing of identity fraud can hardly account for the rise in crime. When
the apprehensions that occurred in Amsterdam were also excluded, the
crime indexes actually increased somewhat, even for 2002 and 2003
when Spirit was operational. The rise in crime between 1997 and 2003
occurred across the country, not being limited to Amsterdam or other
large urban areas (see also control 5a).
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Finally, the supposition that the police increasingly check and register
the residence status of foreign crime suspects finds no clear support in
the data. If this were the case, how are we to account for the observation
that the net rise in crime after all controls (see hereafter, after control 4
and 5) is limited to the indicators of subsistence crime and crimes to
finance drug use, and does not pertain to ‘other crimes’?13
Control 4 and 5: Ethnic embeddedness and demographic changes
The crime rate among non-Western migrants rose slightly between
1999 and 2003 (no comparable data were available for 1997 and 1998).
For instance, for the ages twelve to 80 the crime rate among first and
second generation migrants from Africa, Asia and Latin-America was
3.7 per cent in 1999, 3.6 per cent in 2001 and 4.1 per cent in 2003. For
Eastern Europeans these figures were 2.3 per cent, 2.4 per cent and 2.6
per cent.11 These increases are not more pronounced than in the popula-
tion at large (compare Table 6.5), which was already controlled (3a).
The embeddedness hypothesis may, at the most, contain some truth
for illegal migrants from a number of Eastern European countries. For
instance, the crime rate among migrants from the former Soviet Union
(ages 12 to 80) rose from 2.0 per cent in 1997 to 3.2 per cent in 2003.
This may partly explain why the crime index for 2003 after control 3a is
higher for Eastern Europeans (242) than for the other regions of origin
(129; figures not in table). Finally, the rise in the number of crime sus-
pects may also have been caused by developments in (a) the composition
of the illegal population, or (b) its size.
(5a) Crime involvement correlates with sex, age, ethnicity and the de-
gree of urbanisation. Unfortunately, Cruyff and Van der Heijden (2004)
did not make specific estimations of subgroups within the illegal popula-
tion apart from a general distinction between Europeans and non-Eur-
opeans, which was used for control 5b. But on the basis of the apprehen-
sion data in the VAS, it appears unlikely that the rise in crime has been
caused by changes in the composition of the illegal population with re-
gard to age, sex, ethnicity, or the rate of urban residency.
First of all, the average age of all apprehended third nationals living in
illegal residence actually rose from 28.8 in 1997 to 29.7 in 2003. Further-
more, the share of males has increased only marginally from 79 per cent
to 81 per cent. Besides this, the rise in crime is more pronounced for
women (183 after control 3b) than for men (150). A number of notable
changes have occurred with regard to the ethnic composition of the ille-
gal population. For instance, the share of Eastern Europeans among
non-EU nationals in the VAS increased from 30 per cent to 42 per cent
between 1997 and 2003, while the share of the North-Africans (a group
with a high crime involvement) decreased from 20 per cent to 14 per
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cent. Yet it is unlikely that these changes are responsible for the increase
in the number of crime suspects. The rise in crime is not limited to
specific nationalities, and it even transpires that the total rise in crime
actually became somewhat more pronounced if developments in the eth-
nic makeup were corrected for. Finally, changes in the degree of urban
residence can also not account for the rise in crime. The relative number
of apprehensions in the four largest cities actually decreased between
1997 and 2003, and the rise in crime is not spatially concentrated within
the Netherlands.12
(5b) There are two proxies for assessing developments in the size of
the illegal population: (1) the annual number of apprehensions in the
VAS for crimes, but also for illegal residence and misdemeanours and
(2) the estimations by Cruyff and Van der Heijden (2004). Both indica-
tors suggest an initial fall, followed by a rise in the size of the illegal
population. The eventual rise is more pronounced according to the ap-
prehensions than according to the estimations. This disparity may point
at an increase in the chance of apprehension over time, both as a result
of the rise in crime and because of better detection of illegal labour.
Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s estimations are not sensitive to such devel-
opments in the likelihood of apprehension, at least not in theory.
Figure 6.1 Relative developments in the estimated number of illegal migrants from
Eastern Europe and other (non-EU) illegal migrants (1997; index=100)
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Sources: Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem 1997-2002; estimations taken
from Cruyff and Van der Heijden 2004: 38-39
Figure 6.1 shows how the estimated size of the illegal population devel-
oped since 1997. The number of Eastern Europeans and other non-EU
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nationals have been estimated separately. The estimations for 1997 have
been set at 100, while the year 2003 has been excluded because the esti-
mates by Cruyff and Van der Heijden for that year cannot be compared
to the other years; only the first nine months were available at the time
and for statistical reasons the estimation cannot simply be extrapolated
to the whole year. An important observation is that while the number of
Eastern Europeans appears to have risen, the size of other non-EU
groups appears to be stable or somewhat diminishing.
Hence, it is unlikely that the rise in crime is completely due to an
increase in the size of the illegal population in the Netherlands, for two
reasons. First, as we have already seen, the rise in crime is not limited to
migrants from Eastern European countries. Second, the increase in the
size of the third national illegal population since 2001 – i.e. Eastern Eur-
opeans and other non-EU nationals combined – is, in any case, much
less pronounced than the increase in the number of crime suspects. If
the figures in Table 6.3 are adjusted for possible changes in the size of
the illegal population, as was done for control 3a (using the estimations
by Cruyff and Van der Heijden for the available years), the crime rate for
2003 drops a little further from 156 to 137. Interestingly, the index for
1999 now also mirrors the general trend (see Table 6.3).13
Concluding remarks
In this sub-study the marginalisation thesis – which assumes that inter-
nal border control in the form of institutional exclusion may push illegal
migrants towards crime – was subjected to a critical examination. The
rise in apprehensions of illegal migrants for crimes in the Netherlands
between 1997 and 2003 was taken as a test case. When controlling for
five alternative hypotheses, the marginalisation thesis could not be falsi-
fied. It appears that marginalisation explains a substantial part of the rise
in crime. Yet the picture is more nuanced, and we can conclude that a
combination of factors has contributed to the rise in crime among illegal
migrants in the Netherlands. Increased migration by offenders commit-
ting crimes upon or soon after arrival – which includes criminal migra-
tion and cross-border crime – as well as general developments in poli-
cing and police registration practices account for 22 per cent and 29 per
cent of the increase respectively, while status reclassification (6 per cent)
and demographic growth (15 per cent) were less important. Marginalisa-
tion effects appear to be responsible for the remaining part, i.e. 28 per
cent of the increase.14 Because the alternative hypotheses were favoured
in the analyses, this appears to be a conservative estimate.
To make the effects more tangible, it can be calculated that the intensi-
fication of institutional exclusion of illegal migrants in the Netherlands
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appears to have led to a minimum of 3,000 additional crime suspects in
the period 1998 to 2003, because of the effects of marginalisation (see N
after control 5b in Table 6.3). Whether or not this is a high number de-
pends partly on the perspective from which it is judged. For illegal mi-
grants who still reside in the Netherlands in spite of heightened institu-
tional exclusion, the increase is significant. For them, their chances of
involvement in subsistence crime and/or drug-related acquisitive crime
appear to have increased, on average, by at least 37 per cent between
1997 and 2003 (this is not the same as the fact that 28 per cent of the
increase appears to be due to marginalisation effects, see note).15 More-
over, it could be argued that the total criminogenic effects of institutional
exclusion are somewhat stronger, because (1) the alternative hypotheses
were operationalised according to broad criteria and (2) illegal migrants
were already excluded from the formal labour market in 1991, six years
before 1997, the first year for which reliable digital data were available.
Yet, in any event, the increase is quite marginal compared to crime prob-
lems in general. The additional three thousand crime suspects equal
0.15 per cent of the suspects in the legal population for the researched
period (see Table 6.4) and, even without the controls, the number of
additional crime suspects (12,000) equals no more than 0.6 per cent of
the crime suspects legally residing in the Netherlands in this period, in-
validating the myth that illegal migrants are responsible for a large share
of all crimes. While illegal migrants have been overrepresented in crime
statistics in recent years, their criminal activities still account for only a
small proportion of all crimes in the Netherlands. Still, it must be noted
that the effects are concentrated in certain urban areas (see Chapter 3)
and they have brought about substantial increases in incarceration costs
(also see the conclusion of this book).16
While this book mainly documents the unintended repercussions of
closed internal borders, the analyses in this sub-study also point to the
unintended repercussions of open external borders. It appears that open
and closed societies generate and facilitate specific forms of crime. In a
time in which the free movement of legal goods and certain persons is
promoted, it is also much easier for foreign criminals to migrate for
shorter or longer periods of time and to commit crimes like drug traf-
ficking or aggravated theft in other countries. The unintended conse-
quences of restrictive or liberal migration management indicate the
complexities of dealing with international migration and crime. I will
return to this point in this book’s final chapter.
Another point that will be discussed in this book’s conclusion is to
what degree the strict policies on illegal residence discourage unwanted
migrants from coming to and residing in the Netherlands. As we have
seen in this sub-study, there are no empirical indications that their num-
ber has diminished in the Netherlands in response to these policies. Yet
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given the current state of research we cannot rule out the possibility that
the tightening of internal border controls has prevented a further in-
crease. Yet it is worth mentioning that Van Meeteren, Van San and Eng-
bersen (2008: 162) have not found a rise in the number of illegal mi-
grants in Belgium for the period 2001-2005 (unfortunately their study
does not estimate illegal residence in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000). In-
ternal border controls in Belgium have not been increased to the same
degree as in the Netherlands in the period of study (1997-2003).
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7 Conclusions and discussion
This final chapter reflects on the coherence of the sub-studies in this
book and summarises the main findings of the study as a whole. I start
with an explanation of this study’s theoretical contribution, followed by a
number of comments concerning the main limitations of this study, as
well as some suggestions for future research. I then continue with a dis-
cussion of some implications for policy.
Theoretical conclusions
This study was intended to contribute to what Merton (1968) called ‘the-
ories of the middle range’, i.e. theories that aim to bridge the gap be-
tween abstract theorising and empirical evidence. In particular, it contri-
butes to substantive theory on the terrain of migration, crime and public
safety by critically examining and developing ideas proposed by other
researchers in the Netherlands and elsewhere.
This study’s primary theoretical contribution is that it adds to the in-
sight that today, in order to understand crime and other forms of rule
observance and violation among migrants, researchers should pay due
attention to the governmental regulation of international migration and
the ways in which these practices interact with semi-autonomous social
forces from other segments of society. In other words: in explaining
crime and transgressions among migrants we should not only look at,
for example, cultural factors or forms of social exclusion in destination
countries that tend to be countered by the state, such as racial discrimi-
nation on the labour market or educational deprivation among second
generation migrants. We should also pay attention to how migrants
adapt to formalised practices of social exclusion implemented and legiti-
mised by the state itself.
Various types of border control were distinguished in this study. A
distinction was made between external border control and internal bor-
der control. The two main variants of internal border control, on which
this study focused, were called institutional exclusion and secondary ter-
ritorial exclusion.
The first reason for paying attention to various forms of border control
is that these are, more or less by definition, coupled with new forms of
illegality and migrant crime. Certain types of behaviour have become
obligated in order to reach restrictive immigration goals. One case in
point, which is related to external border control, is the obligation to en-
ter or leave a country with valid papers. Other examples, which are re-
lated to practices of secondary territorial exclusion, are the obligation to
show a valid ID in public space and the requirement made of an undesir-
able alien to leave the country. The violation of such stipulations consti-
tutes what has been coined residence crime in this study: crimes com-
mitted with the aim of residing in a jurisdiction, in spite of the external
and internal border controls by the state that claims sovereignty there.
Other examples of residence crime are crossing the border with a smug-
gler or showing a false ID.
Second, this study demonstrates that there are significant, albeit com-
plex and more indirect, relations between the intensified regulation of
international migration and migrants’ involvement in more regular
forms of crime, such as theft, drug trafficking and violence. It docu-
ments that aspects of migration control may become associated with fac-
tors that are known to promote or depress crime and disorder.
Practices of institutional exclusion tend to encourage criminal involve-
ment among illegal migrants who establish themselves in spite of these
practices. This is chiefly for the reason that institutional exclusion may
trigger the criminological mechanism known as strain. According to
strain theories people are more likely to use illegal pathways if the con-
ventional roads to culturally prescribed goals are increasingly closed off
to them (Merton 1939; for more recent applications of this theory see
Agnew 1992; Young 1999). This approach sees criminality as a beha-
vioural adaptation in response to the strain people may experience be-
tween goals they believe to be legitimate and access to the means to rea-
lise these ambitions in a conventional way. Hence, the experience of
strain in the face of migration control may not only promote certain
forms of residence crime such as the use of false IDs,1 but may also,
albeit more indirectly, incite certain conventional forms of crime and
disorder. We have seen that illegal migrants sometimes resort to crime,
particularly those that generate economic resources, in the hope of
achieving social standards that they themselves consider elementary
and/or are considered as elementary by the milieus of which they are or
aspire to be a part. They sometimes perceive no other option than to
commit a crime, given their marginal social position after settlement,
which was in turn caused or at least reinforced by institutional exclusion
as an instrument of internal border controls. Unlike residence crime,
offenders place greater demands on the quality of their lives in the case
of what is called subsistence crime in this study. Examples of such stan-
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dards are: the desire to consume food from shops, contributing to the
funeral costs of a father, paying a dowry, wanting to chauffeur a Dutch
girlfriend (in the Netherlands illegal migrants are not entitled to a dri-
ver’s license). The main variants of subsistence crime that were found
are various forms of theft, working with false documents and street trade
in drugs.
It appears that the increased institutional exclusion of illegal immi-
grants may also lead to problematic drug use: in a number of cases pro-
blematic drug use emanated from homelessness and/or a career in sub-
sistence crime as a clean drug dealer. Like other marginalised users,
such illegal migrants often become dependent on addiction-related
crimes such as burglary to finance their substance use. Hence, in the
case of subsistence crime and addiction-related crimes, the connection
between offending and institutional exclusion appears to run via the out-
come of processes of marginalisation in the country of destination, in
particular via economic deprivation and homelessness.
Chapter 6 analysed the steep increase in the number of illegal mi-
grants suspected of crimes in the Netherlands. It showed that as prac-
tices of institutional exclusion were being intensified in the Netherlands
the documented crime rate among illegal migrants grew accordingly to
become roughly as high as, or perhaps even higher than among compar-
able non-Western migrants with legal residence. It appears that the rise
has various causes. Yet it is likely that the main explanation lies in the
increase in institutional exclusion as an instrument of internal border
controls.
Internal border control in the form of secondary territorial exclusion
impacts the involvement of migrants in conventional types of crime as
well. Usually it does so in the opposite direction of institutional exclu-
sion: the study documents that secondary territorial exclusion increases
the social pressure to avoid police contacts, which generally decreases
offending, even if it may sometimes encourage specific residence crimes
such as using fake IDs for identification purposes or driving away after a
traffic accident. Secondary territorial exclusion tends to decrease rule
violation because it usually triggers a different criminological factor
than strain, to wit social control.
According to the social control approach in criminology, people are
more likely to control their criminal impulses if they have something to
lose by indulging them (Hirschi 1969; Meier & Johnson 1977; Nagin &
Paternoster 1994; Weerman 1998; Schuyt 1995: 136-155). In addition to
the punishments that are aimed at deterring legal residents from crime,
illegal migrants risk being held in Aliens’ Detention, expulsion, and the
loss of social and economic ties in the country of destination, even in the
case of minor norm violations that would normally be sanctioned with a
fine, alternative punishments, or brief terms of imprisonment. There
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were good reasons why the threat of excommunication and banishment
was an important instrument of social control in former times (Morris &
Rothman 1998).
The effects of secondary territorial exclusion are more easily over-
looked than the effects of institutional exclusion. The fact is that in po-
lice data rule transgression catches the eye more easily than rule obser-
vance. Nonetheless, this study has found three empirical observations
that confirm the deterrence thesis, which asserts that the elevated deten-
tion and expulsion risks for illegal migrants tend to depress crime rates
among them.
Firstly, it turns out that the crime rate among illegal migrants was
substantially lower than among comparable legal migrants in the mid-
1990s, i.e. when the institutional exclusion of illegal migrants was less
developed in the Netherlands.
Secondly, the deterrent effects reveal themselves in the low involve-
ment of illegal migrants in expressive or symbolic crimes such as assault
and vandalism (see for instance Van San 1998; Cohen & Rotton 2003). It
appears that in the case of the instrumental crimes mentioned – resi-
dence crime, subsistence crime and addiction-related crime – the social
control mechanism is outweighed by the strain mechanism.
Thirdly, this study has found indications that criminal illegal migrants
often prefer types of crime that do not require overt contact with the
victim (cf. Scott 1985, 1990). Overt crimes are more likely to lead to po-
lice contacts and tend to have higher clear-up rates than covert crimes.
Robbery occurring under the influence of institutional exclusion appears
to be rare among illegal migrants.
The question may be raised of why the effects of institutional exclu-
sion differ from the effects of secondary territorial exclusion. Is it not the
case that both types of border controls involve the state’s endeavour to
achieve the social exclusion of, in its view, unwanted immigrants? It
should be noted that the difference does not lie in the fact that the first
type of social exclusion is institutional, while the second is territorial.
Rather, the difference lies in the fact that institutional exclusion tends to
demonstrate itself to the migrant as an actual state or condition, whereas
secondary territorial exclusion tends to demonstrate itself as a feared
prospect or repercussion. In these two senses, the state’s endeavour to
achieve social exclusion appears to trigger different criminological me-
chanisms. In the first sense immigration control has already brought
about a strong measure of social exclusion: access to work and housing
may turn out to be limited given practices of internal border control. In
the second sense internal border control evokes the fear that additional
social exclusion may be awaiting; in the latter case, immigration controls
function as a sanction, a threat, a fear of further exclusion. While social
exclusion as a condition may trigger the strain mechanism, social exclu-
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sion as a possible prospect and sanction tend to contribute to social con-
trol, which usually promotes rule observance.
An additional contribution of this study lies in demonstrating that the
increased regulation of international migration may become associated
with the involvement of migrants in the committing of felonies, but also
in less serious forms of rule transgression such as misdemeanours and
violations of unwritten social rules. In that respect the two aspects of
internal border control also appear to yield similarly differential effects.
It turns out that misdemeanours should likewise often be understood as
a response to the strain between legitimate aspirations and limited ac-
cess to conventional means to fulfil these aspirations, in part as a conse-
quence of having illegal residence status. Cases in point are: living in
overpopulated illegal doss houses, not having a permanent address,
homelessness and approaching potential marriage partners in the street
with an eye to obtaining a residence permit. But the risk of apprehension
and expulsion also reveals itself in the case of misdemeanours and viola-
tions of unwritten social rules. It turns out, for instance, that some ille-
gal migrants keep their curtains closed during the day in the hope of not
being seen. Yet, as a rule, the socially wrought restraint of illegal mi-
grants has a favourable effect on neighbourhood safety and liveability. At
least there are indications that illegal migrants are less noisy than legal
residents because of expulsion risks, and on the streets they appear to
assume less dominant stances as well (Chapter 3).
The interaction with social ties
The effects of external and internal border controls do not always mani-
fest themselves in the same measure and in the same way for all groups
of illegal migrants; if we want to understand that variation we have to
realise that there are several interests and beliefs in segments of the dif-
ferentiated, open-market societies in the West that differ from the beliefs
and interests that dominate immigration policies. I have contributed to
the insight that both the extent and the way in which aspects of immigra-
tion control have consequences for public safety are to a considerable
extent determined by the interplay between these state practices and the
relatively autonomous, sometimes opposing forces from other parts of
society. These conclusions are inspired by sociology, particularly the so-
ciology of law.2
By its very nature, a restrictive immigration policy clashes with the
interests of migrants who are subjected to it but fail to meet the criteria
for legal residence. Therefore it is not very remarkable that some of
these migrants try to establish themselves without government consent.
This study shows, however, that in countries like the Netherlands there
exist, concentrated in certain (shadow) places, more established groups
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whose interests are negatively affected by these policies, who contest the
legitimacy of such policies, or who contribute to the opportunity struc-
ture of illegal residence because they profit from the weak social position
of illegal migrants. This was mainly demonstrated indirectly by analys-
ing the spatial distribution patterns of illegal migrants (Chapter 2).
These analyses indicate that there are three social actors who partially
undermine restrictive immigration objectives: (1) established non-Wes-
tern migrant communities, (2) employers, particularly in sectors that de-
pend on the secondary labour market and (3) migrant and native singles
with a foreign partner or an interest in obtaining such a partner. Restric-
tive immigration policies also encounter resistance from within the state
itself, from local governments or state professionals for example, as well
as from organisations in civil society such as Dutch churches and pro-
gressive action groups, but the latter effects were not prominent in this
study (for this see Van der Leun 2003, 2004).
These sectional interests and beliefs reduce the effectiveness of at-
tempts at regulation of international migration flows. In addition, pre-
cisely because they reduce the degree of social exclusion that is realisable
by the state, they also determine in part to what extent and how the poten-
tial effects on crime and public safety of the state’s endeavour to imple-
ment social exclusion become manifest.
As a rule, the likelihood that border control has repercussions for pub-
lic safety decreases with the extent to which the illegal migrant has social
ties with the established population. This finding was already present in
the existing research, although attention was mainly directed at the role
of established migrant communities and professionals in mitigating the
effects of institutional exclusion and it has found additional support in
his study. It transpires that illegal migrants from established migrant
communities – especially from Turkey, but also for example from China
– are apprehended for crimes considerably less often than illegal mi-
grants from groups that have made less headway in the Netherlands,
such as Somalis and Iranians (Chapter 4). This is partly because illegal
pioneers often depend on residence crime in order to come to the Neth-
erlands; for want of ties with established residents it is more difficult for
them to obtain a tourist visa or temporary residence permit. After settle-
ment, pioneers depend to a relatively high degree on subsistence crime
and drug-related crimes, especially on variants that are executable by a
relatively unorganised offender such as various forms of theft and street
trade in drugs. It seems that social ties with the legal population gener-
ally reduce the strain between legitimate aspirations and access to con-
ventional means of realising those ambitions.
I also found qualitative indications on the individual level that such
social ties may mitigate the criminogenic potential of institutional exclu-
sion by the state. During their stay in the Netherlands, there may be con-
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siderable variation in the degree of connection illegal migrants have to
more established inhabitants. My respondents tended to commit fewer
crimes in the period during which they found black work or were finan-
cially supported by a partner, than for instance in the periods when they
lived on the street and/or hung around with other delinquents. With the
exception of violence, they were also more often involved in crime when
they their residence was illegal than in the periods when they were re-
ceived as asylum seekers (see also De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes
2006). In addition, the men who managed to forge the fewest social ties
also appeared to run the highest risk of developing careers as drug users
in the urban margin, partly because they lacked social support to cope
with their difficult life conditions in other ways.
The likelihood of involvement in misdemeanours and violations of
unwritten rules appeared to decrease as well with the bond between the
illegal migrant and segments of the legal population. It appears that legal
residents rarely see illegal migrants as detrimental to public safety if they
live with their families or a partner, or can afford to rent apartments
(Chapter 3). By contrast, it turned out that footloose illegal newcomers
who have a deviant position in neighbourhoods are sometimes seen as a
threat in this sense. The latter groups are more often homeless, live for
shorter periods in illegal pensions, or sleep in cars or minivans.
Although not all of the latter groups aspire to an established position in
the country of destination, the state can keep them out of the legal hous-
ing market more successfully because they have limited ties with estab-
lished residents. Owing to their relative disembeddedness, they are also
less acquainted with important neighbourhood rules, such as the times
when garbage is collected.
Interestingly, the effects of secondary territorial exclusion also vary
with the strength of the social ties between an illegal migrant and social
minorities. Here, such ties appear to amplify its tendency to depress mi-
grant crime. The more integrated an illegal migrant, the more he or she
has to lose by detention and expulsion from the Netherlands, because
such ties do not eliminate the risk of expulsion; strictly speaking, only
naturalisation can eliminate that risk.3 It turns out in any case that rela-
tively unconnected illegal migrants, like the pendulum migrants from
Eastern Europe, are much more overtly visible in neighbourhood life
than other groups of illegal migrants, and sometimes display behaviour
that is offensive to many residents, particularly to women.4
Nature of the social ties
All that has been said so far about the importance of social embedded-
ness confirms the tenor of previous research in the Netherlands. At the
same time, however, I demonstrated that the role of social ties with the
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legal population is more complex. The interests and beliefs among the
three social actors – migrant communities, employers and singles – do
not by definition reduce the chances of an migrant violating social rules
under the influence of his or her illegal residence status. First, while the
degree of social ties is relevant, so is the question of with whom one is
connected. Previous research assumed that ethnic embedding enhanced
access to formal and informal institutions. Yet it is argued in this study
that ethnic embedding sometimes also increases access to criminal cir-
cuits (Chapter 4). Furthermore, it was observed in Chapter 5 that illegal
migrants who become hard drug users often end up in marginal drug
networks in the cities. There they learn forms of crime that help to fi-
nance drug use. It should be noted, however, that such ties appear to be
weaker and more fragmented than the familial ties of the illegal mi-
grants in the Turkish community that Staring (2001) described (see also
Sansone (1992) on the nature of social ties in marginal criminal net-
works).
Second, it was shown that even ties with ‘conventional’ milieus can
sometimes encourage criminality under the influence of institutional ex-
clusion (Chapter 5). Such social ties may under certain conditions in-
crease the social pressure towards offending. It appears that illegal mi-
grants sometimes commit crimes as a means of complying with
demands articulated in their social environments. Strain under the influ-
ence of institutional exclusion may be amplified in the case of a conflict
between the outcome of having illegal residence status and the expecta-
tions associated with the parallel statuses of the migrant, for example,
the status of son, father, or husband. As it turns out, the effects of social
embeddedness in the form of social capital – which increases behaviour-
al options, including criminal options – should be disentangled from the
effects of social embeddedness in the form of social expectations.
For a combination of reasons, however, it is unlikely that refinements
such as these are the rule rather than the exception in Dutch society.5
The form of rule transgression
In this book it has been argued that illegal migrants’ social ties influence
the shape of possible rule transgression under the influence of having
illegal residence status. As has been said, an illegal migrant who has a
Dutch girlfriend with a car appears to have a higher chance of driving
himself, albeit without a driver’s license.
Also – and most importantly – there turn out to be significant differ-
ences in the nature of crimes committed according to region of origin.
Because of their ties with established migrant communities, illegal mi-
grants have an elevated chance of involvement in a type of crime that is
relatively common among their countrymen with legal status.
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Other factors
Crime involvement is not only a matter of exogenic restraint and oppor-
tunity given the illegal residence status and social ties in the country of
origin; in response to strain migrants appear to choose forms of crimin-
ality they find less morally abhorrent in comparison to other perceived
criminal alternatives. It appears that the weighing of behaviour alterna-
tives differs to some degree, both between and within ethnic groups.
While illegal migrants from Eastern Europe appear to opt for theft in
case of criminality under the strain of a marginal position, African mi-
grants have an elevated chance of becoming involved in identity fraud or
financial scams, while illegal North Africans relatively often decide to
become drug dealers. Thus the form that criminality may take under the
influence of having illegal residence status is in large measure socially
and culturally determined (cf. Cullen 1984).
In sum, illegal migrants’ patterns of rule violation and observation
should to a considerable degree be understood as the aggregate of indi-
vidual responses to conditions that are the outcome of different aspects
of border control, which interact in complex ways with different degrees
and types of social embeddedness in the country of destination as well as
cultural factors that are related to the country of origin.
This book’s central claim does not imply, of course, that norm viola-
tion or observation among illegal migrants is always an adaptation to re-
strictive immigration policy. The study also shows that some forms of
rule violation among illegal migrants, like sexual crimes, are only mar-
ginally the outcome of restrictive immigration policies, if at all (Chapter
5). In addition, we have seen that some forms of criminal migration and
cross-border crime – where an offender migrates to other countries with
the intention to commit crimes such as drug trafficking or burglary –
occur among illegal migrants in the Netherlands (Chapter 6). It is unli-
kely that restrictive immigration policy contributed to these forms of of-
fending. On the contrary, certain types of criminal migration and cross-
border crime presuppose relatively open borders, as was the case with
forms of transnational brigandage from Eastern European countries
that were already due to become EU members during the period of
study. Furthermore, it was shown that in Holland a significant and in-
creasing number of criminal illegal migrants appear to be former legal
migrants who have lost their residence rights and are declared undesir-
able aliens because of criminal activities. Admittedly, such practices of
what has been called status reclassification in this study (Chapter 6) con-
stitute an increasingly significant third element of internal border con-
trol. Yet status reclassification should primarily be understood as a state
response to migrant crime rather than as a cause or condition of migrant
crime and disorder.
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Similarly, I have argued that illegal migrants do not only or even pri-
marily conform to social rules as an adaptation to secondary territorial
exclusion, but rather because they have internalised such rules as a re-
sult of previous socialisation in the country of origin, and often sub-
scribe to their legitimacy.
Limitations and suggestions for future research
All in all, this book primarily increases our insight into the unintended
effects of restrictive immigration policy for migrant crime and public
safety in the country of destination. It demonstrates that not all migrants
who are formally excluded do in fact abandon residence in countries like
the Netherlands. This is possible in part because such countries are not
only closed welfare states, but also differentiated open-market societies.
It turns out that this combination of social conditions also influences in
several ways the more unintended and unanticipated consequences of
immigration control in the context of public safety.
An important limitation of this study is that the intended effects of
migration controls have, in a large measure, not been researched. Ac-
cordingly, this study does not shed light on the extent to which immigra-
tion controls overall and internal border controls, in particular, diminish
certain migration flows, as they are intended to do. While there are, as
yet, no empirical indications for a decrease in illegal residence in the
Netherlands because of increases in internal border controls (Chapter
6), I could not rule out the possibility that these increases have pre-
vented a steeper growth of illegal residence in the Netherlands.
Because of this limitation it is not yet clear whether institutional exclu-
sion, while increasing the chances of an illegal migrant becoming in-
volved in crime, has a negative effect on the absolute number of criminal
illegal migrants. It could be that fewer criminal illegal migrants remain,
insofar as the population at risk would diminish more as a result of in-
stitutional exclusion than compensated for by the increase in the risk of
crime involvement. In that case, it is possible that fewer illegal migrants
more often violate social rules as a consequence of institutional exclu-
sion.6 (It could even be that internal border controls, insofar as they re-
duce immigration substantially, benefit the life chances of the remaining
unwanted migrants in some respects. Perhaps the lower the number of
remaining illegal migrants the lower their mutual competition for life
chances in the country of settlement with respect to work, housing and
finding a partner.)
A similar reservation concerns the effects of social embeddedness. I
have asserted that the chances of illegal residence status having negative
consequences for public safety diminish on average according to the
strength of the social ties between the illegal migrant and more estab-
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lished actors in Dutch society. That does not necessarily mean that the
magnitude of the safety problems that are coupled with illegal residence
is smaller because of such ties, since ties with the legal population also
facilitate illegal residence. If they were to disappear, the absolute magni-
tude of the safety problems that are coupled with illegal residence would
perhaps decrease, while the relative magnitude would increase. That is
to say, again, fewer illegal migrants would more frequently transgress for-
mal and informal social rules that are relevant for public safety in the
country of destination.7
We could learn more about the intended effects of migration control
by means of a comparative, international study. Unfortunately such a
study is currently lacking. Four additional routes for future research sug-
gest themselves.
Firstly, my analyses could be replicated for other countries. This might
provide additional evidence for the mechanisms that have been de-
scribed in this book. Or it might transpire that aspects of immigration
controls yield different outcomes in different countries: unintended con-
sequences should always be understood in relation to the ‘logic of situa-
tions’ (Popper 1962: 95-97). For instance, it could be hypothesised that
in countries with a larger informal economy and a larger private housing
market, a shift to informal practices will be more likely as a result of
institutional exclusion by the state, rather than a shift towards crime.
Secondly, more research could be done on whether neighbourhood
social organisation is weakened as the proportion of people in a given
neighbourhood who lack a residence permit reaches a certain threshold,
making such areas more attractive for offenders in general (Chapter 3).
A third route to explore is whether this study’s findings are also rele-
vant to an understanding of crime and rule trespassing among legal mi-
grants, especially first generation migrants with temporary residence
permits. For example, it can be expected on the basis of this study that
the risk of losing a residence permit will have a deterrent effect on their
criminal involvement. This may provide an additional explanation for
the finding that criminal involvement among first-generation migrants
is usually lower than among their offspring (De Haen-Marshall 1997;
Tonry 1997). It may also be useful to account for differences between
first- and second-generation migrants in the extent to which they are
pressured to comply with unwritten social rules.8 My findings may also
be relevant in helping to understand aspects of rule trespassing and
compliance in other underprivileged and repressed groups such as per-
sons in hiding (cf. Scott 1990).
Finally, more research should be conducted on illegal migrants as
crime victims, given the greater tendency on their part to shun police
contacts in instances of victimisation, and given the observation that
they are pressured to settle in high-crime neighbourhoods.
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Implications for policy
This study indicates the complexities of dealing with international mi-
gration, crime and public safety. It demonstrates that closed as well as
open borders may trigger specific forms of migrant crime and other
forms of rule violation that are important for public safety in countries
of destination. If free movement of legal goods and certain persons is
promoted, as occurred as part of the EU’s eastern enlargements, it also
becomes easier to migrate to other countries for shorter or longer peri-
ods of time to commit crimes such as drug trafficking or aggravated
theft. This is all the more likely if there are large international economic
disparities. Nevertheless, selective closure of external borders may gen-
erate certain forms of smuggling and trafficking. Likewise, this study
has helped to document the fact that practices of institutional exclusion
may lead to subsistence crime and drug-related crimes.
Hence, in a globalised world that is simultaneously characterised by
large international disparities in wealth and life chances, easy solutions
to migrant crime are clearly unavailable. Policymakers who want to limit
migrant crime should base their approach on an assessment of the in-
tended and unintended effects of restrictive versus more liberal migra-
tion policies. This is clearly beyond the scope of this study.
Yet a number of points can be made on the basis of this study. First,
internal border controls by means of institutional exclusion are currently
becoming more common in destination countries in Europe and North
America (Carrera & Guild 2007; Jencks 2007; NCSL 2008). In that
sense, the Netherlands constituted a strategic site in which to study the
effects of such measures. My study suggests that institutional exclusion
is not beneficial to public safety in destination countries, as long as the
intended effects of such measures – discouraging illegal residence – are
indeed limited, as they appear to be in the Netherlands. This is particu-
larly true if repatriation policies are also ineffective. In that case, institu-
tional exclusion merely contributes to the creation or entrenchment of a
marginal migrant population. This is not to say, of course, that govern-
ments might not have other reasons for opting for the institutional ex-
clusion of unwanted migrants, as a way of preserving the primary labour
market for the established population, for instance, or for symbolic rea-
sons, showing their voters that ‘something is being done’ about illegal
immigration.
The second point is that secondary territorial exclusion, at least from
the perspective of public safety, appears to be a better way to go than
institutional exclusion. Detention and expulsion risks, or at least the be-
lief by migrants that such risks exist, tend to depress rule violation
among illegal migrants, particularly if they value continued residence
outside of detention. I have shown that this general finding does not al-
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ways hold: illegal migrants’ tendency to shun police contacts may endan-
ger public safety indirectly if the number of illegal migrants reaches a
certain threshold, since it may then weaken neighbourhood social or-
ganisation in concentration areas, making such areas more attractive to
offenders. Likewise, it is questionable whether secondary territorial ex-
clusion benefits public safety, insofar as apprehension mainly leads to
repeated periods in detention and is not followed by repatriation.9 Final-
ly, it should be stressed that there is of course a clear tension between
secondary territorial exclusion and the values of civil liberty.
An additional point of relevance to policymakers is the question of
whether all immigration controls are actually necessary or at least realis-
tic. This study confirms that in some economic sectors, such as horticul-
ture and the takeaway restaurant trade, the economic situation requires
or promotes the use of cheap and flexible labour (Chapter 2). It appears
that domestic supply in the Netherlands and other destination countries
cannot always meet this demand. The recent opening up of the Dutch
labour market to workers from new EU member states such as Poland
shows that legal labour migration is certainly possible at the lower end of
the labour market as well. This raises the question of why such restric-
tions were not lifted earlier by means of temporary labour migration pro-
grammes. Had that been the case, housing of such workers could also
have been planned for, while problems of overcrowding in run-down
urban doss houses might have been prevented or at least reduced. It
should be mentioned here that temporary labour programmes for non-
EU citizens may be necessary in the not too distant future if the labour
supply from the new EU member states dries up. Temporary labour mi-
gration programmes could also be ideologically justified as a way to sti-
mulate development in poorer countries through remittances, and as a
means of creating opportunities for work and mobility that are, after all,
very unequally distributed across the planet.
Towards a right to elementary social relief for illegal migrants?
I would like to end this book with some comments on the question of
what should be done with those illegal migrants who are difficult to re-
patriate, but who are often not legalised either. More particularly, I will
look at the question of whether such migrants should be given a right to
elementary social relief. Before turning to this question, it is necessary to
explain at some length the birth of ‘illegals care’ in the Netherlands.
In the 1990s, a period when the Dutch welfare state was slimmed
down, additional and more informal social safety nets developed in the
Netherlands. Illegal migrants, in particular, are now extremely depen-
dent on them. For instance, a 2002 case study in The Hague and Leiden
revealed that there was considerable solidarity with illegal migrants at a
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local level (Rusinovic et al. 2002; Van der Leun 2004). A highly varied
group of churches, civil initiatives, migrant organisations, left-wing acti-
vists and civil servants expressed support for illegal migrants. These in-
stitutions and individuals tended to specialise in the support they of-
fered. Some donated meals (see also the rise of food banks in the
Netherlands since 2001 (Desain et al. 2006)), while others gave legal
advice or information about health care, arranged temporary accommo-
dation, or offered language courses.
Interestingly, local governments – faced with the outcomes of restric-
tive immigration policy in the form of homeless illegal migrants in their
streets, some of whom were committing subsistence and drug-related
crime – also began to offer relief to specific categories of illegal migrants.
For instance, many municipalities subsidise their accommodation or
have begun to organise accommodation themselves. According to an in-
ventory by the VNG, an organisation of Dutch municipalities, 170 of the
approximately 400 municipalities offered such support in direct or in-
direct ways, from which more than 2,000 persons benefited (Van der
Leun 2004). Such municipal support is largely aimed at asylum seekers
whose applications have been turned down.
Yet these local networks are quite loose and unorganised. Each of the
individuals and organisations involved tries to take care of a small part of
the demand. Moreover, not every applicant can be helped, since re-
sources are limited. The organisations must be selective and are forced
to set criteria governing who may or may not be helped; the old distinc-
tion between the deserving poor and undeserving poor tends to return
under these criteria. Rejected asylum seekers, i.e. refugees, have a great-
er chance of being helped than other groups of illegal migrants such as
‘fortune seekers’. This is the case with municipal support, but also for
support by churches. Women and children are helped more often than
single men.10
A growing group of vulnerable illegal migrants is accumulating in the
Netherlands, composed of people who cannot find sufficient employ-
ment, do not have a family or partner to support them, and are to a great
extent excluded from the informal social safety nets. They are increas-
ingly often declared undesirable aliens due to repeated illegal residence,
more or less serious criminal activities, or a combination of the two.
There may also be a question of problematic drug use (Chapter 5; see
also Molenaar 2007). The size of this group is unknown, but in the
Netherlands it appears to involve between several hundred and several
thousand individuals. They are mostly, but not exclusively, adult males.
A considerable number of the members of this group are difficult to
expel, because they manage to keep their identities secret, but also in
part because their countries of origin appear to be reluctant to take such
marginalised illegal migrants back.11 They are also less likely to be
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granted residence rights under legalisation programmes which tend, in
the Netherlands and elsewhere, to exclude migrants who have been con-
victed of crimes. It appears that detention is becoming the dominant
form of ‘relief’ for this group (see also Wacquant 2006). Their detention
often takes place in regular prisons: in the period 1994-2006 the num-
ber of foreign-born prisoners in the Netherlands almost doubled, from
30 September 1994 when there were 4,370 persons, to 30 September
2006 when there were 9,045.12 This increase had several causes, such
as the increased repression of drug trafficking. However, the number of
persons in Aliens’ Detention also multiplied by more than a factor of six:
on 30 September 1994, 425 persons were in Aliens’ Detention, on 30
September 2006, 2,555. Comparable developments appear to have taken
place, to varying degrees, in other EU countries (Alt 1999; EMN 2007;
Van Meeteren, Van San & Engbersen 2008; Van Kalmthout, Hofstee-
Van der Meulen & Dünkel 2007) and in the US (Scalia 2002). In Wes-
tern Europe as a whole there are now more than 200 detention centres
for illegal migrants (Broeders & Engbersen 2007).
Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen (2004) have carried out research in
two large Dutch institutions for Aliens’ Detention: the Tilburg Peniten-
tiary and Ter Apel Penitentiary. They found that the average length of
stay in these institutions has almost doubled in recent years, from 44
days in 1995 to 80 days in 2003 (2004: 13). Furthermore, they found
that the percentage of successful expulsions, in spite of increased efforts
to expel illegal aliens, remained almost unchanged at just under 50 per
cent.13 Further, Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen reported that before
detention, a minimum of 29 per cent of detainees had been presented
at an embassy or consulate at least once with an eye to expulsion.14
Formally, detention in the Aliens’ Detention is primarily a tool for ex-
pulsion (ACVZ 2002). The state can put an alien in custody until the
country of origin supplies a laissez passer, a document with which the
alien can return home. By law, detention may be as long as it is reason-
able to expect that such a document may be obtained. Meanwhile, the
alien cannot disappear into illegality. If all procedures work out as in-
tended, a stay in the Aliens’ Detention usually lasts a number of days or
weeks. If expulsion is more problematic or eventually impossible, length
of stay can increase to more than a year.
The figures by Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen correspond with the
supposition that Aliens’ Detention increasingly functions as a sort of fi-
nal relief for strongly marginalised illegal migrants. During my own
fieldwork in the penitentiary at Tilburg, I found indications of this as
well. Several men to whom I spoke turned out to have been in Aliens’
Detention more than once. The clergymen and psychologists working in
the institution turned out to know some of them quite well from pre-
vious stays. Institution staff members also told me that undesirable
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aliens are sometimes put in detention by the police in the big cities dur-
ing special festivities in town such as Koninginnedag, the nationwide cel-
ebration of the Dutch queen’s birthday.
Illegal migrants sometimes appear to contribute to this informal relief
function. Staff members claimed that detainees – between themselves
they referred to them as aliens – sometimes preferred a stay in Aliens’
Detention to life on the streets. Reputedly there were even cases where a
detainee who had been released because no laissez passer could be ob-
tained, set up camp in the bushes next to the institution. Although most
illegal migrants whom I interviewed found Aliens’ Detention a difficult
and denigrating experience – especially if they had not been appre-
hended for crimes – some respondents judged it less negatively. An un-
desirable alien from Iran, who had for years been part of a group of
street drug-users in the Amsterdam neighbourhood De Bijlmer, claimed
that he sometimes pleaded guilty to offences he had not committed in
order to recover in detention from his life on the streets.
These unintended functions of detention reveal similarities with the
poorhouses of the past, particularly the earliest variants such as the
houses of correction or workhouses. These institutions were charac-
terised by a strong measure of social control and repression (Poederbach
1932; Katz 1986; Wagner 2005; Van Leeuwen 2000), and these ‘police
institutions for the poor’ (Poederbach 1932: 20) also locked up the un-
employed who had committed only light offences. An Amsterdam ordi-
nance from 1613 defines the target group of the houses of correction as
follows:
Great crowds of beggars and vagabonds, very lazy idlers, men as well
as women who are found here in the City, who steal the alms from
the truly deserving, to the burden of the Municipality and its Citi-
zenry, and who usually set out for idleness, noise, gaming, drunken-
ness, prostitution and other godlessness, for (as has often been
found) Spies, Night Robbers and Thieves may hide among them. (Ci-
ted in Poederbach 1932: 22; translation by author)
The later workhouses were characterised by a higher degree of voluntary
residence, and the poor could submit admission requests themselves.
Further, a right to absence was increasingly introduced on condition of
good behaviour. Later on, detainees even received an elementary salary,
whereas all income from their work had previously gone to the institu-
tion. Such poorhouses, which were a Dutch invention, existed in many
Western countries from the end of the sixteenth century until well into
the second half of the twentieth century (Wagner 2005). The transition
between the former and the latter poorhouses occurred around the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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There are also differences between current detention practices and the
poorhouses of the past, but the primary difference is one of ideology.
Whereas illegal migrants are officially not prepared for a return to so-
ciety, although that often happens in practice, a stay in the poorhouses
did serve that particular purpose, even if their return often did not occur
in the way the establishment imagined it would. After all, labour was
mandatory because it was assumed this would correct the behaviour of
the poor and teach them to support themselves in decent ways (Foucault
1977). But in part because the latter often did not succeed, the poorhouse
gradually developed from a reform institution to counteract pauperism
into a relief house for the poor (Wagner 2005).15 In Aliens’ Detention,
labour is not mandatory, though in most detention centres such as the
one in Tilburg the detainees were given the opportunity to labour if so
desired; wages are 2.56 euros per hour (Van Kalmthout & Van Leeuwen
2004: 80).16
In sum, a differentiation of poor relief appears to develop in countries
of destination, under the influence of international migration and its
regulation, leading among other things to a renaissance of old arrange-
ments, which do of course pertain to migrants who come from much
greater distances than before; in that sense there appear to be a question
of a progressive regression in history, whereby some aspects repeat
themselves on a different scale.
The differentiation of poor relief is twofold. First, the arrangements
have developed in the shadow of a national welfare state with its
slimmed down but still superior social security. Second, these arrange-
ments are multiform themselves. They include softer and harder var-
iants, which also differ in the extent of formalisation and the local or
national scale or level at which they are organised.
These developments raise the question of whether such informal
types of illegals care will or should be formalised. It would not be the
first time that humanitarian ideas and public order considerations
among elites had contributed to the granting of social rights to the poor
(cf. De Swaan 1988, 1989, 1994, 1997). This question is the more press-
ing because, as was argued in the first sub-study, international migration
from poorer to richer countries is likely to continue, possibly even in a
larger measure. If the number of migrants who receive state permission
to settle does not keep up with the actual social demand, while the effec-
tiveness of expulsion policy does not increase, illegal residence will re-
main prevalent in the Western world, and the social figure of the illegal
migrant will then become a permanent fixture. Most illegal migrants will
be capable of supporting themselves; nonetheless a subgroup that is very
dependent on care will always stand out, particularly if the regular labour
and housing market are closed off to it.
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At this point there is already, in various ways, a form of differentiated
citizenship in the Netherlands and countries like it. For instance, aliens
with residence permits do not have all the political rights that present-
day Dutch nationals have, and although foreigners who are citizens of
EU member states are free to settle in the Netherlands, if they apply for
welfare benefits they lose their residence rights. Illegal migrants have
certain elementary rights as well; in the Netherlands they have a right to
basic medical care and legal aid, though the outcome of a legal case may
be awaited in the Netherlands only in cases of human trafficking, and
children without legal residence have a right to education.
Perhaps it will transpire that the revival of old variants of poor relief is
in fact a prelude to a further formal differentiation of citizenship. The
generally felt need to support illegal migrants and the desire to control
the potential threat they represent could lead to a right to elementary
relief for certain categories of illegal migrants, for example, people who
cannot be expelled. On the one hand, there are evidently problems at-
tached to a right to poor relief and the increase in citizenship differentia-
tion it implies. One snag is that it brings us closer to the pre-industrial
class-based society in which birth rather than achievement determined
social position. This drawback could perhaps be diminished by granting
specific groups of illegal migrants the opportunity eventually to earn a
residence permit in case of good behaviour, just like legal migrants may
eventually be allowed to become naturalised and acquire full citizenship
(cf. Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004). A second drawback is that poor-
houses for illegal migrants should ideally offer only basic relief, and
should preferably be introduced in the EU as a whole if they are not to
function as magnets for unexpellable illegal migrants in other EU coun-
tries.
On the other hand, a case could certainly be made for such a right to
elementary relief, and perhaps the later poorhouses could be used as a
model for such a right. A number of detention practices for migrants
who commit minor residence, subsistence and drug-related crimes
could then perhaps be steered in a more humane direction. This would
require us to accept that international inequality in an era of intensified
globalisation is bound to promote local differentiation of all kinds, in-
cluding increased local social stratification, irrespective of efforts by gov-
ernments to control international migration, and also, in part, precisely
because of these efforts.
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Notes
Chapter 1
1. The term ‘Western countries’ is widely used in the social sciences (for an example see
Andreas & Snyder 2000), and usually refers to the affluent, industrialised countries in
West Europe and North America, plus Australia and New Zealand. In this study the
term ‘non-Western countries’ is used as a proxy to refer to countries whose citizens
tend to be subjected to restrictive migration policies. In the period of study this also
included a number of countries in Central Europe that were non-EU countries during
the research period or part thereof (1997-2005), such as Poland and Romania. The
latter countries are often considered Western countries.
2. While the number of non-European illegal migrants has remained fairly constant, the
number of European illegal migrants appears to have decreased somewhat recently,
since a growing number of Eastern Europeans have obtained residence rights as EU
citizens as a result of the EU’s enlargements (for the most recent estimations see Van
der Heijden et al. 2006).
3. According to Castles and Miller (2003), there are approximately 1.5 million first-genera-
tion migrants in Italy with a residence permit and approximately 300,000 illegal mi-
grants. While the number of registered first-generation migrants in the Netherlands
(+/- 1.6 million) more or less equals the number in Italy, there were, as has been said,
approximately 150,000 illegal migrants during my research period (1997-2005).
4. See Van Heek (1936) for a marvellous pioneer study on Chinese migrants in the Neth-
erlands. The post-war taboo primarily concerned research that did not only look for
socioeconomic explanations in order to account for ethnic differences in offending
(see also Maas-De Waal 1991; Van Gemert 1998). See, for example, Saragin (1980) on
the post-war sensitivity with regards to studying race and crime.
5. These are, by the way, not necessarily the groups from whom scientists can learn the
most. More research should be done comparing immigrant groups with a high and
low involvement in crime so as to reduce ‘sampling on the dependent variable’.
6. I suspect that research in many countries lags behind because of the greater reserve
internationally with regard to the study of crime among migrants and ethnic minori-
ties. An additional reason is that registration practices in the Netherlands, which is a
fairly organised, bureaucratised country, lend themselves to scientific research
(although my predecessors, particularly Joanne van der Leun, nonetheless had to do a
lot of work to make such research possible). In other countries, residence status is
often not well documented in police files (McDonald 1997).
7. Sometimes the distinction between minor and serious offences is difficult to make in
police data on illegal migrants, because at the time of registration the cases have not
been prosecuted and judged. An incident that is initially registered as a major crime
(for instance house burglary) may eventually be prosecuted and judged as a minor
crime (for instance simple theft), and the other way around. For this reason my prede-
cessors classified house burglary as a minor crime because theft is, usually, a minor
crime in the Netherlands, even if house burglary can be punished with more than four
years of imprisonment, even if this is rarely done in practice.
8. According to CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl; visited August 2007) domestic migra-
tion in the Netherlands, i.e. rehousing between municipalities, was 642,089 in 2005.
The official international migration from and to non-Western countries was 59,719
(immigration 36,508 and emigration 23,211). Hence, the ratio between domestic and
the latter types of international migration was approximately 11:1.
9. The unskilled labour migration in the 1960s from countries around the Mediterranean
was in this respect rather exceptional, made possible in part by the active recruitment
practices by the countries of destination, in regions that were specifically selected for
this purpose by the governments of the countries of departure. The Moroccan govern-
ment encouraged recruitment among the poor Berber population (Van Gemert 1998).
Chain migration by poorer migrants is often subsidised by established immigrants.
10. There are a number of exceptions. For instance, Holland received Jewish refugees
from Germany in the 1930s, although there was an inclination to admit only the weal-
thier refugees. Actually, a relatively substantial number of poorer Jewish refugees be-
came ‘illegal migrants’ in Holland in the years before the Second World War (Van Eijl
2005).
11. Two other reasons are mentioned in the literature: first, the decreasing costs of trans-
portation, which enabled longer journeys for larger and larger segments of the popula-
tion, even in developing countries. The second reason is decolonisation; for instance,
Surinam – a former Dutch colony – became independent in 1975.
12. At present the right to leave a country is a human right, although strangely enough this
right is not complemented by the right to enter another country.
13. At present an asylum request is, for instance, recognised only if there is a demon-
strable political threat to the applicant. A general threat to a group is no longer suffi-
cient (Lucassen & Penninx 1997). Moreover, those who are recognised as refugees in-
creasingly receive temporary residence permits (Doornbos and Groenendijk 2001).
They become illegal migrants if they stay in the country after the expiration of the
temporary residence permit.
14. In the Netherlands, a housing permit by the local government is required to be allowed
to rent almost all cheap rent-controlled accommodation, except for single rooms with
shared kitchen and toilet facilities. Applications for a housing permit are rejected if the
applicant lacks a residence permit. After the introduction of the Linking Act it is easy
for local governments to verify whether or not an applicant has a residence permit.
15. Dutch Bureau for Statistics (http://statline.cbs.nl; visited May 2007).
16. Medical practitioners sometimes put medical ideals before the stipulations of legisla-
tors, while teachers who admit talented illegal youngsters to schools sometimes put
pedagogical and humanitarian ideals before immigration policy.
17. Foreigners who stay in the Netherlands for three months or less do not have to add
their names to the official register of births, marriages and deaths. The registrations in
the VAS, on which this study is in part based, are not dependent on the register of
births, marriages and deaths.
18. A very small minority of illegal migrants were born with this status and thus had no
influence over their classification as illegal aliens. However, many illegal migrants in-
itially came to the Netherlands or another Schengen country with a tourist visa and/or
initially resided legally in the Netherlands for another reason, while requesting asylum
for example.
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19. Undesirable aliens can be prosecuted and imprisoned for six months each time they
are found in the Netherlands within the period laid down (five or ten years). See also
Chapter 6.
20. See for instance the pronouncements by Jaap Blokker (one of the owners of Blokker, a
Dutch chain of general goods stores): ‘Illegalen roven winkels leeg’ (‘Illegals plunder
shops’), which was published in the national newspaper de Volkskrant on 26 July 2003.
21. In January 2007 the fourth sub-study (‘I am just trying to live my life’) was presented at
the Nieuwspoort press centre in The Hague, together with two other studies on asylum
migration and crime (De Boom, Engbersen & Leerkes 2006; Althoff, De Haan & Mie-
dema 2006). A number of representatives of national political parties were present.
22. The proper legal term in the Netherlands is ‘staandehoudingen’. When the police stop
someone, it is a staandehouding. This does not necessarily lead to an arrest, which
involves deprivation of liberty. For illegal migrants, however, registered stops will
usually end in an arrest. In addition, the distinction between apprehension and arrest
is not really reflected in everyday language. Therefore the terms apprehension and
arrest are used interchangeably in this study.
Chapter 2
1. Of all apprehensions, 52 per cent lack a registered residential address. In approxi-
mately 20,000 of these cases it is likely that the apprehended immigrants concerned
did not yet have residential addresses in the Netherlands because these apprehensions
took place at ports, airports, state highways and train stations, were carried out by the
military police who control the border, or happened on the registered day of arrival in
the Netherlands. If these apprehensions are left out of consideration, the percentage of
missing values decreased from 53 to 42. Police stations have been identified with the
help of the Internet. In order to check whether the registered home addresses de-
scribed the place of apprehension rather than the place of residence, a sample of 1,500
was taken from the data. In 381 cases, the residential address was equal to the place of
apprehension. However, these are not necessarily invalid registrations because at least
74 of the 381 cases pertain to centres for asylum seekers, brothels, companies and
market gardens. It may well be that the arrested immigrants actually resided where
they were apprehended. The analyses in the first part of the chapter, i.e. at the level of
municipalities, are based on 28,857 apprehensions. The analyses at the neighbourhood
level are based on 23,775 apprehensions.
2. Cruyff and Van der Heijden (2004) reported separate estimates for provinces and po-
lice districts of the four biggest cities. These estimates are based on the place of appre-
hension (and not, as is the case in this chapter, on the registered residential addresses).
For the year 2002, we compared their estimates with the number of apprehensions in
our database. For nearly all provinces, the number of apprehensions equals between 9
and 11 per cent of the estimated total number of illegal migrants. Only the province of
Utrecht deviates (5 per cent). This suggests that there are no substantial geographical
differences in risk of arrest between urban and rural areas. When police regions in the
big cities were compared, I found that the risk of arrest appears to be elevated some-
what in Amsterdam (15 per cent).
3. The Dutch Bureau for Statistics (CBS) uses the following definition of a non-Western
immigrant: an immigrant is ‘non-Western’ if he or she was born in Turkey, Africa,
Latin America or Asia with the exception of Indonesia and Japan. An inhabitant is
counted as a second-generation immigrant if at least one of the parents is born abroad.
In principle, the mother’s country of birth determines whether such inhabitants are
counted as ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’. If the mother’s country of birth is the Nether-
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lands, than the father’s country of birth determines this. Figure 2.3 includes first- and
second-generation immigrants from non-Western countries. CBS excludes Indonesia
and Japan from the rest of Asia for differing reasons. Indonesia is excluded because a
substantial number of older Dutchmen were born there to Dutch parents in colonial
times. Japan is excluded for it is considered a highly industrialised country. Of course,
the latter raises the question of when China and India are to be excluded (!). All in all,
CBS statistics appear to provide ethnic data based on country of origin without directly
measuring ethnicity: in a number of recent studies CBS has even published a number
of studies on third-generation immigrants because there was a demand by researchers
and policy makers to get data on these mostly young people. Direct measurements of
ethnicity were abandoned in the 1970s for political reasons. It seems that ‘objective
criteria’ such the countries of birth of parents and grandparents are considered less
problematic. Personal communication by the CBS confirmed that the organisation
tries to approximate ‘social categories that are discerned in Dutch society at large’.
4. The measure for the relative concentration of illegal residence shows a rather skewed
distribution; ten ‘outliers’, i.e. neighbourhoods where the relative concentration is
more than three standard deviations higher than the average, have therefore been ex-
cluded from the analyses. This did not affect the statistical significance of the analyses,
as the total number of urban neighbourhoods is more than 1,200 (see Table 2.2).
5. Next to the proportion of single persons, two additional neighbourhood characteristics
had a significant effect on the concentration of illegal migrants – the average size of
families and the percentage of families with children. Both variables are, however,
strongly correlated with the other independent variables (particularly with the percen-
tage of non-Western immigrants). For statistical reasons (‘collinearity’) these variables
could not be included in the model. The ‘effect’ of both variables is probably merely
due to the effect of the percentage of non-Western immigrants.
6. It is difficult, however, to isolate the effects of the presence of legal, non-Western im-
migrants from the effects of the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods, for eth-
nic segregation is, in part, due to ethnic group differences in income (see Farley 1991:
288). The standardised effect of the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods di-
minished from -0.34, when the concentration of illegal migrants is only predicted with
the value of the housing stock and the average income of the residents (not shown in
Table 2.2), to -0.07 when the share of non-Western immigrants was controlled for (see
the second model). Furthermore, it is possible that a small number of illegal migrants
live in upmarket areas – for instance, domestic workers (see Mahler 1995 on this topic
for the US). We did not, however, find indications for this in the Dutch police data. In
the Netherlands, with its cultural taboos on sharp class divisions, domestic workers do
not usually live with their employers. It is also easier to find more suitable accommo-
dation in cheaper areas at an acceptable travel distance from the workplace in the Neth-
erlands since neighbourhoods are smaller and the rate of income segregation is sub-
stantially lower than in the US; in Dutch neighbourhoods, cheap and expensive blocks
are located much closer to each other than in the US.
7. The standardised effect drops from 0.29, when the concentration of illegal migrants is
predicted only on the basis of the percentage of single residents, to 0.24 when the
percentage of legal, non-Western immigrants is added to the model, to 0.20 in the fifth
regression model.
8. Additional information was obtained on twelve neighbourhoods for which the model
does not accurately predict the number of registered illegal migrants (these neighbour-
hoods are highlighted in Figure 2.7). It turns out that such anomalies can be quite well
explained and do not contradict the theoretical approach. Neighbourhoods with more
illegal migrants than predicted are either being used as prostitution areas, or house (or
have in their vicinity) centres for asylum seekers or market gardens. No suitable statis-
tical data could be found on these aspects of the first and third dimensions of the
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spatial opportunity structure for illegal migrants, i.e. the presence of compatriots in
centres for asylum seekers and the opportunities for illegal labour in prostitution areas.
Neighbourhoods with fewer registered illegal migrants than predicted were mainly
found in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (where the home addresses of illegal migrants
are not very accurately recorded), or were affluent districts with many single people
and much private homeownership. If we had had data on the concentration of single
people with low incomes and private ownership of inexpensive houses, we would prob-
ably have predicted the concentration of illegal migrants for these neighbourhoods
more adequately. If the twelve highlighted neighbourhoods are left out of considera-
tion, the model’s explanatory power increases from 50 to 60 per cent. The remaining
unexplained variance, which is never zero in cases of empirical research, probably
points to similar measurement errors, or to unmeasured variables such as the pre-
sence of churches, psychiatric clinics and institutions for the homeless. These institu-
tions sometimes house illegal migrants, particularly those who are unemployed and
have no supportive network of family and friends (the ‘floating population’).
Chapter 3
1. Secondary analyses based on estimates by Cruijff and Van der Heijden in Leerkes et al.
(2004) show that the annual risk of arrest for criminal illegal migrants is 13 per cent,
against 6 per cent for non-criminal illegal migrants. Because the probability that an
address is recorded in the VAS is lower for criminal (20 per cent) than for non-criminal
(33 per cent) migrants, criminal illegal migrants are on average 30 per cent more likely
to enter our neighbourhood measure of illegal residence. This will not greatly bias the
estimates, because the majority of the illegal migrant population is not involved in
crime (in about half the cases illegal residence is the sole reason for arrest). In addition,
criminal and non-criminal illegal migrants tend to live in the same neighbourhoods.
2. The eigenvalue of the factor is 1.53. Both variables have factor loadings of .87 on the
factor; the correlation between the variables is .53.
3. These six factors have the following eigenvalues (item factor loadings in parentheses)
of 2.18 (factor loadings .66, .73, .57, .54, .77), 2.05 (factor loadings .68, .79, .75, .62),
1.71 (factor loadings .71, .60, .60, .72), 2.54 (factor loadings .62, .74, .73, .76, .70), 1.51
(factor loadings .72, .64, .76) and 1.81 (factor loadings .74, .61, .68, .60).
Chapter 4
1. Asylum seekers, for instance, are as a rule not allowed to work and cannot apply for
unemployment benefits, but do receive board, lodgings and some ‘pocket money’. La-
bour migrants may, of course, work and as a consequence are entitled to the social
arrangements that are linked with it. Foreigners admitted to the Netherlands because
of family formation or family reunification usually have the right to work, and have a
right to concomitant social arrangements when they loose their jobs or become ill. As a
rule, however, they cannot apply for unemployment benefits that are not related to
work.
2. Kehla (in Engbersen 1999) and Zaitch (2002) had already done some work in this
direction.
3. I selected countries from which the total number of legal migrants, aged eighteen to
25, was greater than 1,000.
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4. A hypothetical example can illustrate the adjustments made. Suppose Kromhout and
Van San had counted a 100 suspects from a particular country of origin, 80 of them
legal migrants and twenty illegal. Kromhout and Van San could not distinguish be-
tween them with certainty using HKS. Suppose that out of these twenty illegal mi-
grants, ten told the police they resided in the Netherlands but concealed their precise
residential addresses, five told the police they resided in the Netherlands and disclosed
their addresses, and the remaining five told the police they did not reside in the Neth-
erlands. In this case, Kromhout and Van San would report 95 ‘legal’ suspects (i.e. 100-
5), data adjustment A would lead to 75 ‘legal’ suspects (twenty illegal migrants would be
subtracted from the number of ‘legal’ immigrants reported by Kromhout and Van
San), and adjustment B would lead to 90 ‘legal suspects’ (only the five illegal migrants
who disclosed their residential addresses would be subtracted from the 95 ‘legal’ sus-
pects reported by Kromhout and Van San). In this example, the actual number of legal
migrants (80) would be between data adjustment A (75) and data adjustment B (90).
5. Crime involvement varies with age. It tends to rise from twelve up to eighteen or nine-
teen years, and then slowly declines (cf. Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). To control for
this correlation, age should be held constant (particularly because the share of minors
may vary between ethnic groups and between legal and illegal migrants). The alterna-
tive would be to present separate figures for legal and illegal migrants aged twelve to
eighteen. This would not make sense, however, because few illegal migrants are mi-
nors in Holland.
6. This is not the same as the average number of suspects in 1999 and 2000 divided by
the average size of the population, multiplied by 100.
7. The data presented by Kromhout and Van San do not allow a specification according to
sex and age at the same time. In the relevant age category (eighteen to 25 years of age),
they do not present separate data on police registrations of male and female young-
sters.
8. Ethnic crime patterns tend to be fairly constant within a time span of a few years (cf.
Van San & Leerkes 2001).
9. This may constitute an underestimation of the actual number of illegal migrants from
Morocco. Some illegal migrants fromMorocco tell the police they were born in Algeria,
because this obstructs their deportation from the Netherlands. Note, however, that this
does not necessarily mean that the prevalence of crime among illegal Moroccans was
underestimated, for it is a relative measure. It was only underestimated in as far as
criminal illegal Moroccans lie about their country of birth more often than non-crim-
inal illegal Moroccans did.
10. ‘Crimes’ refers to apprehensions in three categories usually distinguished by Engber-
sen et al. as ‘minor offences’, ‘serious offences’ and ‘drugs’. See also Chapter 6.
11. The self-reporting of offences has many drawbacks as well (cf. Junger 1990) and it
would be nearly impossible to obtain access to criminal illegal migrants without police
assistance. Judicial data on convicted offenders may also be biased. For instance, the
percentage of suspects who are summoned to court may differ per ethnic group be-
cause of group differences in the willingness and/or ability to pay financial settlements
(De Leng & Hille 1991).
12. Type of crime committed correlates with age (with more vandalism and less violence
among minors). See also notes 5 and 17.
13. This calculation was made for the total number of offences committed by offenders
from the eight ethnic groups for which the ‘quality’ of criminality is specified. Hence,
Cramer’s V was derived from a 2x9 cross-tabulation, i.e. residence status by type of
offence.
14. Note that Cramer’s V, calculated per ethnic group, correlates negatively with the respec-
tive crime rates among legal migrants which were depicted in Table 4.1: from r=-0.67
(p<0.07) with adjusted crime rate A to r=-0.81 (p<0.02) with the unadjusted crime rate.
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Hence, the chance of illegal migrants’ crime involvement being limited to the use of
false documents, and not extending to other offences, appears to rise as the crime
involvement in the ethnic group as a whole decreases.
15. Without False Documents the unweighted correlation coefficients in Figure 1 are 0.53
(p<0.09), 0.58 (p<0.06) and 0.55 (p<0.08) for the initial data and data adjustment A
and B. Similarly, without False Documents and without Surinam the unweighted cor-
relation coefficients are 0.79 (p<0.01), 0.77 (p<0.01) and 0.78 (p<0.01). Without False
Documents the weighted correlation coefficients are 0.41 (p<0.21), 0.40 (p<0.22) and
0.43 (p<0.19). Without False Documents and without Surinam the weighted correla-
tion coefficients are 0.92 (p<0.00), 0.88 (p<0.00) and 0.93 (p<0.00).
16. For similar findings about the market for stolen telecom services in Australia see Gra-
bosky and Smith (2001: 30).
17. As can be seen in Table 4.5, the diminished share of violence cannot be due to the
deviant age composition of the illegal population, with fewer adolescents, since similar
patterns prevail among illegal offenders aged twelve to eighteen and eighteen to 25.
18. In the Netherlands, approximately half of all apprehensions of illegal migrants do not
result in deportation. Either non-deported illegal migrants manage to conceal their
identity, or their countries of origin decline to cooperate (Engbersen et al. 2002).
19. Most foreigners from non-Western countries need such an invitation if they want to
reside in the Netherlands for more than three months (this is called a Machtiging Voor-
lopig Verblijf or MVV). The Dutch authorities link several financial responsibilities to
such an invitation.
Chapter 5
1. The actual situation is somewhat more complex. Rejected asylum seekers only become
illegal migrants within this term of four weeks if an appeal against the decision is
impossible, or if the asylum seeker is given leave to appeal but does not have the right
to reside in the Netherlands while awaiting the decision.
2. The state sometimes does not realise the possibility for repatriation immediately. It
may also be that the asylum seeker cannot leave because (s)he is stateless or because
the country of origin does not furnish a laissez passer, or because (s)he refuses to leave
because of a lack of prospects in the country of origin, fear for prosecution in so far as
the asylum request has been rejected undeservedly, migration debts, etc. The migrant
can also hinder expulsion by keeping silent about his or her true identity.
3. The heightened involvement of North Africans in this street trade can partly be ex-
plained by the increasing unemployment rate among former guest workers, chain mi-
grants and their offspring. Unemployed Moroccans will have become well informed
about Dutch street life. The wholesale business is more often conducted by Turks,
Latin Americans and Dutch nationals (Bovenkerk 2001). North Africans have limited
access to hard drugs in their region of origin.
4. The clergymen estimate that 80 per cent of the detainees attend the services. Religion
supports many detainees during detention. Others attend the services as an outing.
The services were probably a good place to recruit respondents because they are a
space that the men can appropriate to a certain degree. They can express a shared
cultural/spiritual identity which helps to put the earthly detention regime into perspec-
tive, and experience a certain collective power vis-à-vis the institution. The guards kept
a certain distance; some detainees read out loud from the Bible.
5. The interpreters were: a female Russian interpreter for Russian, a male Moroccan-
Dutch interpreter for French-Arabic and a female Dutch interpreter for Serbo-Croatian.
On two occasions a telephone interpreter was used via the Ministry of Justice. One
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respondent’s Dutch language skills were lower than expected and with another respon-
dent the interpreter was ill during an interview. The Serbo-Croatian interpreter was
found through the internet, the remaining interpreters via my personal network.
6. Applicants for asylum are allowed to remain in Holland, but may not travel freely be-
tween countries. In addition, they do not have a right to a Dutch driver’s license for
scooters or automobiles. Unlike illegal migrants, asylum seekers receive housing and
allowances for food and clothing (for some rejected asylum seekers this was also true
in some cases). However, these allowances amount to no more than 40 euros per week.
Asylum seekers are allowed to work, but no more than twelve weeks a year. In addition,
it is probable that differences in deprivation according to residence status are partly
cancelled out by differences in punishment. Illegal migrants risk detention in Alien’s
Custody (sometimes for more than a year at a time) and expulsion, whereas criminal
asylum seekers tend to get a fine, alternative sentences or a prison sentence.
7. In addition, a visa application requires time and contact with government bodies.
These requirements may be particularly problematic for refugees – and almost all the
men (23 out of 26) considered themselves as such.
8. For this reason I used the term ‘bestaanscriminaliteit’ in the original Dutch version of
this text. It translates as ‘existence crime’. ‘Livelihood crime’ might also be an appropri-
ate term here.
9. Staring (2001: 184), for instance, reported that the Turkish illegal migrants he inter-
viewed had mostly been detained for violence (the interviews were not about crime).
Violence is also relatively common among legally resident Turkish migrants, for in-
stance in connection with honour vengeance (see Chapter 4).
10. Two men destroyed property during fits of anger as a result of taking the law into their
own hands (K and M). The other case in which goods were destroyed (X) was a failed
car burglary (drug-related crime).
11. The social class background of the long distance ‘illegal pioneers’ who were inter-
viewed for this sub-study was certainly not low. This may be, in part, a consequence of
the regulations governing migration which, though privileging higher income groups
when granting tourist visas, primarily raise migration costs for people who do not meet
the official criteria and are not helped by established residents to settle clandestinely,
for instance, with tourist visas. See Chapter 1.
12. The Afghan respondent stated that he used to distil liquor, which was punishable un-
der the Taliban administration. He claimed he was detained for it, but escaped when
he was sentenced to an Islamic re-education camp.
13. The hysteresis effect (Bourdieu 1977), in which systems – in this case the habitus – do
not immediately react to forces that are exerted on them, may help us understand why
serious crime problems usually do not occur among poor migrants, but rather among
their children (Tonry 1997).
14. It also seems that relational embeddedness does not necessarily imply social capital.
15. In 2003 12 per cent of the apprehensions because of crime concerned a serious of-
fence, i.e. an offence with a maximum punishment of at least four years in prison
(undesirable aliens are not counted in this figure, see Leerkes et al. 2004: 27). These
offences are usually violent crimes. Furthermore, a significant proportion of illegal
migrants who are recorded as having committed violent crimes are legal migrants
who were declared illegal migrants because of criminal activities (as undesirable aliens
or because of the application of the sliding scale, see Chapter 6).
208 ILLEGAL RESIDENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE NETHERLANDS
Chapter 6
1. Section 67 Aliens Act 2000 and Section 197 Criminal Law.
2. For illegal migrants it is sufficient if the person resides illegally in the Netherlands and
has repeatedly violated a stipulation in the Aliens Act that is punishable as a misdemea-
nour (for instance not leaving the Netherlands after admission has been refused), or if
the person is believed to be a threat to public order or national security (in which case
no conviction for a crime is necessary).
3. According to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 4 No-
vember 1950), migrants legally residing in a country have a right to maintain a family
life there, which obviously clashes with the implications of a being an undesirable
alien. Such migrants may still make short visits to the Netherlands, even if continued
settlement is regarded as illegal residence.
4. Some ‘undesirable aliens’ are criminally active illegal migrants who never had a legal
status. In theory it is possible that the chances of such illegal migrants leaving the
country increase because of being turned into ‘undesired aliens’. However, there is no
empirical evidence for such an effect. If they stay, they can be imprisoned for six
months in case of re-apprehension. But many illegal migrants spend long periods in
Aliens’ Detention anyhow, officially with an eye to repatriation. Furthermore, it is prob-
able that such migrants constitute a minority of the undesirable aliens (see note 8 of
this chapter).
5. Between 1999 and 2002 the total number of police officers increased from 40,000 to
about 47,000 (Ministry of Justice 2005: 127).
6. See note 7 in Chapter 1. Formally, house burglary is not a minor crime, but my prede-
cessors had good reasons to classify it as a minor crime nonetheless.
7. The category ‘property crimes’ is taken as an indicator for subsistence crime and addic-
tion-related crime and is therefore defined in a broad sense; it includes property crimes
with a violent component (although the latter are relatively rare among illegal mi-
grants). It entails: ‘theft’, ‘theft with burglary’, ‘theft with violence’, ‘conning’, ‘extor-
tion’, ‘receiving’, ‘counterfeiting’ and ‘embezzlement’. Theft and theft with burglary
make up the large majority of the cases in this category (about 80 per cent).
8. The IND data did not lend themselves to a neat distinction between undesirable aliens
who were illegal migrants to begin with and undesirable aliens who initially had a
residence permit. Nonetheless, it is probable that former legal migrants constitute a
majority of the cases. In only 145 of the cases do the IND entries mention ‘illegal resi-
dence’ among the reasons for declaring a person an undesirable alien between 1997
and 2003, mostly in addition to convictions for crimes. This may be an underestima-
tion of the actual number of reclassified illegal migrants, as only the most serious
reasons (i.e. felonies) for declaring a person an undesirable alien may have been regis-
tered. The IND system allows for the registration of three reasons. However, it is not
likely that illegal migrants constitute the majority of the persons who become undesir-
able aliens. Legal migrants outnumber illegal migrants in the total Dutch population by
a ratio of 10:1 (also see Chapter 1).
9. According to the police, this principle was somewhat less strictly adhered to in the
1990s than it is today. However, this possible bias does not weaken the argument. On
the contrary, it makes the argument stronger. Assume that in the first years of the
research period (1997-2000) a higher number of illegal migrants were registered in
the VAS under more than one name and foreigner number than in the later years of
the research period (2001-2003). In that case, this study overestimates the number of
crime suspects with illegal residence status in a higher measure for the first years under
study than for the later years because of double counts. This would mask the real rise
in crime between 1997 and 2003. Moreover, similar results were obtained when the
analyses were done on the level of the apprehension.
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10. If a person is arrested at the border, the arrival date is self-evident. If, on the contrary,
an illegal migrant had been living in the Netherlands for some time before the appre-
hension, the police will depend more often on what the arrestee is willing to tell them
about the date of entry. In such cases it is more likely that no date of entry will be
registered, because the arrestee may not report it or the conveyed information is
deemed unreliable. Finally, analysis of the missing values revealed that such apprehen-
sions are connected to somewhat different types of crimes than what turns out to be
characteristic for criminal migration.
11. CBS Statline (statline.cbs.nl). These figures include first- and second-generation mi-
grants.
12. The contribution of the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The
Hague) to the total number of apprehensions in the VAS, for crimes and other reasons,
dropped from 45 per cent in 1997 to 41 per cent in 2003. After control 3a, the crime
index for 2003 for the four cities was 150, for the other regions 164.
13. While the crime index for 2003 decreases as a result of this final control, ΔN increases;
the total number of additional crime suspects would have been somewhat higher be-
cause of marginalisation effects than has actually been the case, if the size of the illegal
population had not dropped and then risen, but had remained constant since 1997.
14. The relative increase between 1997 and 2003 is 131 (231-100). Of this, status reclassifi-
cation appears to explain 8 (231-223), criminal migration 29 (223-194), general develop-
ments in crime finding and registration 38 (194-156) and demographic growth 19 (156-
137). The size of these contributions should be taken as approximations, also because
the order of the controls influenced the outcomes to some extent.
15. The increase is 37 per cent (137 vs. 100) if it is assumed that all crime suspects remain-
ing after control 5b can be explained by the marginalization thesis. The increase is
higher if it is assumed that these remaining crimes have, in part, other backgrounds
that are unconnected to state policies (such as ‘honour violence’). For instance, the
increase is 48 per cent if it is assumed that in every year 500 crime suspects offended
because of such reasons ((3079-500)/(2246-500)=1.48).
16. In the period 1994-2006 the number of foreign-born prisoners almost doubled in the
Netherlands: on 30 September 1994 there were 4,370 persons, whereas on 30 Septem-
ber 2006 this has risen to 9,045.21. The increase has several causes, such as the heigh-
tened repression of drug trafficking in general. However, the number of persons in
Aliens Custody multiplied by more than a factor of six in this period: on 30 September
1994, 425 persons were in Aliens Custody; on 30 September 2006, 2,555 (Statline
(http://statline.cbs.nl), online data by the Dutch Bureau for Statistics; visited June
2007).
Chapter 7
1. The strain mechanism provides an explanation for only a part of residence crimes,
such as making use of a people smuggler or using false IDs: in these cases the offen-
der adapts his or her behaviour in the face of strain. These forms of residence crime
can be contrasted with ‘nominal’ residence crimes such as staying in the country as an
undesirable alien. In the latter case rule violation is not an adaptation to strain, but
becomes merely defined as a rule violation.
2. My principle source of inspiration has been Griffith and Weyers’ approach (2005),
which goes back to a considerable extent to an article by Moore (1973). Furthermore, I
am indebted to Hannerz’s ideas (1992) about cultural complexity and globalisation.
According to Hannerz the outcomes of globalisation differ from place to place because
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global trends (which translate here as governmental migration regimes) are in constant
interplay with local conditions (read: social ties).
3. One of Sayad’s (2004) Algerian respondents, who had a temporary residence permit in
France, phrased it poetically: ‘naturalisation is a vaccine against deportation’.
4. It is not the case, by the way, that all illegal migrants aspire to an integrated position;
some come only with the expectation of a temporary stay (see Chapter 3). In addition,
illegal migrants without social ties can also become attached to residence in the Nether-
lands. In that case the tie is more of a psychological nature than sociological. Hirschi’s
(1969) social control theory relates to both types of ties.
5. (1) A tie with the established society seems to produces stronger status expectations as
well as to provide the conventional means to live up to these expectations. If this were
not the case, we would have no good explanation for the low crime rate among Turkish
and Chinese illegal migrants. (2) In some migrant groups crime is quite prevalent,
particularly among young men (see Van San and Leerkes 2001). However, among
adults a relatively small minority is involved in crime with any frequency. Annually,
approximately 2 per cent of the registered population is recorded as a crime suspect
(Chapter 6). Illegal migrants discovered committing crimes have an average age of 30
years (Engbersen et al. 2002). (3) Illegal residence status constitutes a major handicap
to criminal cooperation. In criminality as well, illegal migrants tend towards a margin-
al position. After all, even if there is no evidence that could lead to conviction, the first
police contact can lead to detention and expulsion because of illegal residence or to
status reclassification as an undesirable alien. In addition, illegal migrants cannot start
a company that can serve as a front for criminal activities such as wholesale drug trade
(Zaitch 2002).
6. A simple numerical example can clarify this. Assume that approximately 8 per cent of
the 150,000 illegal migrants commit crimes (the number of registered suspects is
probably an underestimation of the real number). On the one hand, the number of
delinquent illegal migrants would remain the same if a more lenient policy with res-
pect to illegal residence doubled the number of illegal migrants to 300,000, while the
crime rate halved to 4 per cent. On the other hand, the number of criminal illegal
migrants could increase in spite of the more lenient policy with respect to illegal resi-
dence, if the crime rate decreased by less than 50 per cent, for example, because the
conventional life chances for illegal migrants also decreased under the influence of
their increasing numbers.
7. While a number of illegal migrants who now come to the Netherlands ‘under direction’
(Staring 2001) would try to migrate on their own initiative, others would abandon mi-
gration. Furthermore, it is possible that some illegal migrants lose their ties – which
apparently were not very strong, in that case – while residing in the Netherlands, for
instance because a relationship with a partner ends. Nothing is known about the mag-
nitude of such effects.
8. For instance, Bovernkerk (1978: 147) reports that, according to the Amsterdam police,
first generation Moroccan migrants – most had temporary residence permits at the
time – were characterised by their docile behaviour when dealing with the police. Now,
30 years later, urban sociologists describe second-generation street youths of Moroccan
origin – most have Dutch citizenship or permanent resident permits – as very assertive
and provocative (De Jong 2007).
9. Repeated detentions may be a risk factor for crime involvement, because it promotes
differential association with other offenders and may lead to deviance amplification.
10. These observations are based in part on information from a key informant who works
at the foundation Landelijk Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt (‘National Support Point
for the Undocumented’).
11. According to VAS data, for the period 1997 to October 2003, one out of every five
apprehensions of an undesirable alien led to an expulsion. In cases of illegal aliens
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apprehended for illegal residence, about 42 per cent resulted in an effective expulsion.
In cases of serious offences it was 33 per cent and for minor offences, 39 per cent. For
drug offences the percentage was relatively high (47 per cent), probably because these
often involve apprehensions at Schiphol Airport, where there is less uncertainty about
the country of origin. The figures mentioned are indicative. In approximately one-third
of cases there is no information on possible expulsion. It may also be, incidentally, that
delinquent aliens obstruct expulsion more effectively by using aliases.
12. CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl), visited August 2007. The number of detainees
who were born in the Netherlands, including second generation migrants, also in-
creased in the period mentioned. As a consequence the percentage of foreign-born
detainees did not increase as sharply as the absolute numbers, but rose from 50 per
cent to 56 per cent.
13. For 2003 the percentage of expulsions from the Penitentiaries at Tilburg and Ter Apel
via Schiphol Airport was 33 per cent. A further 2 per cent of the detainees in that year
were transferred to foreign authorities in surrounding countries. In 2002 these figures
were 42 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, and in 1995 44 per cent and 2 per cent
(Van Kalmthout & Van Leeuwen 2004: 13, 24).
14. Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen (2004: 60). The authors base this on the checklist
used by the government to record information about the alien, filled in by the local
aliens police. Out of 329 respondents who were researched by Van Kalmthout and Van
Leeuwen, 95 respondents (29 per cent) had been previously presented, thirteen re-
spondents (4 per cent) had not and there were no data available for 221 respondents
(67 per cent).
15. The least productive workers remained dependent on the poorhouse much longer than
the more productive ones, who often found work elsewhere if economic conditions
improved. In addition, many of the poor seem to have availed themselves of the oppor-
tunities offered by the institution in strategic ways, for example, by using it as tempo-
rary relief centre in winter.
16. One reason why labour is not mandatory is that it is rather costly to organise working
facilities in detention centres. In the Aliens’ Detention in Tilburg there was a work
facility for illegal migrants. The unit closed down in 2007 when a number of alterna-
tive locations for Aliens’ Detention became available in the West of the Netherlands,
i.e. closer to the embassies in The Hague, including a remarkable number of detention
boats. The use of boats may also be meant to symbolise the government’s wish that the
migrants who are detained there leave the Netherlands.
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Summary
Research problem
Western countries like the Netherlands pursue restrictive immigration
policies in relation to people from non-Western countries. Policies
aimed at making illegal residence unattractive are increasingly part of
this. The Dutch ‘illegals policy’ is marked by an emphasis on institution
exclusion of illegal migrants. These migrants are systematically excluded
from social institutions such as the formal labour market, the housing
market, social security benefits, education (except for minors) and most
medical care.
In spite of, and indeed owing to, the restrictive immigration policy –
of which the illegals policy is only a part – illegal migrants represent a
substantial segment of the population, particularly in certain urban
neighbourhoods. It is estimated that 150,000 illegal migrants, or ap-
proximately 1 per cent of the total population, were living in the Nether-
lands in the period under study (1997-2005). In some urban neighbour-
hoods illegal migrants probably constituted 6 to 8 per cent of the
residents. Illegal residence is prevalent in other Western countries as
well.
The central question of this study is to what extent, and under which
conditions, the residence and migration of illegal migrants impact pub-
lic safety in the Netherlands, and to what extent aspects of immigration
policy contribute to that.
The study focuses on illegal residence but also pays attention to the
migration processes that precede it. It examines the extent to which the
possible involvement of illegal migrants in crimes can be explained by
the illegality of their residence and its potential consequences. Attention
is also paid to more subjective aspects of safety and liveability. With an
eye to that, the study examines the connection between illegal residence
and rule observance and transgression in neighbourhood life, including
the violation of unwritten social rules.
There are two main reasons for researching the relationship between
illegal residence and public safety. First, practices of institutional exclu-
sion may pressure the affected migrants into involvement in alternative
and illegal means of migration and subsistence. Second, the risk of ex-
pulsion that is inherent in illegal residence is likely to impede rule viola-
tion among illegal migrants, as such migrants often try to minimise
their chances of police contacts, as these may lead to expulsion.
As illegal residence is concentrated in a relatively limited number of
deprived urban neighbourhoods it might be expected that the answer to
the primary research question would differ according to the specific
place or neighbourhood. Moreover, many perpetrators of crimes are par-
ticularly active in the vicinity of where they live. Subjective aspects of
safety and liveability are also connected with the neighbourhood to a
considerable extent. In addition, research on the spatial spreading of ille-
gal residents could illuminate the social ties between illegal migrants
and more established groups in society (see below for some of the rea-
sons why such ties are important for understanding illegal residence in
relation to public safety). This implies a second question: To what extent,
and in what way, is illegal residence spatially concentrated within the
Netherlands, how can patterns of spatial concentration and incorpora-
tion be explained, and what are the consequences of the spatial concen-
tration of illegal residence for neighbourhood safety?
Previous research and the contribution of the study
This study builds on previous research into the social position of illegal
migrants, both in the Netherlands and in other Western countries. In the
Netherlands, in particular, a number of publications have focused on the
relationship between illegality and criminality. A new element in this
study is that a sizeable number of criminal illegal migrants were inter-
viewed. An additional innovative aspect is that systematic comparisons
were made with crime patterns among comparable migrant groups who
have legal residence. Furthermore, theoretical insights from existing re-
search on crime among legal migrants were also employed in greater
measure; more attention was paid to cultural aspects in offending, and
to the involvement of illegal migrants in criminal migration and cross-
border crime, where offending is a migration motive. Some attention is
also paid to the deliberate changing of immigration statuses by the state
if a migrant is convicted of certain crimes in the country of destination.
Legal migrants may be turned into illegal migrants for this reason, po-
tentially adding to the total number of criminal illegal migrants.
Nationally and internationally there have been several studies that pro-
vide indications of the crucial factors in spatial settlement patterns of
illegal migrants. These settlement patterns were researched systemati-
cally for the first time in this study. Finally, the effects of the concen-
trated presence of illegal migrants in certain residential areas for objec-
tive and subjective neighbourhood safety and liveability were examined
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for the first time. For this reason some attention is also paid to the rela-
tionship between illegal residence and patterns of transgression of (or
compliance with) unwritten social rules in public space.
Data sources
Various types of data were used, mostly collected during two contract
studies. One was financed by the Dutch Ministry of Housing. The other
was commissioned by the independent research programme Police and
Science, subsidised by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Amsterdam
School for Social Science Research made the writing of this PhD thesis
possible.
The quantitative data consisted of police data on all illegal migrants
who were apprehended in the Netherlands between January 1997 and
October 2003. Additionally, data files giving figures on social economic
neighbourhood characteristics and aspects of neighbourhood safety and
liveability. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) provided
data on all foreigners who were declared undesirable aliens or who lost
their residence permits between 1997 and 2003 because of criminal ac-
tivities.
The qualitative data were twofold. First, fieldwork was carried out be-
tween 2003 and early 2006 in two neighbourhoods where illegal resi-
dence is relatively common, one in Rotterdam and one in The Hague.
In total, twenty professionals, 70 illegal migrants, 45 landlords and 101
residents were interviewed. Second, in 2005, I interviewed 26 male ille-
gal migrants with an asylum history and a record of offences. The latter
interviews took place in the Aliens’ Detention of the Tilburg Prison.
Five sub-studies
The data were used in five sub-studies, reports of which are collected in
this book and constitute Chapters 2 through 6. The chapters build on
each other, but can nevertheless be read separately in combination with
the introductory chapter.
– In the first sub-study, the patterns of spatial concentration and incor-
poration of illegal migrants in the Netherlands were described and
explained by combining quantitative data with qualitative data from
the two selected neighbourhoods.
– In the second sub-study, the connections between illegal residence
and neighbourhood safety and liveability were analyzed. This was
also done by methodological triangulation: quantitative results were
compared with the findings of the fieldwork in Rotterdam and The
Hague.
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– Using police data, the involvement in crime among illegal migrants
aged twelve up to and including 24 from eleven countries of origin
was compared to the patterns of crime among legal migrants of com-
parable age and country of origin.
– The fourth sub-study examined the choices made by criminal illegal
migrants in interaction with the social conditions they were con-
fronted with, partly as a result of their illegal residence status. Also, a
typology of crime among illegal migrants is given.
– The number of crime suspects with illegal residence status rose sub-
stantially in the Netherlands from the middle of the 1990s. In the
fifth sub-study, six possible explanations for this rise are examined,
using various quantitative data.
The chapters mentioned are preceded by an introductory chapter and
rounded off by a concluding chapter that describes the main findings
and discusses a number of implications for policy. The introduction de-
scribes the study’s research problem in the light of previous research in
this field. Dutch immigration policy is also discussed, as well as a num-
ber of other characteristics of Dutch society that are required for a good
understanding of this study. It also goes into a number of ethical aspects
of this study. Finally, it explains the relevance of the study for other Wes-
tern countries.
Central findings
The study shows that some aspects of the patterns of rule violation and
observation among illegal migrants, which are relevant for public safety,
must be understood as a response to social conditions to which the
Dutch restrictive immigration policy contributes. This is true for possi-
ble involvement in crimes, as well as for misdemeanours and transgres-
sions of more informal social rules. Hence, this book’s central claim: to
understand rule violation by migrants today researchers should pay due
attention to the governmental regulation of international migration and
the ways in which these practices interact with semi-autonomous social
forces from other segments of society.
The first reason for paying attention to these state practices is that the
intensified regulation of international migration flows is, more or less by
definition, coupled with new forms of illegality. Examples in point are
entering or leaving a country without valid papers, not being able to
show a valid ID after settlement, or not reporting to the aliens police
after arrival. Second, there appear to be significant links between the in-
stitutional exclusion of illegal migrants and their involvement in more
regular forms of rule violations such as theft, violence and drug traffick-
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ing. Yet, the latter relationships are complex: it turns out that a restrictive
immigration policy does not have unambiguous consequences for pub-
lic safety. Some aspects of public safety can be harmed under the influ-
ence of this policy, while other aspects benefit in comparison to the ef-
fects of legal residence. The study shows that in order to understand this
complexity it is useful to make a distinction between various aspects of
migration control, particularly between external border control and two
main aspects of internal border control: institutional exclusion and sec-
ondary territorial exclusion.
On the one hand, the state’s endeavour towards social exclusion pro-
motes rule violation via the social mechanism of strain. People are more
inclined to opt for illegal pathways according to the degree to which con-
ventional means for fulfilling their aspirations are closed off. This holds
true for illegal migrants as well. For instance, there is often a question of
residence crime among such migrants. The aim of residence crime is to
reside in the Netherlands or another Western country despite restrictive
policies. Examples include travelling to or leaving the Netherlands with a
false document, or endeavouring to evade controls by using someone
else’s ID. Furthermore, illegal migrants sometimes become involved in
subsistence crime to satisfy social standards that are regarded as elemen-
tary by them and/or the social milieus they are, were, or want to be a part
of. This is the more likely if illegal migrants are excluded from formal
institutions in society that provide legal life chances such as the labour
market and social housing. The principal variants of subsistence crime are:
working with false documents, theft and dealing drugs in the streets.
Strain that occurs under the influence of illegal residence status may
also promote problematic drug use and incite forms of addiction-related
crime, particularly in case of homelessness.
On the other hand, a restrictive immigration policy strengthens social
control, since as long as the foreigner does not have legal residence sta-
tus, he or she runs a constant risk that the social position in the country
of settlement, even if this position is sometimes very marginal, will be
forfeited. In line with social control theory, this second tendency of the
state’s endeavour towards the social exclusion of particular categories of
migrants – secondary territorial exclusion – favours rule observance.
The latter tendency expresses itself in the observation that the docu-
mented crime rate among illegal migrants used to be substantially lower
than among comparable legal migrants, before the institutional exclu-
sion of illegal migrants took on its present shape. Further, it emerges
from the low involvement of illegal migrants in expressive or symbolic
crimes. In comparison to instrumental offences, in which the offence is
primarily a means to a particular end, such as identity fraud, expressive
crimes are more often an end in themselves, by which perpetrators ex-
press themselves, so to speak. Examples of crimes that are relatively rare
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among illegal migrants are violence against persons and goods. Besides
this, there are indications that criminal illegal migrants are relatively
likely to commit instrumental crimes that can be carried out surrepti-
tiously and do not require contact with the victim.
It turns out that illegal residence has comparable differential effects
on neighbourhood life; illegal migrants sometimes approach strangers
in the street in the hope of finding a partner, since this would help them
obtain a residence permit, while on the other hand the illegal residence
status usually pressures them to observe formal and informal neigh-
bourhood rules, such as the abatement of noise nuisance.
Western societies are increasingly characterised by ethnic, economic,
and cultural diversity. This study makes it plausible that there are – con-
centrated in some neighbourhoods – several groups in the Netherlands
who contest the legitimacy of the restrictive immigration policy, are ne-
gatively affected by it and/or have an interest in the weak social position
of illegal migrants: (1) established non-Western migrant communities,
(2) employers who depend on the secondary labour market and (3) sin-
gles with a foreign partner or an interest in such a partner. These three
social actors, with whom many illegal migrants have or obtain social ties,
lessen the success of the strict regulation of migration flows. Simulta-
neously, they influence the degree to which, and the way in which, illegal
residence affects public safety.
As a rule, social ties weaken the first effect of the state’s endeavour
towards social exclusion, while they strengthen the second, that of social
control, since it turns out that such ties often increase the degree of ac-
cess to regular means of migration, such as travelling with a tourist visa,
and subsistence, such as working in the informal economy, living with
family, or finding a marriage partner via social networks instead of on
the street. Therefore, they often decrease the degree of strain between
migrants’ aspirations and conventional opportunities. The risk of expul-
sion, on the other hand, appears to be of greater importance in the case
of strong social ties, since an illegal migrant risks loosing these ties and
the resources they give access to along with residence in the Nether-
lands.
Yet the social ties mentioned do not necessarily have a favourable ef-
fect on public safety. It turns out that illegal migrants and established
inhabitants sometimes cooperate in crime. In addition, social ties that
do not lend access to conventional means of subsistence sometimes in-
crease the pressure to violate rules. With the help of crimes illegal mi-
grants sometimes try to satisfy expectations connected to their parallel
statuses, such as the status of father, son, or fiancé.
Social ties also influence the form that possible rule violation takes.
Because of their embeddedness in established migrant communities,
criminal illegal migrants have an elevated chance of involvement in
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types of crime that are relatively common among established country-
men. Moreover, migrants appear to develop forms of crime that they do
not morally reject to any great extent, in comparison to other behavioural
options. The weighing of behavioural alternatives appears to some de-
gree to differ between and within groups of origin; illegal migrants
partly decide for themselves which social ties they will enter into and
which ties they would rather not develop.
Rule violation and/or rule observance among illegal migrants is not
always an adaption to external and internal border controls. At the same
time, this study shows that some crimes, such as sexual crimes or forms
of criminal migration, are barely connected to the restrictive immigra-
tion policy, if at all. Some types of criminal migration turn out to presup-
pose relatively open borders. Similarly, while illegal migrants observe
social rules because of the risk of expulsion, they have also internalised
these rules as a result of previous socialisation in conventional social
environments, and thus acknowledge their legitimacy.
The concluding chapter reflects on the theoretical outcomes of this
study as a whole, and discusses a number of implications for policy. It
ends by looking at the question of whether illegal migrants will or
should be given a right to elementary social relief.
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
Probleemstelling
Westerse landen zoals Nederland voeren een restrictief immigratiebeleid
voor mensen uit niet-westerse landen. Beleid om illegaal verblijf onaan-
trekkelijk te maken maakt daarvan in toenemende mate deel uit. Het
Nederlandse ‘illegalenbeleid’ kenmerkt zich door een nadruk op de insti-
tutionele uitsluiting van illegale migranten. Deze migranten worden sys-
tematisch uitgesloten van van maatschappelijke instituties zoals de for-
mele arbeidsmarkt, de woningmarkt, het uitkeringenstelsel en het
onderwijs (met uitzondering van minderjarigen) en de meeste medische
zorg.
Ondanks en dankzij het restrictieve immigratiebeleid – waarvan het
illegalenbeleid slechts een aspect is – vormen illegale migranten een
substantieel deel van de bevolking, vooral in bepaalde stadsbuurten. In
de onderzoeksperiode (1997-2005) woonden er naar schatting 150.000
illegale migranten in Nederland, of circa een procent van de totale bev-
olking. In sommige stadsbuurten liep dat percentage vermoedelijk op tot
zes á acht procent. Illegaal verblijf komt ook in andere westerse landen
op substantiële schaal voor.
De eerste hoofdvraag van deze studie is in hoeverre en onder welke
omstandigheden het verblijf en de migratie van illegale migranten gevol-
gen heeft voor de openbare veiligheid in Nederland en in hoeverre de
restrictieve immigratiepolitiek ten aanzien van deze groep daaraan bij-
draagt.
De studie richt zich voornamelijk op illegaal verblijf en in mindere
mate op het migratieproces dat er aan vooraf is gegaan. Er is in de eerste
plaats nagegaan in hoeverre de eventuele betrokkenheid van illegale mi-
granten bij misdrijven verklaard kan worden vanuit de onrechtmatig-
heid van het verblijf en de potentiële consequenties daarvan voor de mi-
grant. Daarnaast is er aandacht voor meer subjectieve aspecten van
veiligheid en leefbaarheid in de ontvangende samenleving. De studie
gaat in dat verband tevens in op de relatie tussen illegaliteit en overtre-
dingen in het buurtleven, waaronder overtredingen van ongeschreven
sociale regels.
Er waren twee hoofdredenen om de relatie tussen illegaal verblijf en
de openbare veiligheid te onderzoeken. Ten eerste kunnen praktijken
van institutionele uitsluiting de ‘getroffen’ migranten aansporen tot be-
trokkenheid bij alternatieve en illegale middelen van migratie en bes-
taan. Ten tweede is het aannemelijk dat het risico op uitzetting dat inher-
ent is aan illegaal verblijf juist een belemmering vormt voor
regelovertreding. Dergelijke migranten zullen de kans op politiecontac-
ten en uitzetting wellicht willen minimaliseren.
Aangezien illegaal verblijf geconcentreerd is in een relatief beperkt
aantal stedelijke achterstandswijken kon verwacht worden dat het an-
twoord op de hoofdvraag zou verschillen per woonplaats en daarbinnen
per buurt. Veel plegers van criminaliteit zijn namelijk vooral actief in de
nabijheid van de eigen woning. Ook subjectieve aspecten van veiligheid
en leefbaarheid zijn vaak buurtgebonden. Daarbij geeft onderzoek naar
de ruimtelijke spreiding van illegaal verblijf zicht op de sociale bindin-
gen tussen illegale migranten en meer gevestigde groepen in de samen-
leving (zie hierna over het belang daarvan voor een goed begrip van ille-
gaal verblijf in relatie tot openbare veiligheid). Dit impliceerde een
tweede hoofdvraag: In hoeverre en hoe is illegaal verblijf ruimtelijk ge-
concentreerd in Nederland, hoe kunnen de patronen van ruimtelijke
concentratie en incorporatie worden verklaard en wat zijn gevolgen van
de ruimtelijke concentratie van illegaal verblijf voor buurtveiligheid?
Eerder onderzoek en bijdrage van deze studie
In de studie is voortgebouwd op eerder onderzoek in binnen- en buiten-
land naar de maatschappelijke positie van illegale migranten. Zo waren
er vooral in Nederland enkele publicaties verschenen over illegaliteit en
criminaliteit. Nieuw is dat voor het eerst uitgebreid is gesproken met een
groep delinquente illegale migranten. Daarnaast zijn voor het eerst sys-
tematische vergelijkingen gemaakt met de criminaliteitspatronen bij ver-
gelijkbare migrantengroepen met rechtmatig verblijf. Ook is er in ster-
kere mate gebruik gemaakt van theoretische inzichten uit het onderzoek
naar criminaliteit bij reguliere migranten. Zo is er meer aandacht voor
culturele aspecten van criminaliteit en voor betrokkenheid van illegale
migranten bij criminele migratie, waarbij het plegen van misdrijven
over de grens een migratiemotief is. Daarnaast is er enige aandacht voor
het bewust wijzigen van verblijfstitels door de staat ingeval een migrant
is veroordeeld voor bepaalde misdrijven in het ontvangende land. Legale
migranten kunnen om die redenen worden geherclassificeerd als ille-
gale migranten, wat potentieel kan leiden tot een toename van het aantal
criminele illegale migranten.
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Er waren nationaal en internationaal diverse studies met aanwijzin-
gen over de ruimtelijke concentratie van illegale migranten en de deter-
minanten daarvan. Daarnaar is in deze studie echter voor het eerst sys-
tematisch onderzoek gedaan. Ten slotte is voor het eerst onderzocht wat
de effecten zijn van de geconcentreerde aanwezigheid van illegale mi-
granten voor de lokale buurtveiligheid en -leefbaarheid.
Gegevensbronnen
Voor de studie is gebruik gemaakt van diverse gegevens, die merendeels
verzameld werden bij twee opdrachtonderzoeken. Een onderzoek werd
gefinancierd door het Ministerie van VROM. Het andere onderzoek was
voor het onafhankelijke onderzoeksprogramma Politie en Wetenschap,
dat gesubsidieerd wordt door het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken.
De Amsterdamse School voor Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
maakte het schrijven van dit proefschrift mogelijk.
De kwantitatieve gegevens betreffen politiegegevens over alle illegale
migranten die in Nederland zijn aangehouden tussen januari 1997 en
oktober 2003. Voorts zijn databestanden verzameld met gegevens over
sociaaleconomische buurtkenmerken en aspecten van (buurt)veiligheid
en leefbaarheid. De Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst (IND) stelde gege-
vens beschikbaar over alle vreemdelingen die vanaf 1997 tot en met
2003 ongewenst zijn verklaard of een verblijfsvergunning hebben verlo-
ren vanwege criminele activiteiten.
De kwalitatieve bronnen zijn tweeërlei. Ten eerste heeft er tussen
2003 en begin 2006 veldwerk plaatsgevonden in een Rotterdamse en
Haagse buurt waar illegaal verblijf vrij veel voorkomt. Er werden in totaal
20 professionals, 70 illegale migranten, 45 huisbazen en 101 buurtbew-
oners geïnterviewd. Ten tweede heb ik in 2005 uitgebreid gesproken
met 26 (mannelijke) illegale migranten met een asielachtergrond en
een strafblad. De laatstgenoemde interviews hebben plaatsgevonden in
de Vreemdelingenbewaring van de PI Tilburg.
Vijf deelstudies
Met de gegevens zijn vijf deelstudies verricht. De onderzoeksverslagen
zijn in dit boek gebundeld en vormen de hoofdstukken twee tot en met
zes. De hoofdstukken bouwen op elkaar voort, maar zijn zelfstandig
leesbaar in combinatie met het inleidende hoofdstuk.
– In de eerste deelstudie zijn de patronen van ruimtelijke concentratie
en incorporatie van illegale migranten in Nederland beschreven en
verklaard door kwantitatieve gegevens te combineren met kwalita-
tieve gegevens uit de twee onderzoeksbuurten.
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– In de tweede deelstudie zijn de relaties tussen illegaal verblijf en
buurtveiligheid en -leefbaarheid geanalyseerd. Dit is eveneens ge-
beurd door methodologische triangulatie waarin kwantitatieve gege-
vensbronnen werden vergeleken met de bevindingen uit het veld-
werk in Rotterdam en Den Haag.
– In de derde deelstudie is op basis van politiegegevens de aard en om-
vang van de criminaliteit onder illegale migranten vergeleken met de
patronen van criminaliteit onder vergelijkbare migranten met re-
chtmatig verblijf. Het betreft migranten uit elf herkomstlanden in de
leeftijd van twaalf tot en met 24 jaar
– In de vierde deelstudie is op basis van de interviews in de Vreemde-
lingenbewaring onderzocht welke keuzes delinquente illegale man-
nen maakten in de maatschappelijke omstandigheden waarmee ze
(mede) door de illegale verblijfsstatus werden geconfronteerd. Voorts
wordt een aanzet gegeven voor een typologie van misdaad bij illegale
migranten.
– In de vijfde deelstudie zijn op basis van diverse kwantitatieve gege-
vensbronnen zes mogelijke verklaringen getoetst voor de sterke toe-
name van het aantal criminaliteitsverdachten met een illegale ver-
blijfsstatus sinds het midden van de jaren negentig.
Deze vijf hoofdstukken worden voorafgegaan door een inleidend hoofd-
stuk en afgesloten met een hoofdstuk dat de centrale bevindingen bes-
chrijft en daarnaast ingaat op een aantal beleidsimplicaties van deze stu-
die. Het inleidende hoofdstuk geeft een nadere omschrijving van de
probleemstelling van de studie in het licht van het eerdere onderzoek op
dit terrein. Daarnaast wordt het Nederlandse immigratiebeleid bespro-
ken, evenals enkele overige kenmerken van de Nederlandse samenlev-
ing die voor een goed begrip van deze studie vereist zijn. Voorts wordt
ingegaan op enkele ethische aspecten van deze studie. Tot slot wordt in-
gegaan op de relevantie van deze studie voor andere Westerse landen.
Belangrijkste bevindingen
De studie laat zien dat de patronen van regelovertreding en -naleving
onder illegale migranten, voor zover die relevant zijn voor de openbare
veiligheid, voor een substantieel deel begrepen moeten worden als een
reactie op omstandigheden waarin de Nederlandse restrictieve immigra-
tiepolitiek een aandeel heeft. Dit geldt voor de eventuele betrokkenheid
bij misdrijven en overtredingen evenals voor de patronen van naleving
en overtreding van meer informele sociale regels. De studie laat daar-
mee zien dat het voor een goed begrip van regelovertreding bij migran-
ten nodig is om oog te hebben voor de wijze waarop overheden in bes-
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temmingslanden internationale migratiestromen reguleren, en de wijze
waarop die praktijken in wisselwerking staan met sociale krachten va-
nuit andere, relatief autonome maatschappelijke segmenten.
De eerste reden om aandacht te hebben voor deze overheidspraktijken
is dat de regulering van internationale migratie nieuwe vormen van ille-
galiteit met zich meebrengt. Voorbeelden daarvan zijn het inreizen or
verlaten van een land zonder geldige papieren, het zich niet kunnen
identificeren, of het niet melden bij de Vreemdelingenpolitie na vesti-
ging. Ten tweede blijken er relaties te bestaan tussen deze praktijken en
meer commune vormen van regelovertreding zoals diefstal, geweld en
drugshandel. De laatstgenoemde relaties zijn echter complex. Het re-
strictieve immigratiebeleid blijkt geen eenduidige gevolgen te hebben
voor de openbare veiligheid. Sommige aspecten ervan kunnen onder in-
vloed van deze politiek onder druk komen te staan, terwijl andere aspec-
ten er juist door worden begunstigd in vergelijking met rechtmatig ver-
blijf. Deze studie leert dat het zinvol is om een onderscheid te maken
tussen afzonderlijke aspecten van migratiecontrole, in het bijzonder tus-
sen externe grenscontrole en twee hoofdtypen van interne grenscon-
trole: ‘institutionele uitsluiting’ en ‘secondaire territoriale uitsluiting’
noem.
Enerzijds stimuleert het statelijke streven naar sociale uitsluiting rege-
lovertreding via het zogenoemde strainmechanisme. Mensen zijn ster-
ker geneigd om illegale paden te betreden naarmate de reguliere wegen
tot de doelen die zij voor ogen hebben, zijn afgesloten. Dit geldt even-
eens voor illegale migranten. Zo is er onder hen vaak sprake van verblijf-
scriminaliteit. Dit zijn misdrijven die erop zijn gericht om in een re-
chtsgebied te verblijven ondanks het restrictieve beleid. Voorbeelden
daarvan zijn Nederland in- of uitreizen met een vervalst reisdocument
of het zich legitimeren met een document van een ander. Daarnaast pro-
beren illegale migranten soms met bestaanscriminaliteit te voldoen aan
sociale standaarden die door henzelf en/of de milieus waaraan ze deel
(willen) hebben of hadden als elementair worden beschouwd. De kans
daarop neemt toe naarmate illegale migranten zijn uitgesloten van for-
mele instituties in de samenleving die legale levenskansen verschaffen
zoals de arbeidsmarkt en het systeem van sociale huisvesting. De voor-
naamste varianten van bestaanscriminaliteit zijn werken met valse pa-
pieren, diefstal en straathandel in drugs. Voorts komt het voor dat strain
onder invloed van een illegale verblijfsstatus problematisch druggebruik
stimuleert en zodoende verslavingsgerelateerde criminaliteit in de hand
werkt.
Anderzijds versterkt de restrictieve immigratiepolitiek externe sociale
controle. Zolang de vreemdeling geen verblijfsrecht heeft, bestaat im-
mers het risico dat de verworven maatschappelijke positie in het vesti-
gingsland, ook al is die soms zeer marginaal, moet worden prijsgegeven.
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Zoals op grond van de sociale controle theorie te verwachten is, stimu-
leert die tweede tendentie van het statelijke streven naar sociale uitsluit-
ing (‘secondaire territoriale uitsluiting’) doorgaans regelnaleving.
Die tendentie komt ten eerste tot uitdrukking in de waarneming dat
de geregistreerde criminaliteit bij illegale migranten aanvankelijk lager
was dan onder vergelijkbare legale migranten, toen de institutionele uit-
sluiting van illegale migranten nog minder vorm had gekregen. Daar-
naast toont deze tendentie zich in de relatief lage betrokkenheid van ille-
gale migranten bij zogeheten expressieve misdrijven, waarin de dader
zichzelf als het ware uit. Dit in tegenstelling tot meer instrumentele mis-
drijven waarin het delict in sterkere mate een middel is tot een doel dat
buiten het misdrijf zelf is gelegen. Voorbeelden van misdrijftypen die
onder illegale migranten beperkt voorkomen zijn geweld tegen personen
en goederen. Daarnaast zijn er aanwijzingen dat criminele illegale mi-
granten een relatief grote kans hebben om betrokken zijn bij misdrijfty-
pen die heimelijk uitgevoerd kunnen worden en geen contact met het
slachtoffer vereisen.
Het restrictieve immigratiebeleid blijkt soortgelijke differentiële effec-
ten te sorteren in het buurleven. Enerzijds spreken illegale migranten op
straat soms ongevraagd onbekenden aan om een partner te vinden voor
een verblijfsvergunning. Anderzijds dringt de illegale verblijfsstatus
meestal tot een sterke mate van naleving van formele en informele buur-
tregels, bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van geluidsoverlast.
Westerse samenlevingen kenmerken zich in toenemende mate door
etnische, economische en culturele diversiteit. De studie maakt aanne-
melijk dat er in Nederland diverse groepen zijn die de legitimiteit van
het restrictieve immigratiebeleid betwisten, door deze politiek in hun
belangen worden getroffen en/of baat hebben bij een zwakke
maatschappelijke positie van illegale migranten. Het betreft: (1) geves-
tigde niet-westerse migrantengemeenschappen, (2) werkgevers, vooral
als zij aangewezen zijn op de secondaire arbeidsmarkt en (3) singles
met een buitenlandse partner of belangstelling daarvoor. Deze drie so-
ciale actoren, waarmee veel illegale migranten in meer of mindere mate
sociale bindingen hebben of verwerven, verminderen de mate waarin de
overheidsregulering van migratiestromen succesvol is. Tegelijkertijd be-
palen ze mede in hoeverre en hoe die politiek gevolgen heeft voor de
openbare veiligheid.
Als regel verzwakken de genoemde sociale bindingen de potentiële
criminogene effecten van het statelijke streven naar sociale uitsluiting,
terwijl ze de tendentie tot regelnaleving die ervan uitgaat, juist verster-
ken. Dergelijke bindingen geven vaak indirect toegang tot reguliere mid-
delen van migratie (zoals reizen met een toeristenvisum) en bestaan
(zoals werken in de informele economie, inwonen bij familie, het via via
vinden van een huwelijkspartner in plaats van op straat). Zo verminde-
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ren ze doorgaans de strain tussen legale gedragsmogelijkheden en ge-
dragsdoelen. Het risico van uitzetting lijkt door deze bindingen juist van
grotere betekenis te zijn, aangezien een illegale vreemdeling riskeert om
naast het verblijf ook deze sociale bindingen te verliezen.
Sociale bindingen met gevestigden blijken niet per definitie een gun-
stig effect te hebben voor de openbare veiligheid. Soms is er tussen ille-
gale migranten en gevestigde inwoners sprake van criminele samen-
werking. Bovendien blijken sociale bindingen de druk tot
regelovertreding te kunnen vergroten, althans indien ze geen toegang
geven tot conventionele bestaansmiddelen. Het komt voor dat illegale
migranten met misdrijven proberen te voldoen aan de verwachtingen
die verbonden zijn met hun ‘nevenstatussen’, zoals de status van vader,
zoon of verloofde.
De genoemde sociale bindingen beïnvloeden tevens de vorm die even-
tuele regelovertreding aanneemt. Door hun inbedding in gevestigde mi-
granten-gemeenschappen hebben delinquente illegale migranten bij-
voorbeeld een verhoogde kans op betrokkenheid bij een misdrijfsoort
die relatief gangbaar is onder gevestigde landgenoten. Daarbij komt dat
migranten in reactie op strain juist die vormen van delinquent gedrag
lijken te ontwikkelen die zij moreel beperkt afwijzen in vergelijking met
overige waargenomen gedragsalternatieven. De weging van gedragsalter-
natieven lijkt tussen en binnen herkomstgroepen deels te verschillen. Zo
bepalen illegale migranten zelf mede welke sociale bindingen zij aan-
gaan, en welke liever niet.
Regelovertreding en -naleving onder illegale migranten is niet altijd
een aanpassing aan externe en interne grenscontrole. De studie laat te-
gelijkertijd zien dat bepaalde misdrijven, zoals seksuele misdrijven of
vormen van criminele migratie, waarin een dader migreert om misdrij-
ven te plegen, niet of nauwelijks verband houden met het restrictieve
immigratiebeleid. Bepaalde vormen van criminele migratie blijken juist
relatief open grenzen te veronderstellen. Evenzo houden illegale migran-
ten zich niet primair vanwege het risico op uitzetting aan sociale regels
die openbare veiligheid helpen waarborgen. Ze hebben deze regels door
eerdere socialisatie in conventionele kringen veelal verinnerlijkt en on-
derschrijven vaak de legitimiteit ervan.
Het afsluitende hoofdstuk beschrijft de voornaamste theoretische con-
clusies van de studie als geheel en gaat daarnaast in op een aantal belan-
grijke beleidsimplicaties ervan. Het boek wordt afgesloten met een dis-
cussie over de vraag in hoeverre illegale migranten een recht op
elementaire opvang zullen of zouden moeten krijgen.
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